Ying Zheng v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 20a0203n.06
Case No. 19-3782
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
YING ZHENG,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
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ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
FROM THE UNITED STATES
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
APPEALS
O P I N I O N
BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; CLAY and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges
COLE, Chief Judge. This is another of many cases our court has recently considered in
which a noncitizen of the United States seeks, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira
v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), to vacate an order of the Board of Immigration of Appeals
denying her relief from removal. See, e.g., Calzadilla-Sanchez v. Barr, No. 18-3432, 2020 WL
730620, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 2020); Garcia-Romo v. Barr, 940 F.3d 192, 196–97 (6th Cir.
2019); Gomez-Chavez v. Barr, 791 F. App’x 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2019).
Petitioner Ying Zheng’s argument is as follows: Under our immigration statutes, a
nonpermanent resident must have “been physically present in the United States for a continuous
period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding” an application for cancellation of removal.
8 U.S.C. § 1229b (b)(1)(A). That period, per a statutory provision referred to as the “stop-time
rule,” concludes when the resident “is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a).” 8 U.S.C.

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Case No. 19-3782, Zheng v. Barr
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§ 1229b (d)(1). Under Pereira, “[a] putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific
time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section
1229(a),’ and so does not trigger the stop-time rule.” Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113–14. Zheng’s
notice to appear did not specify the time or place of her removal proceedings; instead, that
information was conveyed in a subsequent notice of hearing. So, the argument goes, the notice to
appear was defective under the statute such that the stop-time rule was never triggered.
As the government correctly notes, and Zheng herself concedes, a published opinion of this
court that was issued while her petition was pending, Garcia-Romo v. Barr, disposes of her
argument. In Garcia-Romo, we held that the stop-time rule is triggered when the government
sends a noncitizen “all the required categories of information under § 1229(a)(1)(A)-(G) through
one or multiple written communications.” 940 F.3d at 201. Thus, upon receiving her notice of
hearing, Zheng received all of the information required by statute, and the stop-time rule was
triggered. Because we are bound to follow Garcia-Romo, we cannot afford Zheng the relief she
seeks.
For these reasons, we deny Zheng’s petition for review.

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