United States of America v. Christopher Schaller

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 19, 2023
Decided May 26, 2023
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2100
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER SCHALLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 19-30050-001
Sue E. Myerscough,
Judge.
O R D E R
Christopher Schaller pleaded guilty to six counts of wire fraud, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343, and was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised
release. Schaller appeals, despite a broad appeal waiver in his plea agreement. His
counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Schaller did not respond to counsel’s motion. See CIR .
R. 51(b). Because counsel’s brief explains the nature of the appeal, addresses issues that
an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve, and appears thorough, we focus on
the subjects she discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-2100 Page 2
While he was a manager and loan officer at a mortgage company, Schaller
routinely committed fraud related to customers’ mortgage applications. He prepared
(or caused to be prepared) false and fraudulently altered documents, which he then
included in customers’ mortgage applications. He was indicted on six counts of wire
fraud and pleaded guilty to all six counts.
Schaller’s plea agreement contained a broad appeal waiver. Schaller waived his
right to appeal his conviction and sentence, including “any term of imprisonment, term
of supervised release, term of probation, supervised release condition, fine, forfeiture
order, and/or restitution order,” and “the manner and/or method the district court
use[d] to determine” the sentence.
Counsel first considers whether Schaller could challenge his guilty plea, but she
does not tell us, as she should, whether Schaller wants to withdraw his plea and
whether she consulted and advised him of the risks of withdrawing his plea. See United
States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012) (counsel may refrain from discussing
guilty plea only if, after consultation, defendant does not want to withdraw it); United
States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). But we need not reject counsel’s brief,
because the plea transcript shows that the district court substantially complied with the
requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.
After informing Schaller that he was under oath and could face perjury charges if
he lied, the court ensured that Schaller understood the charges (including maximum
possible penalties), the trial rights he was giving up, and how his sentence would be
determined. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(A–K, M). We note that the court did not
discuss its obligation to impose a special assessment, id. 11(b)(1)(L), but that information
appeared in Schaller’s plea agreement, so the omission does not undermine his plea.
See United States v. Driver, 242 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2001). And the court ensured that
Schaller was pleading guilty of his own volition, that there was a factual basis for the
plea, and that he understood that he was forfeiting his right to appeal his sentence and
conviction. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(N), (b)(2), (b)(3).
We agree with counsel that because the agreement and plea are valid, the appeal
waiver is enforceable and forecloses any appellate argument. See United States v. Nulf,
978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020). When a valid waiver is present, the only potential issue
is whether a narrow and rare exception to the waiver applies, see United States v.
Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016), and it would be frivolous for Schaller to
argue that any exception applies here. As counsel notes, Schaller’s 30-month sentence
did not exceed the 20-year statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343, nor did his three-

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No. 22-2100 Page 3
year term of supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(3); 3583(a)(2). And nothing in
the record suggests that the judge considered any constitutionally impermissible
factors. See Campbell, 813 F.3d at 1018.
We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion and DISMISS the appeal.

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