Countryside Bank v. Zafar Sheikh

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 26, 2021*
Decided March 31, 2021
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 19-2655
COUNTRYSIDE BANK,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ZAFAR SHEIKH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
Hammond Division.
No. 2:18-cv-132
Theresa L. Springmann,
Judge.
O R D E R
After Countryside Bank named Zafar Sheikh among other defendants in a
mortgage-foreclosure suit, Sheikh removed the case from state to federal court. Sheikh
argued that the case involved a federal question. The district court disagreed, remanded
the case to state court, and awarded fees to Countryside for its expenses in litigating
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 19-2655 Page 2
removal. Sheikh now contests the fee award, but because the district court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing those fees, we affirm.
This appeal involves four orders. The first arose after Countryside sued Sheikh in
Indiana state court for breaching a mortgage agreement and defrauding a financial
institution in violation of Indiana Code §§ 35-43-5-4 and 35-43-5-8(a). Sheikh removed
the case to federal court, and Countryside moved for a remand. In its first order, the
district court remanded the case and allowed Countryside to seek fees under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) for its litigation expenses.
The second order, specifying the fees, came after Countryside submitted its
billing records. Sheikh, in turn, moved to reconsider remand. The district court denied
Sheikh’s motion, reasoning that, because it had already mailed a certified copy of the
remand order to the state court, it had lost the power to review the decision to remand.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)–(d); see Shapiro v. Logistec USA, Inc., 412 F.3d 307, 311–12 (2d Cir.
2005) (collecting cases); see also J.O. v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 273
(7th Cir. 1990). It also ordered Sheikh to pay $5,280 to Countryside (about 75% for
litigating removal and 25% for addressing Sheikh’s motion to reconsider).
The third order came after another motion to reconsider. Within 30 days of the
entry of the second order, Sheik moved “to question the inflated costs” or to extend the
time to appeal. The district court construed this as a request to allow another motion to
reconsider, which it granted, and Sheikh then moved for reconsideration. Countryside
opposed the motion and asked for an award of the additional fees that it had incurred
since its first submission of fees. The district court then issued its third order in which it
denied Sheikh’s motion for reconsideration and granted Countryside’s request for an
additional $2,750 in legal fees (bringing the total to $8,030).
The fourth order came after Sheikh filed several more motions. First, Sheikh
moved to amend the third order. He did not contest the fee award itself; he asked only
that he be allowed to pay in monthly installments. While that motion was pending,
Sheikh filed a notice purporting to appeal the first and third orders. Then, after another
bank acquired Countryside, he moved to dismiss Countryside. Countryside opposed
that motion and sought an award of the fees accrued since its second submission. In its
fourth order, the court denied the motion to dismiss, allowed Sheikh to pay in monthly
installments, and granted Countryside its fees (an additional $6,407.50 bringing the total
to $14,437.50). Sheikh did not appeal this order.

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No. 19-2655 Page 3
Before considering the merits, we clarify the scope of this appeal. We previously
asked the parties to brief whether our review should be limited to only the third order.
After considering the briefs, we deemed Sheikh’s motion “to question the inflated
costs” after the second order a timely notice of appeal of that order and the first order,
so we will review those orders. We can also review the third order. Though Sheikh
prematurely appealed that order while his motion to amend it was pending, that appeal
became operative once the district court disposed of the pending motion. See F ED. R.
A PP . P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i); Katerinos v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 368 F.3d 733, 737–38 (7th Cir.
2004). But we may not review the fourth order because Sheikh never filed a fresh notice
of appeal after the district court issued it. A litigant who files a notice of appeal that is
premature because of a pending motion, as Sheikh did, must either file a new notice
once the pending motion is decided or amend the original, premature notice once the
district court disposes of that pending motion. F ED. R. A PP . P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); see Fogel v.
Gordon & Glickson, P.C., 393 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2004). Sheikh did neither.
Countryside has not invoked this defect in our jurisdiction, but its acquiescence does
not confer jurisdiction. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213 (2007).
With our review limited to the first three orders, Sheikh argues that he
reasonably believed that this case raised a federal question, so the district court abused
its discretion in awarding fees. A district court may in its discretion award fees if
removal lacked reasonable grounds. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.,
546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005); Jackson Cnty. Bank v. DuSablon, 915 F.3d 422, 424 (7th Cir. 2019).
That was the situation here. Jurisdiction must be clear from the face of the well-pleaded
complaint. Panther Brands, LLC v. Indy Racing League, LLC, 827 F.3d 586, 589 (7th Cir.
2016). And Countryside’s complaint states only claims of mortgage-contract breach, a
state-law claim, see Olson v. Bemis Co., 800 F.3d 296, 300 (7th Cir. 2015), and fraud
against a financial institution in violation of Indiana Code §§ 35-43-5-4 and 35-43-5-8(a).
Sheikh offers two responses, but neither one persuades us. First, he argues that
the claim under Indiana Code § 35-43-5-8(a) raises a federal question because it
prohibits defrauding “a federally chartered or federally insured financial institution.”
He is incorrect. A state-law claim that refers to federal authority does not present a
federal question unless adjudicating the claim requires the resolution of a substantial,
disputed question of federal law. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983). But Sheikh has never identified such a question for
this claim.

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No. 19-2655 Page 4
Sheikh next contends that Countryside should have pleaded that the defendants
violated federal banking and anti-racketeering laws and that Countryside itself violated
federal laws. This argument has two flaws. First, even if we assume that the defendants
allegedly violated federal laws, Countryside was not required to plead those violations
in addition to its state-law claims. See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804,
813 (1986). As the master of its complaint, Countryside could omit claims and rely on
only state-law claims. Id. Second, Sheikh’s assertions that Countryside violated federal
laws are not reasonable grounds for removal jurisdiction. For one thing, he does not
identify these laws, so we have no idea if private federal claims under them even exist,
as must be the case for removal jurisdiction. See generally Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs,
Local 150 v. Ward, 563 F.3d 276, 281–82 (7th Cir 2009); Crandal v. Ball, Ball and Brosamer,
Inc., 99 F.3d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases). And to the extent that he relies on
these unspecified laws as defenses to the state-law claims, federal defenses do not create
federal jurisdiction. Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998).
Sheikh next challenges the calculation of the fees. He contends that the hourly
rate charged by Countryside’s attorney was unreasonable and that the number of hours
was inflated. His arguments are unpersuasive. The district court used the hourly rate
that Countryside negotiated before the court ruled that Countryside could recover its
fees, so the rate is presumptively reasonable. See Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol
Labs., Inc., 200 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1999). And Sheikh has offered nothing to rebut that
presumption. Further, Countryside’s billing records belie Sheikh’s argument that
Countryside inflated its hours. The billing entries corresponding to the first fee award
show that Countryside billed only for responding to Sheikh’s motions, and its hours are
proportional to that objective. The goal of fee-shifting is “to do rough justice, not to
achieve auditing perfection,” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011), so we need not
entertain Sheikh’s challenges of the first fee award down to the minute. We are satisfied
that the records reasonably support the first fee request, so we give “substantial
deference” to the district court’s determinations. See id. Sheikh’s brief does not mention
or develop an argument regarding the second fee award, so he waives any argument
that the fee was improper. See United States v. Dabney, 498 F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 2007).
Finally, as discussed above, we lack jurisdiction to hear Sheikh’s arguments regarding
the final fee amount in the fourth order.
We have considered Sheikh’s other arguments, and none has merit.
AFFIRMED

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