United States v. Su Mun

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-10031

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Su Y. Amos Mun, also known as Amos Su Young Mun,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:19-CR-86-3

Before Owen, Chief Judge, and King and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Su Y. Amos Mun pleaded guilty to maintaining a drug-involved
premises. At sentencing, the district court ordered Mun to pay restitution in
the form of funeral and cremation expenses to the victims’ families. We
AFFIRM.

*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 17, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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No. 20-10031
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I.
Defendant-appellant, Su Y. Amos Mun, was the owner and manager
of the HanGil Hotel Town (the “Hotel”), which was, at times, referred to as
“an addict’s paradise” and a “hotel of horrors.” There, in exchange for
paying Mun an inflated room rate, drug dealers could sell drugs openly and
without concerns about law enforcement. The Hotel was also the scene of
violence and torture as well as at least two deaths. Specifically, an individual,
J.B., died in the Hotel of a heroin overdose, and another individual, L.R., died
in the Hotel of either a heroin overdose or a violent encounter with one of the
dealers. And although the Hotel was deemed too dangerous to send in an
undercover officer, law enforcement eventually caught up with Mun.
Mun was indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a
controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A),
and (b)(1)(C) and maintaining a drug-involved premises in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mun pleaded guilty to
maintaining a drug-involved premises. At sentencing, in addition to imposing
a 240-month term of imprisonment, the district court ordered Mun to pay
restitution in the amount of $11,400 to the families of J.B. and L.R.
Mun timely filed a notice of appeal, challenging the restitution order.
II.
As a general matter, where a defendant fails to object below to alleged
sentencing errors, we review for plain error. United Sates v. Del Barrio, 427
F.3d 280, 282 (5th Cir. 2005). But regardless of whether the defendant
objected below, we review de novo a sentence that is allegedly illegal. Id.
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No. 20-10031
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In this case, Mun challenges both the legality of the restitution order
and certain factual findings underlying the restitution order.
1
We address
each argument in turn.
Mun contends that the restitution order is illegal because the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (the “MVRA”) precludes the award of
funeral and cremation expenses for property offenses, including maintaining
a drug-involved premises. But the plain language of the MVRA renders
Mun’s argument meritless.
The MVRA describes the available restitution based on the type of
damage or loss suffered by the victim rather than the type of offense. Compare
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1) (limiting restitution “in the case of an offense
resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property”) with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663A(b)(3) (stating that “in the case of an offense resulting in bodily
injury that results in the death of the victim,” the MVRA authorizes
restitution in “an amount equal to the cost of necessary funeral and related
services”). And make no mistake—the MVRA clearly contemplates that
property offenses, such as Mun’s offense of maintaining a drug-involved
premises, might involve victims that have suffered “a physical injury or
pecuniary loss.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(B).

1
Although the parties dispute whether Mun waived his right to challenge certain
factual findings in light of the plea agreement’s appeal waiver, we need not resolve this
issue because Mun’s appeal fails on the merits. United States v. Marunda, 731 F. App’x 281,
285 (5th Cir. 2018) (explaining that because “[a]n appeal waiver does not deprive us of
jurisdiction,” we can affirm on the merits without resolving the waiver issue) (citing United
States v. Story, 439 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Shifflett, 773 F.
App’x 214, 215 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Because [the defendant’s] argument fails on the merits,
we assume without deciding that [her] appeal waiver does not bar her argument that the
restitution order included costs she did not proximately cause.”).

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In this case, it is readily apparent that the victims suffered bodily
injury resulting in their deaths.
2
Undoubtedly, the MVRA authorizes
restitution in “an amount equal to the cost of necessary funeral and related
services” where “an offense resulting in bodily injury . . . results in the death
of [a] victim.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(3). And there is equally no doubt that
maintaining a drug-involved premises could so result in the death of a victim.
Therefore, despite Mun’s argument to the contrary, a conviction for
maintaining a drug-involved premises does not necessarily foreclose an
award of funeral and cremation expenses.
Mun next argues that the factual findings do not establish that his
offense of conviction “directly and proximately caused” the victims’ deaths.
In so arguing, Mun emphasizes that it was the “wrongdoing of others” that
caused J.B. and L.R.’s deaths and thus their family members’ losses. Mun’s
argument is misguided.
In analyzing this issue, we look to whether Mun’s offense of
conviction was a but-for and proximate cause of J.B. and L.R.’s deaths. See
United States v. Sharma, 703 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir. 2012).
First, but-for causation is “not a difficult burden to meet,” and there
can be “many but-for causes.” United States v. Salinas, 918 F.3d 463, 466
(5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). As we have explained, but-for causation
simply means that “the harm would not have occurred in the absence of . . .
[Mun’s] conduct.” Id. In this case, the record evidence establishes exactly
that. But-for Mun’s operation and maintenance of the Hotel, J.B. and L.R.
would not have died when they did.

2
To that end, Mun’s reliance on cases such as United States v. Onyiego, where the
harm to the victims was solely in the form of property loss or damage, is misplaced. 286 F.3d
249, 251–52, 56 (5th Cir. 2002).
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At bottom, through his actions, Mun maintained an unsafe
environment replete with drug deals, overdoses, and instances of violence
and torture. Mun walked the halls of the Hotel every day to collect the so-
called drug “tax” from dealers. And Mun’s conduct did not end there. He
monitored the Hotel’s security footage not only to keep track of the dealers
but also to delete footage that portrayed illegal conduct. Additionally, Mun
provided Hotel residents with advance notice when he knew that a
compliance or law enforcement check was imminent so that the dealers could
take precautions. Mun also paid a “cleanup crew” to remove dead bodies
from the Hotel. In other words, Mun’s actions maintained “an addict’s
paradise,” where J.B. overdosed as onlookers refrained from calling 911
because the police could not come to the Hotel. And though L.R. might have
died of a heroin overdose or a violent encounter with one of the dealers,
Mun’s maintenance of the Hotel similarly remains a but-for cause of her
death. Plainly, but for Mun’s maintenance of the Hotel, L.R. would not have
died on the day that she did.
Next, a person is “proximately harmed” when the harm is “a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the criminal conduct.” United States
v. Mathew, 916 F.3d 510, 519 (5th Cir. 2019). Here, in the “addict’s
paradise,” which Mun maintained and where dealers were incentivized not
to call 911, the risk of a fatal overdose such as J.B.’s was reasonably
foreseeable. Similarly, whether L.R.’s death was the result of a heroin
overdose or a violent encounter with one of the dealers, either scenario was
reasonably foreseeable. Just as a fatal drug overdose was reasonably
foreseeable in “an addict’s paradise,” so too was a death at the hands of a
dealer in an environment that the record reveals was rife with violent
incidents such as bloody beatings, shootings, and torture with a butane torch.
As the district court observed, Mun maintained “a hotel of horrors”
that was the scene of numerous drug deals, repeated overdoses, several
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No. 20-10031
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deaths, and various instances of torture. Against this backdrop, and pursuant
to the MVRA, the district court properly ordered restitution based on losses
directly and proximately caused by Mun’s offense of conviction.
3

III.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

3
The MVRA clearly authorized the restitution ordered in this case, that is, Mun’s
offense of conviction caused the victims’ losses. To be sure, Mun agreed that the maximum
penalties that the district court could impose included restitution, “which is mandatory
under the law,” i.e., pursuant to the MVRA. Therefore, we have no occasion to reach
Mun’s alternative argument that the restitution was not attributable to Mun’s relevant
conduct and thus outside the plea agreement.
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