Ricardo Rodriguez Sanchez v. TODD W. BLANCHE, Acting U.S. Attorney General

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0303n.06
Case No. 23-3737
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
RICARDO RODRIGUEZ SANCHEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD W. BLANCHE, Acting U.S. Attorney
General,
Respondent.
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ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
FROM THE UNITED STATES
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
APPEALS
O P I N I O N
Before: MOORE, NALBANDIAN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Ricardo Rodriguez Sanchez overstayed his short-term
visa to the United States by many years before being subject to removal. Even so, he argued before
the immigration judge overseeing his case that his children would face hardships without him that
warranted cancellation of removal. The immigration judge disagreed, and the Board of
Immigration Appeals affirmed without a written opinion. Because we agree with the IJ’s finding
that Rodriguez Sanchez failed to show that his children would suffer abnormal hardship and with
the BIA’s decision to summarily affirm, we deny the petition for review.
I.
Ricardo Rodriguez Sanchez, a native and citizen of Panama, entered the United States in
spring 2006 on a visa that was valid for only a few months. But he stayed in the country for many
years, and in 2017, the government charged him as removable and issued a notice to appear.

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Rodriguez Sanchez conceded removability, but applied for cancellation of removal based on the
hardship his children might face without him.
In 2019, the IJ heard Rodriguez Sanchez’s testimony supporting his request for cancellation
of removal. At the time of the hearing, Rodriguez Sanchez hadn’t seen or spoken with three of his
four children since he and their mother divorced about four years earlier. He testified that the
youngest of his four children, R.J., would suffer extraordinary hardship upon his removal.
Although Rodriguez Sanchez had never formally attempted to gain visitation or custody rights, he
kept abreast of R.J.’s development through daily contact with one of his daughters, Amanda.
Rodriguez Sanchez sent Amanda $450 a month to help with “medical care” for R.J., who is deaf
in one ear, “and for the expense of the home” even though he “d[id]n’t have an obligation” to do
so. Hr’g Tr., Admin. R., pp.100, 122. But Rodriguez Sanchez didn’t know how much of that $450
reached R.J., or whether any of it contributed to his medical expenses. And there isn’t any
evidence that, without the $450, R.J. wouldn’t be able to receive the treatment he needs for his
hearing. Moreover, Rodriguez Sanchez testified that R.J.’s hearing was “perfect[]” at the time
because of his hearing aids, and that he was doing well in school. Id. at pp.101, 129. Rodriguez
Sanchez also indicated in his testimony that he has another daughter, Jocelyn. But aside from
identifying her on the record, he didn’t indicate how—if at all—her life would change if he
returned to Panama because she had graduated high school and was going to join the military.
The IJ found Rodriguez Sanchez’s testimony credible, but denied his application for
cancellation of removal. In his oral decision, the IJ concluded that R.J. and Jocelyn were
“qualifying relatives” whose hardship without Rodriguez Sanchez factored into the cancellation
analysis. But he also found that Rodriguez Sanchez’s testimony and documentary evidence failed
to establish that the children would suffer the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”

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required to warrant cancelling his removal. Oral Decision, Admin. R., p.51. He found that “[t]he
only loss [R.J.] will suffer is some portion” of the $450 that Rodriguez Sanchez sent to Amanda
every month, and that R.J. is otherwise “now 100 percent hearing-abled.” Id. at p.53. And
regarding Jocelyn, the IJ concluded that the evidence and testimony failed to show that her life
would “change in any manner, shape, or form if [Rodriguez Sanchez] is no longer in the United
States” because she had already graduated high school and was “going into the military.” Id.
Rodriguez Sanchez appealed the IJ’s denial to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which
affirmed without writing a separate opinion. So he petitioned us for review.
II.
Rodriguez Sanchez challenges the denial of his request for cancellation of removal on two
grounds. First, he argues that R.J. and Jocelyn would face exceptional and extreme hardship
without him. And second, he faults the BIA for affirming the IJ without writing a separate opinion.
Neither argument convinces.
A.
We review the denial of cancellation of removal for substantial evidence. Baltazar Us v.
Blanche, 174 F.4th 509, 513 (6th Cir. 2026). That means that we’ll grant the petition only if “any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. at 512 (citation
modified). And when the BIA affirms the IJ without issuing an opinion of its own, “we review
the IJ’s decision directly.” Shkabari v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 2005).
Four statutory factors control cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Only
the fourth—that the alien’s “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
to the alien’s child, “who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence”—is at issue here. Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). That factor requires the alien to

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prove “hardship sustained by . . . qualifying relatives that’s significantly different from or greater
than the hardship that a deported alien’s family normally experiences.” Moctezuma-Reyes v.
Garland, 124 F.4th 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2024). In other words, the hardship must fall “well outside
the norm.” Id.
The IJ properly concluded that the sole hardship R.J. might face—losing some portion of
the $450 that Rodriguez Sanchez sends to Amanda every month—isn’t exceptionally or extremely
unusual. As we’ve explained elsewhere, “financial . . . strains are the typical results of removal;
they aren’t rare.” Id. at 423. Moreover, Rodriguez Sanchez testified that he’d be able to find work
upon returning to Panama, even though it would be difficult and wouldn’t offer the kind of pay he
can find in the United States. And we’ve held that “even if getting a job [in the country of removal]
may prove difficult,” the alien’s “ability to work . . . counsels against upsetting the [IJ’s]
determination.” Id. Rodriguez Sanchez’s testimony about R.J.’s wellbeing, too, shows that the
latter has no “compelling special needs” that could support cancellation. Id. at 423–24 (citation
modified). By Rodriguez Sanchez’s own telling, R.J.’s hearing aids have fully corrected his
hearing, and R.J. is performing “regular[ly]” in school. Admin R., pp.99–101. And there is no
evidence that, without the $450 Rodriguez Sanchez provides monthly, R.J. would be unable to
receive the medical treatment he needs. The IJ also properly concluded that Rodriguez-Sanchez
didn’t supply any information supporting a hardship finding as to his other qualifying child,
Jocelyn. His only testimony about Jocelyn indicated that she was in perfect health, had finished
high school, and planned to enter the military.
At bottom, Rodriguez Sanchez hasn’t shown us that “any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude” that his qualifying children would face exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship upon his removal. Baltazar Us, 174 F.4th at 512 (citation modified). Nor are we

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convinced by his argument that the IJ considered the hardship factors (like financial strain, special
educational needs, and others) in isolation rather than in the aggregate, given the IJ’s explicit
statement that he’d consider the evidence in the aggregate and his simultaneous discussion of the
hardship factors relevant to R.J. and Jocelyn. So we won’t disturb the IJ’s hardship finding.
B.
Next, Rodriguez Sanchez argues that the BIA erred by affirming the IJ without a written
opinion. The regulations governing the BIA’s appellate process require it to streamline its docket
by summarily affirming when it determines that the IJ was correct (or that any error was harmless)
and either “[t]he issues on appeal are squarely controlled by existing . . . precedent and do not
involve the application of precedent to a novel factual situation” or “[t]he factual and legal issues
raised on appeal are not so substantial that the case warrants the issuance of a written opinion.” 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i). Apart from reciting those labels, Rodriguez Sanchez hasn’t explained
how his case involves either novel or substantial questions. So we have no reason to second-guess
the BIA’s summary affirmance.
III.
For those reasons, we deny the petition for review.

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