Ra’mar Daniels v. Dennis Reagle

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 22, 2023*
Decided March 23, 2023
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
Nos. 22-2729 & 22-2730
RA’MAR DANIELS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
DENNIS REAGLE,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:22-cv-00089-JRS-TAB
No. 1:22-cv-00090-JRS-MJD
James R. Sweeney II,
Judge.
O R D E R
Ra’mar Daniels, an Indiana prisoner, petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to
overturn disciplinary convictions for kicking and pushing correctional officers. The
district court denied his two petitions, and Daniels appeals, challenging whether
* We have agreed to decide the cases without oral argument because the briefs
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Nos. 22-2729 & 22-2730 Page 2
sufficient evidence supported the findings that he violated disciplinary rules. We
consolidate these two appeals for disposition and affirm the judgments.
The relevant events occurred in the infirmary at Pendleton Correctional Facility
on September 5, 2021. Daniels was assessed by a nurse after asserting that he had been
drugged by another prisoner. He was cleared to return to his cell but objected. After
Daniels refused correctional officers’ orders to move, the officers lifted him and carried
him toward a wheelchair. As they approached, he began pushing and kicking. An
officer electronically stunned Daniels to get him to comply with orders to stop resisting.
The officers then placed Daniels on the ground, and he continued to kick them.
Three officers who were kicked wrote conduct reports charging Daniels with
committing battery against a staff person, Offense 117 of Indiana Department of
Correction Policy 02-04-101. Daniels pleaded not guilty to each. A disciplinary hearing
officer, relying on statements from witnesses and video recordings of the incident,
ultimately found Daniels guilty of each charge. Daniels incurred sanctions that included
the loss of 180 days of good-time credit for each conviction. He did not obtain any relief
in the administrative appeals process.
Daniels next filed a single petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking to vacate the
three convictions that arose from the incident at the infirmary. The district court severed
his claims into three separate cases under Rule 2 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts. Citing procedural flaws with the
administrative appeals, the State argued that Daniels failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. In the two cases on appeal here, the district court did not
decide that issue. On the merits, it concluded (among other things) that the conduct
reports, the witness statements, and the video satisfied the requirement of “some
evidence” to support the convictions. Daniels appeals, contesting the sufficiency of the
evidence that he battered the officers.
Although the government does not abandon the argument that Daniels failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies, we need not decide that question because we
agree with the district court that Daniels loses on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2);
Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981–82 (7th Cir. 2002).
Prisoners cannot be deprived of good-time credits, in which they have a liberty
interest, without due process including a written statement from the finder of fact
identifying the evidence and the reasoning for the discipline. Wolff v. McDonnell,

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Nos. 22-2729 & 22-2730 Page 3
418 U.S. 539, 563–67 (1974). There must be “some evidence” to support a conviction.
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 447 (1985). To meet this standard, we ask “whether
there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion.” Id. at 455–56.
Daniels argues that, because he was drugged and stunned, his movements were
involuntary, and so the evidence was not sufficient to show that he knowingly or
intentionally kicked the correctional officers. See I ND. DEP ’ T OF C ORR ., M ANUAL OF
POLICIES AND PROCS ., No. 02-04-101, § III(F) (March 1, 2020) (defining battery). But here,
witness statements reflect that Daniels had been medically cleared to leave the
infirmary and that he began kicking the officers before he was stunned. This
circumstantial evidence is sufficient support for the disciplinary hearing officer’s
conclusions that Daniels intentionally struck the officers. See McPherson v. McBride,
188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 457) (“[Disciplinary] report alone
provides ‘some evidence.’”). Although Daniels presents an alternative, due process
“does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one
reached.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457.
AFFIRMED

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