Renee Marie Johnson v. HON. MATTHEW ANTKOVIAK, Chief Circuit Court Judge

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0096p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
RENEE MARIE JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HON. MATTHEW ANTKOVIAK, Chief Circuit Court
Judge, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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No. 25-1527
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 1:25-cv-00393—Paul Lewis Maloney, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: March 30, 2026
Before: BATCHELDER, STRANCH, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________
LITIGANT
ON BRIEF: Renee Johnson, Wayland, Michigan, pro se.
_________________
ORDER
_________________
PER CURIAM. Renee Marie Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
order dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil-rights complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. She also moves to supplement the record and for us to take judicial notice of certain
facts. This case has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously
agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). For the following reasons,
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we vacate the district court’s judgment, remand for further proceedings, and deny as moot the
motion to supplement and take judicial notice.
This case arises from a Michigan state-court custody order that removed Johnson’s
daughter from her custody and restricted her to supervised visitation. In her § 1983 action,
Johnson sued state Judge Matthew Antkoviak; her child’s late father, Dwight VanDrunen; her
sister-in-law, Heather Sartor; her brother, Matthew Johnson; the Allegan County Department of
Health and Human Services (DHS); and two DHS employees, Mike Bracey and Sheila Ellis.
Johnson asserted four claims: (1) defendants violated her due process rights by wrongfully
denying her custody of her child, (2) Sartor maliciously prosecuted her by filing a false police
report to “interfere[e] with [her] parental rights,” (3) Sartor abused the legal process by filing for
a protective order based on false allegations, and (4) Sartor, VanDrunen, and Matthew Johnson
conspired to deprive her of her parental rights. Only Johnson’s first claim arises under federal
law; claims two through four are premised on Michigan laws. See Mich. Comp. Laws
§§ 600.2907 (malicious prosecution), 750.157a (civil conspiracy), 750.369 (abuse of legal
process). Johnson sought restoration of full custody of her child; a declaration that defendants
violated her constitutional rights, that the state proceedings violated due process, and that Sartor
violated her parental rights; an order for an investigation into witness perjury; and monetary
damages.
The district court granted Johnson leave to proceed in forma pauperis and, upon
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under the domestic-relations exception. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,
703 (1992). In this appeal, Johnson argues that the domestic-relations exception did not bar the
district court from exercising jurisdiction and that the district court erroneously dismissed her
complaint without notice.
“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.” Chevalier v. Est. of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2015). Federal courts
have limited jurisdiction, and district courts may hear only those claims that fall within their
“statutory grant of jurisdiction.” Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435, 437 (2019)
(quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982)).

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District courts have jurisdiction over claims presenting a federal question—that is, claims that
arise under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And although a district court has a general duty to
hear cases over which it has jurisdiction, it may not exercise that jurisdiction in certain
“extraordinary and narrow exception[s].” Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S.
185, 188 (1959).
One such exception is the “domestic-relations” exception, which “precludes federal
courts from hearing cases that ‘involv[e] the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody
decree.’” Alexander v. Rosen, 804 F.3d 1203, 1205 (6th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original)
(quoting Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704). This exception applies only when “a plaintiff positively
sues in federal court for divorce, alimony, or child custody, or seeks to modify or interpret an
existing divorce, alimony, or child-custody decree.” Id. (quoting Chevalier, 803 F.3d at 797). It
does not apply when a “plaintiff asserts federal claims seeking to vindicate federal statutory or
constitutional rights in the context of a domestic-relations dispute, . . . even if the relief sought
includes nullification of a domestic-relations decree.” Edelstein v. Flottman, No. 24-3156, 2025
WL 609487, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2025); see also Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 291 (6th Cir.
1998) (explaining that because an “unconstitutionally obtained” judgment is a nullity, a district
court’s “decree so stating would change nothing at all”), overruled on other grounds by Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), as recognized in, Coles v.
Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 859 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006). But a plaintiff may not avoid dismissal by
positing a federal claim as “a mere pretense [when] the suit is actually concerned with domestic
relations issues.” Danforth v. Celebrezze, 76 F. App’x 615, 616 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Catz,
142 F.3d at 291–92 (recognizing that the domestic-relations exception prohibits a district court
from exercising jurisdiction over a case asking it to determine what custody arrangement “would
be in the best interest of a child”).
This court has not yet determined whether the domestic-relations exception applies in
federal-question cases, like this one, or whether it is limited to cases based on diversity
jurisdiction. Alexander, 804 F.3d at 1205. But we need not decide that issue today.
As to her federal claim, Johnson argued that the state court ordered her child removed
from her custody without notice, without a “finding of parental unfitness” or a hearing, and

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without other “adequate procedural protections,” thus violating of her due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment. On its face, this is a constitutional claim not subject to the
domestic-relations exception to jurisdiction. See Edelstein, 2025 WL 609487, at *2. And
although Johnson asked the district court to issue an order “requiring restoration of [her] full
custody rights rather than limited visitation,”a remedy that would presumably require findings as
to Johnson’s parental fitness and the best interest of her child, Johnson’s federal claim is not
obviously “a mere pretense” rather than a legitimate constitutional claim. We thus conclude that
dismissal of the complaint at the screening stage, on the basis of the domestic-relations
exception, was premature.
Therefore, we VACATE the district court’s judgment dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction, REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order, and DENY as moot
the motion to supplement and take judicial notice.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

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