United States of America v. Brandon L. Taylor

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 28, 2023*
Decided April 28, 2023
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
Nos. 22-2319 & 22-2588
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BRANDON L. TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:07-CR-111(2) RLM-MGG
Robert L. Miller, Jr.,
Judge.
O R D E R
Brandon Taylor, a federal inmate, challenges the denial of his motions for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Because Taylor did not
adequately prove he has an extraordinary and compelling reason for release, we affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the appeals without oral argument because the briefs
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Nos. 22-2319 & 22-2588 Page 2
In 2008, a jury convicted Taylor of firearm and ammunition charges, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), (3), and the court sentenced him above the Guidelines to 20 years’
imprisonment. Even though the government dismissed related carjacking charges
against Taylor, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that he had
participated in the carjacking and used that fact to enhance his sentence.
On direct appeal, Taylor argued that the court incorrectly considered his conduct
underlying the dismissed carjacking counts. We affirmed. United States v. Taylor,
314 F. App’x 872 (7th Cir. 2009).
Taylor later moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district
court denied the motion.
In early 2022, Taylor filed the first of three motions for compassionate release
based on alleged sentencing errors, his rehabilitation, and risks from COVID-19
combined with his health conditions (H. Pylori, hypertension, and high cholesterol).
The court denied the motion, concluding that Taylor had not established an
extraordinary and compelling reason for release. The court explained that his health
conditions seemed well treated in prison; he had refused the COVID-19 vaccine and did
not explain why he would not benefit from it; and the sentencing factors under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) counseled against release. Taylor did not appeal.
In mid-2022, Taylor moved for a sentence reduction, arguing that the sentencing
court’s reliance on dismissed conduct violated Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99
(2013). The district court, construing the motion as a request for compassionate release,
denied the motion on the ground that alleged legal errors in sentencing are not
extraordinary and compelling circumstances.
A month later, Taylor filed his third request for compassionate release, raising
arguments similar to those he presented in his first motion. He submitted additional
information about his vaccine status and health, including a recent diagnosis of
congestive heart failure. The court again denied relief. The court acknowledged Taylor’s
worsening health but did not think that his new conditions were extraordinary and
compelling. Taylor had not shown, the court pointed out, that his conditions were so
severe that prison staff could not care for him. And even if he had established
extraordinary and compelling reasons, his offense and post-conviction violent conduct
would preclude early release in light of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

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Nos. 22-2319 & 22-2588 Page 3
Taylor filed separate timely notices of appeal for the denial of the last two
motions. We consolidated both appeals for disposition.
On appeal, Taylor maintains that his new health conditions, particularly his
coronary artery disease, justify a reduced sentence. But Taylor has the burden of
proving an extraordinary and compelling reason, see United States v. Barbee, 25 F.4th 531,
532 (7th Cir. 2022), and he offered insufficient evidence that he cannot receive adequate
medical care in prison.
Taylor also revives his Alleyne-based argument that the sentencing court wrongly
took into account dismissed conduct that had not been submitted to the jury. But we
rejected a similar contention on direct appeal, Taylor, 314 F. App’x at 875–76, and
repeatedly have held that a putative legal defect at sentencing is not an extraordinary
and compelling reason for release. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 62 F.4th 391, 392
(7th Cir. 2023); United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2021). In any event, the
district court’s § 3553(a) discussion provides an independent basis for affirmance. The
court highlighted Taylor’s offense and post-trial conduct (including assault and threats
against law-enforcement officers assigned to transport him), and just one good reason
suffices to deny a motion for compassionate release. See United States v. Ugbah, 4 F.4th
595, 598 (7th Cir. 2021).
We have considered Taylor’s other arguments, but none has merit.
AFFIRMED

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