Walter Brown v. Unknown Party

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 5, 2023*
Decided April 7, 2023
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-3128
WALTER BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNKNOWN PARTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 21-cv-1685-DWD
David W. Dugan,
Judge.
O R D E R
Walter Brown filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 well over two years after the
events that he describes at Chester Mental Health Center ended. The district court
invited him to explain why he did not comply with the two-year limitations period, and
when it determined that he failed to do so adequately, it dismissed his suit as time-
barred. Because Brown has not offered grounds to render his suit timely, we affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-3128 Page 2
Brown filed this suit in December 2021, asserting abuse and lack of medical care
at Chester from July to September 2018. The district court reviewed Brown’s complaint
and ordered him to show cause why his claims should not be dismissed as untimely.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). It correctly explained that the applicable statute of limitations
period for § 1983 actions is the forum state’s limitations period for personal-injury torts.
See Woods v. Ill. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 710 F.3d 762, 766 (7th Cir. 2013). That
period in Illinois is two years, see id.; 735 ILCS § 5/13-202, which gave Brown until
September 2020 to sue. But he did not sue until December 2021, 15 months too late.
Brown insisted that he acted diligently. First, he said that he tried for three years
to get legal assistance. Second, he asserted, his treatment center imposed COVID-19
restrictions through 2020 that kept him from learning about the time to sue.
The court dismissed Brown’s complaint as untimely. Citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo,
544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005), it correctly explained that equitable tolling may be available if
Brown can show that he was pursuing his rights diligently and some “extraordinary
circumstance” prevented timely filing. But, the court ruled, his two assertions (that
COVID-19 restrictions during 2020 kept him from learning about the filing deadline and
that he had trouble finding a lawyer) were not extraordinary circumstances that
warranted equitable tolling.
On appeal, Brown argues that he deserves equitable tolling based on the two
circumstances that he cites, but we disagree. Typically, a district court’s decision on
tolling is reviewed for abuse of discretion, see Famous v. Fuchs, 38 F.4th 625, 630 n.17 (7th
Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 794 (2023), and the court here did not abuse its
discretion. First, according to Brown, the COVID-19 restrictions existed only during
2020. At most, they disabled Brown from discovering the filing deadline during that one
year. But under Cada v. Baxter Healthcare, 920 F.2d 446, 452–53 (7th Cir. 1990), once an
obstacle that prevents filing a suit is removed (and Brown says that occurred in January
2021), a litigant must sue within a “reasonable time.” Brown did not sue until December
2021, an unreasonable delay in this case. His other proffered reason for his late filing—
his trouble finding a lawyer—was not itself an extraordinary obstacle that prevented
him from timely suing on his own. As we have said, a “lack of representation is not on
its own sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.” Socha v. Boughton, 763 F.3d 674, 685 (7th
Cir. 2014). Thus, the district court properly concluded that Brown was not entitled to
equitable tolling.
AFFIRMED

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