Charles Smith v. Paul Anderson

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 16‐2333
C HARLES SMITH,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
P AUL A NDERSON,
Defendant‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 15 cv 2330 — Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED SEPTEMBER 12, 2017 — D ECIDED OCTOBER 31, 2017
____________________
Before BAUER , EASTERBROOK , and KANNE , Circuit Judges.
KANNE , Circuit Judge. Charles Smith, a registered sex of‐
fender, was convicted of driving with a revoked license and
sentenced to one year’s imprisonment followed by one year’s
mandatory supervised release. To begin his supervised re‐
leased—often called parole—Smith needed the Illinois De‐
partment of Corrections to approve a host site. On his release
date Smith submitted two host sites. At that time, the Depart‐
ment had not investigated or approved the proposed sites. A

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2 No. 16‐2333
parole supervisor therefore ordered Smith’s parole officer,
Paul Anderson, to issue a parole violation report rather than
release Smith.
Anderson’s parole violation report contained incorrect
statements. Principally, the report claimed that electronic
monitoring was a condition of Smith’s supervised release. It
also noted that the Department had attempted to place Smith
at a host site that would allow him to comply with the elec‐
tronic monitoring requirement. Neither statement was accu‐
rate.
Smith spent another six months in custody before the De‐
partment released him on good‐time credit. He sued his pa‐
role officer, Paul Anderson, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an al‐
leged violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court
granted Anderson’s motion for summary judgment. 1 We af‐
firm.
I. A NALYSIS
For relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. See,
e.g., Werner v. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 758–9 (7th Cir. 2016). To do
so, the plaintiff must show that the defendant violated a
clearly establish statutory or constitutional right. Id. Here,
Smith cannot demonstrate that Anderson violated a clearly
established constitutional right, even when we view the facts
in the light most favorable to him.
1 Smith also alleged state‐law claims. The district court found that
Smith failed to meaningfully assert any of them. Smith did not challenge
that ruling in his opening brief, and thus, forfeited those claims. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Litscher, 281 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2002).

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No. 16‐2333 3
Smith brings his 1983 claim for an alleged violation of the
Fourth Amendment. He argues that Anderson’s parole viola‐
tion report led the Department to hold him beyond his release
date. Because Anderson lacked reasonable suspicion for the
facts that formed the basis of his report, Smith insists that the
report violated the Fourth Amendment. See Knox v. Smith, 342
F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that the seizure of a pa‐
rolee without reasonable suspicion could violate the Fourth
Amendment).
Qualified immunity bars Smith’s claim. No court has held
that the Fourth Amendment compels the release of sex of‐
fenders who lack lawful and approved living arrangements.
Brown v. Randle, 847 F.3d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 2017). Thus, when
sex offenders lack these arrangements, their continued deten‐
tion does not violate clearly established rights. In such cir‐
cumstances, the officers responsible for their detention are en‐
titled to qualified immunity. Id.
That is the situation here. Indeed, Illinois law requires the
Department to ensure that inmates have proper and approved
residences before releasing them on parole. Ill. Admin. Code
tit. 20, § 1610.110. It also authorizes the Department to hold
inmates until it has approved their living arrangements. Id. As
of his release date, Department had not approved Smith’s host
site. Thus, Smith’s continued detention did not violate a
clearly established right.
Smith insists that the Department had approved his host
site. He claims that in the absence of additional conditions im‐
posed by statute or the parole board, an inmate satisfies sec‐
tion 1610.110’s approval requirement by submitting any site
that allows law enforcement to monitor the parolee. Thus,
Smith contends, the Department automatically approved his

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4 No. 16‐2333
site when he submitted his mother’s residence and she agreed
to host him.
Of course, that cannot be the case. The Department’s ap‐
proval—not the inmate’s submission—entitles an inmate to
release under the Code. And despite Smith’s contentions, the
Department’s approval is neither mechanical nor automatic.
In fact, the Department later denied both of Smith’s sites.
II. CONCLUSION
On Smith’s release date, the Department had not approved
his host site. Instead of releasing Smith, Anderson submitted
a parole violation report. The report contained errors. But be‐
cause no court has held that the Fourth Amendment requires
prisons to release sex offenders who lack lawful and ap‐
proved places to live, Anderson’s incorrect statements—even
if baseless—cannot form the basis of liability under section
1983.
AFFIRMED.

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