A L Amin Porosh v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-1781
A L A MIN POROSH ,
Petitioner,
v.
M ERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A213-639-409
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 7, 2022 — DECIDED J ANUARY 5, 2023
____________________
Before F LAUM , EASTERBROOK, and S T. EVE, Circuit Judges.
F LAUM , Circuit Judge. Al Amin Porosh, a native and citizen
of Bangladesh, sought asylum because of political persecu-
tion. After a hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) rendered an
adverse credibility determination and denied Porosh asylum.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Porosh’s
appeal. Now, Porosh seeks review of those decisions, arguing
that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was not based on sub-
stantial evidence. Although some of the IJ’s conclusions lack

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2 No. 22-1781
evidentiary support, we deny Porosh’s petition for review be-
cause, on the whole, the IJ’s decision is supported by findings
that have a credible basis in the record.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
Porosh claims he joined a political party, Jamaat e-Islami
(Jamaat), in 2012 when he was fifteen years old and living in
Narayanganj, a city in Bangladesh.1 His role was to recruit
new members by explaining that Jamaat works for democracy
and the freedom of the country while helping the community.
His asylum claim is premised on three alleged encounters
with an opposing political party, the Awami League, in 2014.
The first occurred in July 2014, when three Awami League
leaders called and threatened to kill Porosh if he did not de-
fect. Porosh did not report this threat to the police because he
believes the Awami League controls the government, includ-
ing the police.
In October 2014, members of the Awami League attacked
Porosh and broke his left hand. After the beating, Porosh went
to a government hospital but was denied admission, a fact he
attributes to the Awami League’s influence. Instead, Porosh
received treatment from a private doctor, Ahasanui Kabir. Po-
rosh did not report this attack to the police for the same rea-
sons as before.
The final incident occurred in December 2014. Awami
League members called Porosh and invited him to celebrate
Victory Day (a national holiday in Bangladesh) with them.
1 We relay these facts as Porosh recounts them.

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No. 22-1781 3
When Porosh arrived, approximately fifteen members of the
Awami League confronted him. They accused Porosh of ob-
structing their work and threatened to kill him if he did not
defect. When he refused, they tied him up, taped his mouth
shut, and transported him to another, unknown location. Po-
rosh was locked in a room for two days before they untied his
hands and gave him food and water. At that point, Porosh
managed to flee.
After he escaped, Porosh went to the police to report these
three incidents. Upon hearing that Porosh was attempting to
file a complaint against the Awami League, the police threat-
ened to kill him if he filed a report. A few weeks later, Porosh
moved to another city in Bangladesh, hoping to evade detec-
tion. However, he claims Awami League leaders were still
looking for him, and he did not feel safe.
In 2015, Porosh moved to Malaysia after obtaining a tem-
porary work permit. But, in 2020, while he was still in Malay-
sia, Awami League members contacted his father, threatening
that if they found Porosh, they would kill him.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Malaysia announced that
everyone with a temporary work permit would be sent back
to their home country. In March 2021, Porosh decided to go to
the United States instead and received what he believed to be
a valid work permit.
On March 27, 2021, Porosh entered the United States
through O’Hare Airport. When he presented his work permit
for inspection, officers identified it as fake. After an interview,
officers determined Porosh was “credible” and had a “credi-
ble fear of persecution” based on “political opinion.”

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4 No. 22-1781
B. Procedural Background
Deportation proceedings against Porosh commenced on
April 14, 2021, when the Department of Homeland Security
filed a notice to appear in Chicago Immigration Court. Porosh
appeared pro se, admitted the Department’s factual allega-
tions, and conceded removability.
On June 24, 2021, Porosh applied for asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (CAT). After a hearing, the IJ denied his applications,
finding that Porosh was not credible and that his corroborat-
ing evidence did not support his claims.
Porosh appealed that decision to the BIA, which affirmed
the IJ’s conclusion as to the asylum claim. However, the BIA
declined to affirm on two grounds the IJ considered in ren-
dering an adverse credibility determination: (1) Porosh’s use
of a fraudulent work permit to enter the United States and
(2) the IJ’s impression that Porosh was evasive when answer-
ing certain questions. The BIA also concluded that Porosh
failed to meaningfully challenge the IJ’s denial of his applica-
tion for withholding of removal and protection under CAT,
so it considered those issues waived. Porosh timely appealed
to this Court.
II. Discussion
We address only Porosh’s asylum claim.2 To receive asy-
lum, applicants must prove they were “persecuted in the past
2 “To exhaust an argument, and thus avoid waiver, it must be actually
argued in the administrative proceedings.” Nyandwi v. Garland, 15 F.4th
836, 841 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Kithongo v. Garland, 33 F.4th 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Not raising the[]
issues before the Board constitutes a failure to exhaust.”). Because Porosh

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No. 22-1781 5
or ha[ve] a well-founded fear of future persecution on account
of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership in a social
group, or political opinion.” Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 312
(7th Cir. 2004) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). “[P]ersecu-
tion is defined as ‘punishment or the infliction of harm for po-
litical, religious, or other reasons that this country does not
recognize as legitimate.’” Id. (quoting Roman v. INS, 233 F.3d
1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000)).
“Section 242(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) vests the federal courts with jurisdiction to review final
orders directing the removal of an alien from the United
States.” Meza v. Garland, 5 F.4th 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)). Where the Board has adopted and supple-
mented the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions. Garcia-
Arce v. Barr, 946 F.3d 371, 376 (7th Cir. 2019). Here, the BIA’s
order supplements the decision of the IJ, as opposed to affirm-
ing “on grounds that were in the alternative to the ones the IJ
used.” Liu, 380 F.3d at 311. Therefore, “the IJ’s opinion as sup-
plemented by the BIA’s opinion becomes the basis for re-
view.” See id.3
“We review the decisions denying asylum … for substan-
tial evidence, applying de novo review to legal questions but
did not meaningfully challenge the IJ’s denial of his withholding of re-
moval and CAT claims before the BIA, we need not consider them.
3 On appeal, Porosh argues that the IJ’s credibility determination was
unsupported by substantial evidence because (1) he considered Porosh’s
use of a fraudulent work permit and (2) he relied on an unsupported per-
sonal opinion in concluding that Porosh’s testimony about a doctor’s note
was evasive. We agree with the BIA’s decision to “set aside” these find-
ings, so our review is limited to the “remaining reason[s]” for the IJ’s de-
termination. See Lin v. Holder, 656 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 2011).

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6 No. 22-1781
reversing factual findings only if the record lacks substantial
evidence to support them.” Zhakypbaev v. Sessions, 880 F.3d
881, 883–84 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming the agency’s determina-
tion where it draws from “reasonable, substantial, and proba-
tive evidence on the record considered as a whole” (citation
omitted)). The same deference is given to evaluations of cred-
ibility. See Lin, 656 F.3d at 609 (vacating and remanding IJ’s
credibility determination where not supported by substantial
evidence). It is not enough that “an alternate finding could
also be supported by substantial evidence,” Capric v. Ashcroft,
355 F.3d 1075, 1086–87 (7th Cir. 2004); the alternative finding
must be “compelled,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
Nevertheless, deferential review is afforded only where an
IJ’s “credibility determination[] … [is] supported by ‘specific,
cogent reasons’ that ‘bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.’”
Capric, 355 F.3d at 1086 (citing Ahmad v. I.N.S., 163 F.3d 457,
461 (7th Cir. 1999)). Adverse credibility findings will not be
upheld where they are “based on speculation or conjecture
rather than on evidence in the record.” Chen v. Gonzales, 420
F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371
F.3d 377, 383 (7th Cir. 2004)).
A. Inaccuracies and Inconsistencies
The IJ identified several inaccuracies and inconsistencies
in Porosh’s testimony that supported his adverse credibility
finding. We evaluate each in turn.
1. Democratic Goals of Jamaat
During his asylum hearing, Porosh testified that he joined
Jamaat because it “works for … democracy within [Bangla-
desh]” and for “the freedom of the country.” However, Po-
rosh submitted into evidence an article titled: Jamaat-e-Islami

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No. 22-1781 7
in Bangladesh: Past, Present and Future. It describes Jamaat’s
emergence as a social organization, noting that, despite devel-
oping a political arm, Jamaat “remained s[k]eptical of core po-
litical principles such as secularism and democracy to such an
extent that [it] considered these concepts to be ‘Haram’ (Is-
lamic for ‘forbidden’).”
The IJ found Porosh’s claim “that he was a prominent re-
cruiter for Jamaat [to be] improbable” given that “he de-
scribed such an incorrect view of the principles of the party.”
On appeal, the BIA concluded that while Porosh “generally
reference[d] this inconsistency, … he [did] not meaningfully
challenge it.”
The BIA’s reading of Porosh’s brief was generous. Porosh
did not address the inconsistency before the BIA, nor does he
do so here. Failure to challenge this finding results in waiver.
Kithongo, 33 F.4th at 458 (explaining that the failure of a peti-
tioner to “actually argue[]” an IJ’s finding before the BIA, such
that it puts the BIA “on notice” of the challenge, constitutes
waiver). As a result, “[w]e need not reach the merits of this
argument.” Nyandwi, 15 F.4th at 841.
Even if Porosh had challenged the IJ’s finding on appeal
to the BIA, the article Porosh put into evidence undercuts his
testimony. See Musollari v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 505, 510–11 (7th
Cir. 2008) (holding that a “dramatic discrepancy” between pe-
titioner’s testimony regarding country conditions and “estab-
lished background facts may form the basis of an IJ’s adverse
credibility finding”). The IJ reasonably relied on this evidence
in support of his adverse credibility determination.

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8 No. 22-1781
2. High-Profile Jamaat Events
Another basis for the IJ’s adverse credibility determination
was Porosh’s unfamiliarity with recent, high-profile Jamaat
events—some of which occurred while Porosh claims he was
a recruiter. The same article, Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh:
Past, Present and Future, explains, “The trials against Jamaat-
e-Islami leaders for war crimes have attracted worldwide at-
tention.” When questioned on this subject, however, Porosh
claimed “he was unaware of the war crimes committed by Ja-
maat in 1971 or the riots that occurred in 2013 in connection
with the War Crime Tribunals, which was created in 2009.”
Porosh’s testimony led the IJ to “find[] it implausible that [Po-
rosh] was so involved in Jamaat such that he was seen as a
threat to Awami League.” The BIA agreed.
On appeal, Porosh challenges this determination, con-
tending that the IJ inappropriately “relied on his ‘unsup-
ported personal opinion’[] and ‘perceived common
knowledge.’” He argues that Jamaat is not a terrorist organi-
zation and that he “never witnessed any member … author-
izing … criminal or violent activities” nor “participated in
such actions” himself.
This response misses the mark. Whether Jamaat is actually
a terrorist organization is not pertinent. The issue is whether
Porosh’s credibility is dinged by his claimed unawareness of
events that his own documentary evidence describes as “at-
tract[ing] worldwide attention.”
Even if Porosh offered a way to reconcile the article with
his testimony (he does not), our review is deferential, and we
will not overturn an IJ’s credibility determination if the IJ
“provided specific reasons based on the evidence.” Dai v.

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No. 22-1781 9
Garland, 24 F.4th 628, 636 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Tawuo v.
Lynch, 799 F.3d 725, 728–29 (7th Cir. 2015)). Here, the IJ’s con-
clusion was grounded in record evidence. As a result, we can-
not conclude that it was based on “speculation or conjecture.”
Chen, 420 F.3d at 710.
3. Reading During Hearing
The IJ took issue with Porosh reading from a piece of pa-
per during redirect examination, finding that it displayed a
lack of candor. On appeal, Porosh explains he looked at a doc-
ument in front of him “[d]ue to the hearing being [over video]
and his own misunderstanding of courtroom procedure.” Af-
ter the IJ instructed him to stop reading from the document,
“[Porosh] adhered to the IJ’s request and testified from his
own memory.”
The transcript from the hearing shows the IJ stopped Po-
rosh not long after he began reading. Nothing suggests Po-
rosh’s misstep was based on anything other than inadvert-
ence. Further, there is no evidence that, once corrected, he
tried to resume reading from the piece of paper.
Procedural deviations such as this do not necessarily war-
rant an adverse credibility finding. In fact, overemphasizing
“trivial matters” can lead to an adverse credibility finding un-
supported by substantial evidence. Cojocari v. Sessions, 863
F.3d 616, 626 (7th Cir. 2017) (granting petition for review
where “[t]he actual credibility decision by the immigration
judge emphasized many … trivial matters that d[id] not have
a plausible bearing on [petitioner’s] credibility”); see also
Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606, 617 (7th Cir. 2009) (hold-
ing the IJ is “obliged to distinguish between inconsistencies
and the like that are material and those that are not”).

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10 No. 22-1781
Because there is no “basis … for an adverse credibility de-
termination” premised on Porosh’s fleeting contravention of
hearing procedure, the IJ’s credibility determination, in this
respect, was not supported by substantial evidence. Torres v.
Mukasey, 551 F.3d 616, 631 (7th Cir. 2008).
4. Age
Another factor the IJ considered in rendering an adverse
credibility determination was Porosh’s age. The IJ found it
“difficult to believe that [Porosh], a minor who was still in
high school, was recruiting members for Jamaat to such a de-
gree that he posed a threat to the Awami League.”
On appeal, Porosh argues that the IJ relied on unsup-
ported personal opinion and perceived common knowledge
when he discredited Porosh’s testimony that at sixteen and
seventeen he “convinced many people to join his party.” At
the hearing, Porosh explained he had a good relationship
with residents of Narayanganj, did significant work for Ja-
maat in that region, and “successfully … recruit[ed] a lot of
people.”
Under the INA, an IJ can render a credibility determina-
tion based on “the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or
witness’s account.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). However, the
record does not show that the IJ’s conclusion premised on Po-
rosh’s age was tied to any evidence. In fact, Porosh testified
on cross examination that fourteen and fifteen-year-olds
could join political parties in Bangladesh, like he did.
Despite the deference accorded to agency determinations,
an IJ’s conclusion cannot stand where “nothing in the record
supports” it and “the only testimony [is] to the contrary.” Lin,
656 F.3d at 608; see also Dong v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 573, 577 (7th

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No. 22-1781 11
Cir. 2005) (“The IJ’s skepticism alone, in light of [petitioner’s]
consistent testimony, does not support a negative credibility
determination.”). Porosh’s testimony supports a conclusion
that an adolescent could join a political party and be a suc-
cessful recruiter. Nothing in the record refutes that evidence.
Therefore, the IJ’s determination with respect to Porosh’s age
lacked “specific, cogent reasons” bearing “a legitimate nexus
to the finding.” Capric, 355 F.3d at 1086 (citation omitted).
5. Recruiting Efforts
The IJ’s adverse credibility finding was also premised on
a perceived lack of detail in Porosh’s testimony concerning
“how many people he recruited, the average age of the people
he recruited, [and] how long he worked as a recruiter for Ja-
maat.”
During his testimony, Porosh did not specify the number
of people he recruited or their average age. While Porosh tes-
tified that he joined Jamaat in 2012 and worked as a recruiter,
it is unclear when his responsibilities as a recruiter began and
ended. At the time of the asylum hearing, he still considered
himself a member of Jamaat, although presumably his active
recruiting activities had ceased, at the very least since enter-
ing ICE custody. Precisely when those activities abated, how-
ever, is uncertain. Porosh did not explain whether he contin-
ued to recruit members for Jamaat after moving to Malaysia.
We cannot fault the IJ for noticing this lack of detail and
considering it in rendering an adverse credibility finding.
Santashbekov v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 2016)
(holding that vague testimony supports adverse credibility
determination). To be fair, the questioning at the hearing was
not aimed at eliciting much detail. For example, Porosh was

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12 No. 22-1781
never asked questions about the age or number of people he
recruited—even by the IJ when he took over the examination.
Nevertheless, the imprecision of Porosh’s testimony is
apparent. As a result, the IJ’s credibility determination was
“supported by specific, cogent reasons … bear[ing] a
legitimate nexus to the finding.” Capric, 355 F.3d at 1086; see
also Zhakypbaev, 880 F.3d at 883–84 (affirming the agency’s
determination where it draws from “reasonable, substantial,
and probative evidence on the record considered as a
whole”).
In sum, while some of the IJ’s findings are untethered to
the record, his credibility determination is supported by other
findings tied to substantial record evidence. See Musollari, 545
F.3d at 510 (“[T]he balance of the evidence relied on by the IJ
supports the adverse credibility determination.”).
B. Corroborating Evidence
After making an adverse credibility finding based on
Porosh’s testimony, the IJ found that Porosh was unable to
rehabilitate his credibility with “extrinsic—and credible—
corroborating evidence.” Capric, 355 F.3d at 1086. Porosh’s
corroborating documentary evidence included (1) letters
from his parents, cousin, and uncle and (2) a note from the
private doctor who allegedly treated him after he was injured
by the Awami League in October 2014.
1. Family Members’ Letters
Porosh’s family members’ letters all suffer from similar
flaws. The IJ “accord[ed] little to no weight to the[] contents”
of Porosh’s parents’ letters because they are identical. Po-
rosh’s only explanation was that his parents “ha[ve] the same
opinion about [him].” Even looking past this red flag, the IJ

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No. 22-1781 13
noted the letters lack details necessary to corroborate Porosh’s
claim. Crucially, they do not specify which political party Po-
rosh worked for, what work he did for the party, or when and
how he was injured.
The same is true for the letters from Porosh’s cousin and
uncle, which the IJ found lacking because “[n]either … iden-
tifies any of the political parties,” “how badly or how many
times [Porosh] was harmed by the ‘opposition party,’” or
when he was injured. Porosh argues that “it should be clear
to a reasonable person that [his uncle and cousin] were refer-
ring to the fact that [he] suffered harm at the hands of the
Awami League political party in Bangladesh because he was
a member of Jamaat Islam.”
We disagree. While another adjudicator could draw a dif-
ferent conclusion from Porosh’s evidence, we will not dis-
place an IJ’s credibility determination unless “any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). That is not the case here. Further-
more, there is no evidence in the record that the Awami
League and Jamaat are the only opposing political parties
working in Bangladesh. Therefore, the IJ’s finding was sup-
ported by substantial evidence.
2. Doctor’s Note
The IJ found that Porosh’s doctor’s note also failed to sub-
stantiate his claims. While “the doctor’s note corroborates that
[Porosh] was harmed in October 2014, it does not corroborate
[Porosh’s] testimony that he was harmed by Awami League
in October 2014.” The BIA affirmed. On appeal, Porosh con-
tends that, in failing to credit the doctor’s note, the IJ relied on
unsupported personal opinion.

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14 No. 22-1781
We cannot agree. A reasonable adjudicator would not be
compelled to find that the doctor’s note corroborates Porosh’s
claim for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Porosh’s claim
is premised on political persecution by the Awami League be-
cause of his membership with Jamaat, but the doctor’s note
fails to connect Porosh’s injuries with his Jamaat membership.
We have previously affirmed an IJ’s adverse credibility deter-
mination where documentary evidence “does not mention
any of the particulars of [petitioner’s] claimed political activ-
ity or persecution.” Santashbekov, 834 F.3d at 840 (7th Cir.
2016) (agreeing that medical records were of limited utility
where they “d[id] not independently establish that political
persecution was the cause [of the documented injuries]”).
That same reasoning applies here. As a result, Porosh’s docu-
mentary evidence does not corroborate his claim, and the IJ’s
conclusion was supported by substantial record evidence.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Porosh’s Petition for
Review.

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