Michael Juday v. Fca Us LLC

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-1414
M ICHAEL JUDAY ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FCA US LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:19-cv-00831-TWP-MPB — Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED O CTOBER 29, 2021 — DECIDED J ANUARY 12, 2023
____________________
Before SYKES , Chief Judge, and K ANNE∗ and HAMILTON ,
Circuit Judges.
S YKES , Chief Judge. Michael Juday has worked for FCA US
LLC (formerly Chrysler) for more than two decades. In 2014
he married his wife Becky, also a veteran FCA employee.
∗ Circuit Judge Kanne died on June 16, 2022, and did not participate in
the decision of this case, which is being resolved under 28 U.S.C. § 46(d)
by a quorum of the panel.

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2 No. 21-1414
The Judays work at the company’s transmission plant in
Kokomo, Indiana. In 2017 they submitted medical certifica-
tions from their healthcare providers to take intermittent
leave from work under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA” or “the Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., for periodic
flare-ups of their serious health conditions.
At the end of that year, FCA’s outside FMLA administra-
tor notified the company that Michael and Becky had fre-
quently taken overlapping periods of FMLA leave. FCA
opened an investigation, and neither Michael nor Becky
could explain why they had requested FMLA leave on so
many of the same dates and times. At the conclusion of the
investigation, FCA suspended the couple for providing false
or misleading information in connection with their FMLA
leave requests. Michael Juday then filed suit accusing FCA
of interfering with his rights under the Act and retaliating
against him for using FMLA leave. The district judge entered
summary judgment for FCA on both claims.
We affirm. To prevail on his claims for FMLA interfer-
ence and retaliation, Juday needed to present evidence that
would permit a reasonable jury to find that his suspension
was not based on an honest suspicion of FMLA abuse. He
did not do so.
I. Background
Michael Juday began working for FCA as a machine re-
pairman in 1998. He married Becky, another long-time FCA
employee, in 2014. Throughout 2017 both Judays requested
and were granted intermittent FMLA leave for their serious
health conditions. As required by the Act, FCA permits its
employees to take up to 12 weeks of leave per year for

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No. 21-1414 3
qualifying health conditions with no reduction in position or
pay. Michael requested FMLA leave for anxiety, depression,
and back pain; Becky requested FMLA leave for flare-ups of
irritable bowel syndrome.
The Judays’ healthcare providers completed the neces-
sary medical certifications, which included descriptions of
the reasons for intermittent FMLA leave and how frequently
leave would be required. The providers submitted the
certifications directly to Sedgwick Claims Management
Services, Inc., FCA’s third-party FMLA administrator. In
2017 Michael occasionally exceeded the leave he was allotted
by his healthcare provider. However, he was able to contin-
ue taking leave without discipline by submitting updated
recertifications throughout the year. Sedgwick granted every
leave request Michael and Becky submitted that year. They
returned from each period of leave without reduction in
position or pay.
Throughout the year, Sedgwick periodically reviewed
the Judays’ leave requests. Under FCA’s FMLA policy,
“[p]roviding any false or misleading information relative to
a requested or approved FMLA leave will be cause for
disciplinary action, up to and including discharge.” As a
more general matter, “[p]roviding false or misleading in-
formation to the [c]ompany” violates FCA’s standards for
employee conduct. Michael knew that these policies applied
when communicating leave requests to Sedgwick.
In December 2017 a Sedgwick supervisor e-mailed Anne
Stebbins, the FMLA administrator at FCA, flagging a signifi-
cant pattern of overlap in the Judays’ FMLA leave dates.
Stebbins independently reviewed the couple’s leave requests
for that year and found 21 common days of absence and an

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4 No. 21-1414
additional 27 days on which their partial-day leave requests
overlapped.
An investigation ensued, and FCA labor-relations man-
agers interviewed Michael and Becky separately, with their
union representatives present. Michael indicated that
Becky’s irritable bowel syndrome flare-ups would trigger his
anxiety 20%–30% of the time and that his medical conditions
would also randomly intensify. Becky similarly stated that
her irritable bowel syndrome episodes were random and
sometimes triggered by stressful situations, including flare-
ups of Michael’s condition. Responding to questions about
the overlapping partial-leave days, Michael said that he and
Becky carpooled to work about half of the time. Neither
Michael nor Becky had any explanation for why their leave
requests overlapped as frequently as they did.
When the investigation concluded, Stebbins reviewed the
interview transcripts and the couple’s overall attendance
records for the year. She found that more than half of
Michael’s FMLA absences and half of his late days were on
the same date and at the same time as Becky’s. This conflict-
ed with Michael’s estimate that his need for FMLA leave was
triggered by Becky’s condition about 20%–30% of the time.
Stebbins also noted that the Judays’ shifts started within
12 minutes of each other, with Michael starting at 5:48 a.m.
and Becky starting at 6 a.m. After consulting with labor-
relations representatives and FCA counsel, Stebbins con-
cluded that the couple had provided false or misleading
information to FCA regarding their 2017 FMLA leave.
On February 6, 2018, Michael was placed on a 30-day
disciplinary layoff for violating FCA’s standards of con-
duct—namely, the rules against providing false or mislead-

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No. 21-1414 5
ing information regarding leave requests. Becky also re-
ceived a disciplinary suspension. Michael returned to work
in March to the same position, supervisor, and rate of pay as
before his suspension and has continued to take periodic
FMLA leave.
About a year later, Michael sued FCA alleging that his
suspension amounted to interference with his FMLA rights
and retaliation for exercising his right to FMLA leave. On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the judge held that
the interference claim failed because the undisputed evi-
dence showed that the disciplinary suspension was based on
an honest suspicion of FMLA abuse. The judge rejected the
retaliation claim for the same reason.
II. Discussion
We review the judge’s ruling on cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment de novo, construing the evidence and draw-
ing reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
party against whom the motion under consideration was
made. See Chi. Tchrs. Union v. Bd. of Educ., 14 F.4th 650, 654
(7th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is appropriate when
there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F ED. R. C IV.
P. 56(a).
As relevant here, the FMLA entitles eligible employees to
take up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave each year for “a serious
health condition that makes the employee unable to perform
the functions of the position.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
Upon return to work, employees are entitled to the same
position or “an equivalent position with equivalent em-
ployment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of

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6 No. 21-1414
employment.” Id. § 2614(a)(1)(B). But returning employees
are entitled only to those rights that “the employee would
have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave.” Id.
§ 2614(a)(3)(B); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a) (“An employee
has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and
conditions of employment than if the employee had been
continuously employed during the FMLA leave period.”).
That is, FMLA entitlements apply only if an employee uses
his statutory leave “for the intended purpose.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 2614(a)(1); see also Scruggs v. Carrier Corp., 688 F.3d 821, 825
(7th Cir. 2012).
FMLA claims generally come in two forms: interference
and retaliation. It is unlawful for an “employer to interfere
with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to
exercise” an FMLA right. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). And an
employer may not retaliate against an employee for exercis-
ing his FMLA rights. See id. § 2615(a)(2); see also Nicholson v.
Pulte Homes Corp., 690 F.3d 819, 825 (7th Cir. 2012). To pre-
vail on an FMLA interference claim, an employee must
prove that he was denied a right to which he was entitled;
proof of discriminatory intent is not required. Scruggs,
688 F.3d at 825. A retaliation claim, in contrast, “requires
proof of discriminatory or retaliatory intent.” Nicholson,
690 F.3d at 825.
A. FMLA Interference
An employee claiming FMLA interference must show
that: (1) he was eligible for FMLA protections; (2) his em-
ployer was covered by the FMLA; (3) he was entitled to take
leave under the FMLA; (4) he provided sufficient notice of
his intent to take leave; and (5) his employer “interfered
with, restrained, or denied FMLA benefits to which he was

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No. 21-1414 7
entitled.” Ziccarelli v. Dart, 35 F.4th 1079, 1089 (7th Cir. 2022).
At issue here is the last element.
It’s undisputed that all of Juday’s leave requests were
granted and that he returned to his position as a machine
repairman without any reduction in pay or benefits. But a
Labor Department regulation provides that FMLA interfer-
ence can include “us[ing] the taking of FMLA leave as a
negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring,
promotions or disciplinary actions.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c);
see also Preddie v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 806,
818 (7th Cir. 2015). Juday argues that FCA used his FMLA
leave requests as a negative factor in imposing the 30-day
disciplinary suspension.
This argument presumes that Juday used his FMLA leave
for its intended purpose. But the Act does not insulate an
employee from discipline for abusing his leave rights.
Kariotis v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 681–82
(7th Cir. 1997). In a claim of this type, an employer need not
conclusively prove that the employee abused his FMLA
leave; rather, an “an honest suspicion will do.” Id. at 681. We
have applied this “honest suspicion” standard when an
employer declined to reinstate an employee suspected of
using leave for an impermissible purpose. See Scruggs,
688 F.3d at 825–26; Vail v. Raybestos Prods. Co., 533 F.3d 904,
909 (7th Cir. 2008); Kariotis, 131 F.3d at 680–81. The same
standard applies to the disciplinary suspension at issue here.
The district judge entered summary judgment for FCA
because nothing in the record calls into question FCA’s
honest suspicion that Juday abused his FMLA leave. It is
undisputed that 50% of the Judays’ leave requests over-
lapped. But Michael estimated that his anxiety flare-ups

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8 No. 21-1414
were triggered by his wife’s medical condition only about
20%–30% of the time, and neither Juday had any explanation
for the frequency of the common dates and times of their
FMLA absences. After reviewing the Judays’ interview
transcripts and attendance records, Stebbins concluded that
Michael had given false or misleading information to FCA
regarding his 2017 FMLA leave, violating FCA’s employee
standards of conduct.
Juday argues that our caselaw requires more concrete ev-
idence of FMLA abuse. For support he points to Vail v.
Raybestos Products Co., 533 F.3d at 906. There the employer
was suspicious that an employee was using FMLA leave to
work at her husband’s lawn-mowing business because her
leave requests had increased during the summer and fall
mowing season. An off-duty police officer hired by the
employer had observed the employee mowing lawns on a
morning that coincided with the employee’s back-to-back
leave requests for migraines. Id. at 906–07. That evidence
was sufficient to support the employer’s honest suspicion of
FMLA abuse. Id. at 909–10.
Juday contends that FCA’s investigation falls short of the
evidence we found sufficient in Vail. But our decision in Vail
did not raise the bar for FMLA-abuse investigations; nothing
we said there requires employers to conduct surveillance
before disciplining an employee for abusing FMLA leave.
That the evidence in Vail was sufficient to defeat the claim
does not mean that surveillance evidence is necessary to
defeat an FMLA claim of this type. Because Juday presented
no evidence suggesting that FCA’s suspicion of FMLA abuse
was anything other than genuine, the judge properly entered
judgment for FCA on the FMLA interference claim.

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No. 21-1414 9
B. FMLA Retaliation
To prevail on a claim for retaliation in violation of the
FMLA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in FMLA-
protected activity; (2) his employer took an adverse em-
ployment action against him; and (3) there is a causal con-
nection between the two. Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
807 F.3d 215, 220 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cracco v. Vitran
Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 633 (7th Cir. 2009)). As we’ve
noted, the claim requires proof of discriminatory intent—
evidence that the employer “was acting under a prohibited
animus.” Cracco, 559 F.3d at 634. An employee alleging
FMLA retaliation may establish discriminatory intent by
either the direct or indirect method of proof. See Burnett v.
LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 480 (7th Cir. 2006). Juday proceeds
under the former.1 The direct method of proof permits
inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence—the plaintiff
can rely on “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence
that allows a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the
decisionmaker.” Scruggs, 688 F.3d at 827 (quotation marks
omitted).
Juday’s retaliation claim fails for the same reason as his
interference claim: the record evidence shows that FCA
disciplined him based on an honest suspicion that he was
abusing his FMLA leave—more specifically, he had violated
the company’s rules against providing false or misleading
information in connection with his FMLA leave. Juday
1 The indirect method of proof, on the other hand, requires a plaintiff to
show that he was treated differently than a similarly situated employee
who did not take FMLA leave, despite a satisfactory job performance. See
Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 481–82 (7th Cir. 2006).

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needed to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury
could infer that FMLA abuse was not FCA’s real reason for
imposing discipline and that the company was instead
retaliating against him for exercising his statutory leave
rights. He did not do so. The judge properly entered sum-
mary judgment for FCA on the retaliation claim too.
A FFIRMED

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