Lansdell v. Miller, et al

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-60143
Summary Calendar

John David Lansdell,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Lee Miller, In His Individual Capacity; Lee County,
Mississippi,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 1:18-CV-65

Before King, Smith, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
John Lansdell appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims against Lee County, Mississippi, and Lee Miller, an officer in
the Tupelo City Police Department.

*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 19, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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First, Lansdell argues that Miller committed excessive force against
him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Lansdell says that, even though
he told Miller that he had a preexisting shoulder injury and asked to be
handcuffed in front of his body, Miller refused and instead used two sets of
handcuffs behind Lansdell’s back. On this claim, the district court
determined that Miller was entitled to qualified immunity. To defeat a claim
for qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that the right he claims was
violated “was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.” Tolan v.
Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted). “The
precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret
it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (per curiam).
We have held that “handcuffing too tightly, without more, does not
amount to excessive force.” Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir.
2001). Lansdell cites no controlling precedent that would put every
reasonable officer on notice as to how to arrest someone with a preexisting
injury. Lansdell points to out-of-circuit precedent, but we can only rely on
out-of-circuit cases as part of the clearly-established inquiry when they
demonstrate “a robust consensus of persuasive authority.” Morgan v.
Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371–72 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quotation marks
omitted). As the First Circuit has observed, the circuit courts “have reached
different holdings on the constitutionality of handcuffing an allegedly injured
arrestee behind his or her back.” Hunt v. Massi, 773 F.3d 361, 369 (1st Cir.
2014). There is therefore no robust consensus on the issue. Accordingly, at
the time of Lansdell’s arrest, it was not clearly established that Miller could
not use two sets of cuffs to handcuff Lansdell behind his back.
Second, Lansdell argues that Miller denied him adequate medical care
for his shoulder injury in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. To
establish that kind of violation, a plaintiff must show that the officer “act[ed]
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with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious medical harm and
resulting injuries.” Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2003).
Deliberate indifference has a subjective component, requiring “that the
official have subjective knowledge of the risk of harm. Mere negligence or a
failure to act reasonably is not enough. The officer must have a subjective
intent to cause harm.” Id. at 625–26 (citations omitted). It is undisputed that,
shortly after arriving at the county jail, Miller offered Lansdell the
opportunity to go to the hospital immediately. Lansdell refused. The district
court correctly noted that the offer shows that Miller did not intend to cause
Lansdell harm. Lansdell has therefore failed to satisfy the “extremely high
standard” required for a finding of deliberate indifference. Cadena, 946 F.3d
717, 728 (5th Cir. 2020); cf. Hall v. Robinson, 618 F. App’x 759, 764 (5th Cir.
2015) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff’s failure to take advantage of
available procedure that would have remedied the complained-of harm
undermined deliberate-indifference claim).
Finally, Lansdell argues that Lee County is also liable for providing
inadequate medical care. To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show “(1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a
violation of a constitutional right whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or
custom.” Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 389 (5th Cir. 2018) (en
banc) (citations omitted). Lansdell claims that three instances of inmate
deaths between 2006 and 2015 in Lee County tend to show the existence of
a policy. He provides no details as to how these three incidents are linked, or
how they demonstrate a policy of misconduct. Without more, three
“[i]solated violations” over the space of nine years “are not the persistent,
often repeated constitutional violations that constitute custom and policy.”
Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 n.3 (5th Cir. 1984); see Peterson v.
City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 851 (holding that evidence of 27 complaints
of excessive force over a three year period did not suffice to survive summary
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No. 20-60143
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judgment because “plaintiffs ha[d] failed to provide context that would show
a pattern . . . establishing a municipal policy”).
In the alternative, Lansdell says that his own experience at the Lee
County jail suffices to show the existence of a municipal policy to deny
medical treatment. Typically, however, we cannot infer the existence of a
policy merely from the conduct of several officers during one incident. See,
e.g., Mason v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268, 281 (5th Cir.
2015) (holding that the actions of three officers were insufficient to
demonstrate the existence of a policy); Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 629
(5th Cir. 2015) (refusing to infer a municipal policy of retaliation from a single
“retaliatory campaign against” plaintiffs, “all arising from the same
predicate events”).
Lansdell relies on our holding in Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d
161 (5th Cir. 1985), that the police department’s conduct over the course of
one night sufficed to show an unconstitutional policy. Id. at 171–72. But the
holding in Grandstaff arose from the extraordinary facts of that case, where
an entire police department opened fire indiscriminately on a slow-moving
pickup truck. Barkley v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 277 F. App’x 406, 413 (5th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam). We have therefore “limited” Grandstaff’s
application “to ‘extreme factual situations.’” Barkley, 277 F. App’x at 413
(quoting Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 1998)). Lansdell has
not offered sufficient evidence that his interactions with county employees—
one of whom offered to let him go to the hospital and another who treated
him—present such an extreme factual situation. Cf. Westfall v. Luna, 903
F.3d 534, 548, 551–52 (5th Cir. 2018) (refusing to infer a policy where an
officer “body-slammed [plaintiff] to the ground” even though she was not
resisting and distinguishing Grandstaff as “far more egregious”). Landsell’s
evidence therefore was insufficient to show a triable issue of fact as to the
existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy.
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Affirmed.
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