United States of America v. Paul Carter

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 19, 2023*
Decided May 25, 2023
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1669
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PAUL CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 13-CR-84
Lynn Adelman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Paul Carter, a federal prisoner with various medical conditions, challenges the
denial of his motion for compassionate release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), based on
his elevated risk of severe illness from COVID-19. The district court concluded that
Carter’s medical circumstances were not an extraordinary and compelling reason for
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-1669 Page 2
release and, regardless, the seriousness of his sex-trafficking convictions weighed
against his release. We affirm.
In 2017, Carter pleaded guilty to four counts of sex trafficking by force, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(a)(1), and one count of conspiring to commit forced labor and sex trafficking by
force, id. § 1594(b)–(c). For these crimes, he was sentenced to five concurrent terms of
18 years in prison plus 5 years of supervised release.
In 2021, Carter, represented by counsel, moved for compassionate release. He
asserted that he was still recovering from a serious bout of pneumonia—secondary to a
COVID-19 infection—that landed him in the hospital for two weeks. He worried that
his risk of a severe outcome from COVID-19 was exacerbated by morbid obesity, an
acute kidney injury, a partially blocked artery, and advancing age (51). Carter
acknowledged the reprehensible nature of his offenses but touted his efforts at
rehabilitation. He pointed to multiple programs he completed in prison and his
minimal disciplinary record (two minor infractions).
The district court denied Carter’s motion, concluding that his medical conditions
did not create an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. The court explained
that he was fully vaccinated, he had recovered from a COVID-19 infection in late 2020,
and no active COVID-19 cases had been reported at his prison (FCI Manchester in
Kentucky). The court also determined that the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) weighed against release because he had a lengthy criminal history of “violent,
abusive, demeaning, predatory behavior,” and any substantial reduction in sentence
would put the public at risk and “depreciate the seriousness” of his actions.
Proceeding on appeal pro se, Carter generally challenges the district court’s
determination that his medical circumstances were not an extraordinary and
compelling reason for release and that the § 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed against
his release. We review the district court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. See United States
v. Saunders, 986 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2021).
The district court permissibly concluded that Carter’s medical circumstances did
not create an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. As the court
appropriately found, Carter did not show that he faced a risk of serious illness caused
by COVID-19 given his vaccinated status, the lack of any significant ongoing medical
difficulties, and the absence of any active COVID-19 cases at his prison. See United States
v. Rucker, 27 F.4th 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Manning, 5 F.4th 803, 807–08

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No. 22-1669 Page 3
(7th Cir. 2021) (upholding denial of compassionate release because defendant did not
provide evidence of severe health conditions that increased his risk of complications
from COVID-19).
Even if Carter could establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for
release, the district court reasonably denied his motion based on the sentencing factors.
See Saunders, 986 F.3d at 1078. The court needed to provide “just one good reason” for
denying the motion, Rucker, 27 F.4th at 563, and here the court explained that early
release—Carter had yet to serve half his sentence—would not reflect the severity of his
crimes, promote respect for the law, or protect the public. See Saunders, 986 F.3d at 1078
(upholding denial of compassionate release because defendant served only two-thirds
of his sentence for a serious offense).
AFFIRMED

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