Terrance Prude v. ANTHONY MELI and GARY BOUGHTON

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-1320
TERRANCE PRUDE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
A NTHONY M ELI and GARY BOUGHTON ,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 17-cv-336 — Stephen L. Crocker, Magistrate Judge.
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 11, 2023 — DECIDED A UGUST 7, 2023
____________________
Before SCUDDER , ST. EVE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Terrance Prude helped a friend and
fellow inmate file a successful civil rights lawsuit against their
Wisconsin prison. According to Prude, his friend, grateful for
the help, sent him $10,000 of his damages award to help Prude
retain an attorney for his own criminal appeal. But to the
prison’s Security Director, Anthony Meli, the check did not
look like a token of appreciation; it looked like the product of
an illegal business arrangement. Meli seized the funds as

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2 No. 21-1320
contraband and launched an investigation, after which he
charged Prude with various violations of the Wisconsin Ad-
ministrative Code, including lying, unauthorized use of the
mail, threats, and enterprises and fraud. Prude had a discipli-
nary hearing on the charges and was found guilty. As part of
his punishment, the $10,000 was permanently seized.
Prude contends that the money was not contraband and
that his hearing was a sham, in violation of his due process
rights. Although Meli was an investigating officer who should
have recused himself from the hearing process, Prude claims
he did just the opposite, controlling every step of the hearing
and directing the actions of the hearing officer, Jeremy Westra,
to ensure a finding of guilt and to prevent Prude from ever
getting his money. Despite statements from Meli and Westra
before and during the hearing suggesting a predetermined
outcome, the district court dismissed the claims against Wes-
tra at the screening stage and later granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Meli on all remaining claims. Because the ev-
idence in the record plausibly supports a due process viola-
tion, we reverse.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
1. The Disputed Funds
Terrance Prude is serving an eighty-year sentence at Wau-
pun Correctional Institution (“WCI”). According to his com-
plaint, Prude used his skills as a jailhouse lawyer to help a
longtime friend and fellow inmate file a successful civil rights
lawsuit against WCI. The friend was eventually able to secure
representation by a licensed attorney, Brent Nistler, for the
case.

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No. 21-1320 3
Nistler won the lawsuit to the tune of a $40,000 damages
award. Prude claims that his friend was so happy with the re-
sult and with their lifelong friendship that he used $10,000 of
his damages award to retain Nistler to argue Prude’s criminal
appeal. But Prude did not want Nistler as his attorney—he
wanted another criminal defense attorney, Robert Meyeroff,
to represent him. Prude says that he had Nistler send him the
$10,000 directly so that he could retain counsel of his choice.
That meant that Nistler sent a $10,000 check to Prude’s prison
account.
That $10,000 check raised suspicions for WCI Security Di-
rector Anthony Meli. Because of Prude’s suspected gang
membership, Meli had been monitoring Prude’s non-legal
mail and discovered the $10,000 check from Nistler to Prude.
Meli suspected that the check was part of an improper busi-
ness arrangement between Nistler and Prude. Based on these
suspicions, Meli seized the $10,000 as contraband before it
was deposited in Prude’s account. He later interviewed Prude
about the check and opened an investigation. During the in-
terview, the discussion became heated and Prude threatened
Meli. Meli ultimately charged Prude with lying, threats, en-
terprises and fraud, and unauthorized use of the mail. Prude
admitted to threatening Meli and to the unauthorized use of
the mail but maintained that he was not guilty of lying or en-
terprises and fraud. Most importantly, he insisted that the
$10,000 was a legal gift, wholly unrelated to any alleged
prison violation.
2. Pre-Hearing Allegations
Prior to a hearing on these charges, Prude and Meli spoke
multiple times. During an interview in December 2016, Prude
claims that Meli said “he would make sure [Prude’s] funds

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4 No. 21-1320
are put in the state general fund” and told Prude to “forget
about the funds because you won’t get it back.” Meli also al-
legedly “guarantee[d] that the hearing officer wo[uld]n’t re-
turn the funds to [Prude] or the lawyer who mailed it.” About
a month later, Prude claims that Meli offered him what is
called an “undisputed disposition”—essentially, a plea bar-
gain for prison violations and punishments. Meli said that if
Prude pleaded guilty, he would be sentenced to 180 days in
disciplinary separation and the $10,000 would be perma-
nently seized. Prude turned him down, opting instead for a
hearing on the charges.
In preparation for the hearing, Prude sought to call wit-
nesses and submit evidence in his own defense. In January
2017, he sent an “Interview/Information Request” form to Ni-
cole Kamphuis, a member of the prison’s Business Office who
had initially informed him that the funds from his $10,000
check were on hold. He asked her, “Is it true that Meli author-
ized my funds to be put in the state general fund regardless
of what Westra decides at the disciplinary hearing (yes or no
answer requested only)?” Kamphuis apparently responded,
“Yes,” and signed the document.
On January 25, 2017, Prude also submitted a similar re-
quest form to Meli himself. Prude asked Meli several ques-
tions: First, “Can you submit the Meyeroff letter to the [hear-
ing officer] that I gave you?” This was a reference to Prude’s
claim that he had given Meli a letter from Meyeroff, which
would allegedly show that the $10,000 was payment to retain
counsel for his appeal. Next, Prude asked, “Can I submit a
written statement at the due process hearing I have coming
up?” Prude added, “I also have evidence that proves that you
misrepresented the facts in your [conduct report]. … Please

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No. 21-1320 5
respond.” Meli answered this request on February 1, 2017,
stating simply, “No—you can’t present your evidence/state-
ment at the hearing. Consistent with policy.” Meli offered no
further explanation, but now contends that he never received
a letter from Prude and, if he had, he would not have withheld
it. Meli did not address the other evidence Prude claimed to
have.
3. The Hearing and the Decision
The hearing on these charges occurred the day after Meli
told Prude he could not submit any evidence. The hearing of-
ficer was Captain Jeremy Westra. According to Prude, Westra
and Meli share an office and Meli is Westra’s supervisor. He
claims that Meli, despite being the investigating officer on the
case, sat at the hearing officer’s table with Westra. He alleges
that Westra took cues from Meli, even though Westra was
nominally the hearing officer. Prude alleges, for example, that
Westra asked Meli if he would like to read the Conduct Report
to start the hearing, but Meli allowed Westra to read it instead.
Further, Prude contends that Westra started the hearing by
saying, “You know my hands are tied on the 180 [days of dis-
ciplinary separation] and seized $10,000 that I have to give
you”—the same punishment Meli had offered Prude weeks
earlier. As Westra said this, Meli allegedly sat beside him and
smiled. Then, after Westra had proclaimed his “hands were
tied” as to punishment, Westra started the hearing on Prude’s
guilt.
At the close of the hearing, Westra found Prude guilty of
the charges. Westra then allegedly said, “you really must’ve
pissed Meli off. You already know what the sentence is which
is the same sentence Meli offered you,” and then ordered 180
days in disciplinary separation and seizure of the $10,000.

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6 No. 21-1320
B. Procedural History
Prude filed a complaint on May 5, 2017, alleging violations
of his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Four-
teenth Amendment.1 In his initial complaint, Prude alleged
that Meli had withheld evidence and acted as a biased deci-
sionmaker by denying Prude’s right to present evidence at the
hearing. He also detailed Westra’s “errors” throughout the
process.2
At the screening stage, the court dismissed the majority of
Prude’s due process claims but allowed Prude to proceed
against Meli on his claim that Meli had violated Prude’s due
process rights by denying him the right to present evidence at
the hearing. Then, finding that no allegations suggested that
Westra himself was a biased adjudicator, the court dismissed
Westra as a defendant.
After partial discovery on the surviving claims, the court
permitted Prude to amend his complaint to include allega-
tions that Meli was improperly involved with the hearing and
colluded with Westra to predetermine Prude’s guilt and pun-
ishment.
Less than three weeks later, Prude filed a motion to rein-
state Westra as a defendant based on these new allegations.
The court denied the motion on the grounds that it was un-
timely and would “unfairly prejudice [the] defendants.” The
1 Prude named WCI’s warden, Gary Boughton, as a defendant only in
his official capacity seeking injunctive relief in the event that he prevails
against Meli.
2 By consent of both parties, the case proceeded before a magistrate
judge.

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No. 21-1320 7
court further held that the allegations in the complaint did not
state a claim against Westra because, “viewed in a light most
favorable to Prude, [the new allegations] suggest that Westra
merely followed Meli’s orders, not that he acted out of bias
against Prude.”
Turning to the cross-motions for summary judgment, the
court found that the information request from Kamphuis, and
Westra’s statements before and after the disciplinary hearing,
were inadmissible hearsay and could not be considered at
summary judgment. Even if it considered this evidence, the
court held that it would still grant summary judgment in fa-
vor of Meli because Prude failed to identify what the evidence
would have showed or how it would have affected the out-
come, and further, none of the evidence available supported
a reasonable inference that “Meli inappropriately influenced
how Westra would resolve the charges in the conduct report.”
According to the court, “[t]he most reasonable inference to
draw from Westra’s decision to impose the same punishment
… is that Westra found it to be an appropriate punishment
and … felt bound by policy to direct the money into the state
general fund.”
The court also found the pre-hearing statements from Meli
and Westra similarly benign: “Meli’s assertion [that Prude
would not get the money back] suggest[s] that he was confi-
dent in the charges lodged against Prude, not that he was or-
chestrating the outcome of the disciplinary hearing”; and in
the absence of any incriminating communications between
Meli and Westra, “the only reasonable inference to be drawn
is that Westra felt his ‘hands were tied’ because he had re-
viewed the charges and knew he would have to confiscate the

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8 No. 21-1320
funds, not that Meli told him to find Prude guilty and to im-
pose a specific punishment.” This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
Prude alleges that his due process rights were violated at
three separate times because Meli (1) confiscated his $10,000
check without a hearing, (2) prevented him from presenting
any evidence at the subsequent disciplinary hearing, and (3)
conspired with Westra to subject him to a biased tribunal. We
review each of these claims de novo. The court decided the
first two claims at screening, thus, we take all facts alleged in
the complaint as true and make all reasonable inferences in
Prude’s favor. Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993–94 (7th Cir.
2020). The court rejected the third claim at summary judg-
ment, so we construe all facts and draw reasonable inferences
in favor of Prude. Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d 346, 350 (7th Cir.
2017) (citation omitted).
A. Due Process Claims Against Meli
“A prisoner challenging the process he was afforded in a
prison disciplinary proceeding must meet two requirements.”
Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007). First, a pris-
oner must show that “he has a liberty or property interest that
the state has interfered with.” Id. Meli has conceded this ele-
ment for the purposes of appeal.3 After clearing this hurdle, a
3 On appeal, Meli argues that Prude does not have a protected prop-
erty interest in the $10,000. At the screening stage, however, the district
court found that “Prude’s $10,000 qualifies as a deprivation of a property
interest.” Prude relied on this ruling at summary judgment, and Meli did
not contest this finding. Any argument that Prude lacks a protected prop-
erty interest is thus waived for the purposes of this appeal. Taylor v. Brown,
787 F.3d 851, 860 (7th Cir. 2015).

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No. 21-1320 9
prisoner must show that “the procedures he was afforded
upon that deprivation were constitutionally deficient.” Id.
It is well-settled that due process in a prison disciplinary
hearing requires advance notice of the charges, a hearing be-
fore an impartial decisionmaker, the right to call witnesses
and present evidence (when consistent with institutional
safety), and a written explanation of the outcome.4 Id. At the
same time, these procedural requirements are not overly
rigid. See Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2003). Any
procedures required in a prison “must balance the inmate’s
interest in avoiding loss … against the needs of the prison,
and some amount of flexibility and accommodation is re-
quired.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. Because of the unique issues
present in the prison context and the need to maintain safety
and order, “[r]ules of procedure may be shaped by consider-
ation of the risks of error and should also be shaped by the
consequences which will follow their adoption.” Id. at 567 (ci-
tations omitted).
4 Defendants contend that this standard applies only to deprivations
of liberty, not deprivations of property. But neither our case law nor the
Supreme Court case on which it relies, Wolff v. McDonnell, draws such a
distinction. In fact, Wolff, which developed the constitutional procedural
requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings, explicitly equated the
process required to protect a prisoner’s liberty interest to property interest
protections. 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (“This analysis as to liberty parallels
the accepted due process analysis as to property.”); see also Burns v. Pa.
Dep't of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting a nearly identical
argument).

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10 No. 21-1320
1. Impartial Decisionmaker
The crux of Prude’s due process claim is that he was de-
prived of his right to an impartial decisionmaker.5
5 Meli claims that, because his “alleged actions in depriving Prude of
a neutral decisionmaker would have been ‘random and unauthorized,’”
due process only requires adequate post-deprivation remedies under state
law. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541–43 (1981). Meli waived this ar-
gument on appeal by failing to raise it below. Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769,
787 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc). But even if we were to consider it, the argu-
ment would fail.
First, the Parratt doctrine does not apply to claims alleging that
wrongful conduct corrupted fair fact-finding in the criminal jus-
tice system. No court has suggested as much. [Prude’s] claims
seek to vindicate rights of fundamental fairness and thus differ in
kind from procedural due process claims governed by Parratt,
which seek only notice and a hearing before a deprivation occurs.
Second, the defendants’ broad reading of Parratt cannot stand in
light of later limiting cases. Those cases have made clear that Par-
ratt is limited to a narrow category of due process cases where the
plaintiff claims he was denied a meaningful pre-deprivation hear-
ing, but under circumstances where the very notion of a pre-dep-
rivation hearing would be impractical and even nonsensical, and
where the deprivation was not carried out through established
state procedures.
Armstrong v. Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 539 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the deprivation
was not the product of an unpredictable act like that in Parratt and was
conducted pursuant to established state procedures. See Wis. Admin.
Code § 303.09(1) (“Any employee who believes that an item is contraband
may seize the item.”). Because “‘the property deprivation is effected pur-
suant to an established state procedure,’ Parratt is irrelevant.” Bradley v.
Village of University Park, 929 F.3d 875, 887 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534 (1984)). Accordingly, Meli’s claim that his own
bias when enforcing state law shields him from federal due process claims
fails.

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No. 21-1320 11
“Adjudicators enjoy a presumption of honesty and integrity,
and thus the constitutional standard for impermissible bias is
high.” Zimmerman v. Hanks, 248 F.3d 1162 (7th Cir. 2000) (ta-
ble) (citation omitted); Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th
Cir. 2003). But this presumption has its limits—“[i]f an officer
is substantially involved in the investigation of the charges
against an inmate, due process forbids that officer from serv-
ing on the adjustment committee.” Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d
527, 534 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); see Piggie, 342 F.3d
at 667. At the other end of the spectrum, an officer who signs
off on investigatory forms only in a supervisory capacity is
not involved enough in the investigation to require recusal
from the hearing process. Whitford, 63 F.3d at 534. We judge
factual allegations of bias along this spectrum of involvement
to determine whether a decisionmaker was impartial in com-
pliance with due process.
Under these standards, Prude’s impartial decisionmaker
claim raises issues of fact that should have survived summary
judgment. An impartial officer substantially involved in the
investigation of an offense cannot decide the outcome of a
hearing. Id. And an investigator cannot circumvent this re-
quirement of due process by placing a puppet in the adjudi-
cator’s seat and pulling the strings to control the decision.
Here, significant evidence in the record permitted a reasona-
ble inference that Meli, the investigating officer, conspired
with or controlled Westra to predetermine the hearing out-
come. The district court erred here by drawing inferences in
Meli’s favor to hold otherwise.
First, it is undisputed that, despite having previously been
warned against doing so, Meli decided what evidence Prude
could submit at his hearing. While this is not enough to

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12 No. 21-1320
constitute a due process violation on its own, it does reflect
Meli’s involvement in Prude’s hearing. Just as in Whitford,
Meli prepared the investigative report against Prude and then
performed a role traditionally associated with the deci-
sionmaker: deciding what evidence Prude could present. Id.
Moreover, Meli did so without any explanation or investiga-
tion into what evidence Prude sought to present—this, too,
plausibly suggests biased judgement rather than an impartial-
ity.
Second, Meli’s alleged statements to Prude about the inev-
itable outcome of the hearing support an inference that Meli
controlled the hearing result. Prude alleged that Meli told
him—prior to the disciplinary hearing—that the $10,000
would not be returned to Prude no matter what happened
during the hearing. The district court thought little of these
statements, suggesting that “Meli … may have done so think-
ing it would have elicited a confession from Prude … [or] that
he was confident in the charges he lodged against Prude[.]”
While these explanations may be plausible, it is also plausible
that when Meli stated that the outcome of the disciplinary
hearing was preordained, he meant exactly that—that he al-
ready knew the outcome of the hearing and that it would be
decided against Prude.
The inference that Meli predetermined the outcome is all
the more reasonable when we consider Westra’s alleged state-
ments before and after the hearing.6 Prude testified that, be-
fore any evidence had been presented, Westra stated, “you
6 As addressed below, the district court improperly held that Westra’s
statements were inadmissible hearsay. We consider them here, as the dis-
trict court should have in its summary judgment analysis.

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No. 21-1320 13
know my hands are tied on the 180 [days of disciplinary sep-
aration] and seized $10,000 that I have to give you,” while
Meli sat next to Westra and smiled. According to Prude, this
was the same punishment proposed by Meli in the uncon-
tested disposition offer. And at the conclusion of the hearing,
Westra did, in fact, order that exact punishment. Prude also
alleges that Westra said, “you really must’ve pissed Meli off,”
prior to delivering his verdict. While traditionally these state-
ments may be insufficient, when viewed collectively, and
given Meli’s position of power over Westra as a supervisor,
they give rise to a reasonable inference that Westra was acting
at Meli’s direction.
Although the district court noted the lack of direct evi-
dence of any communications between Westra and Meli about
Prude’s hearing, in cases dealing with discrimination in the
employment context, we have explained that such smoking
gun evidence is uncommon; “[t]he far more common case re-
lies on circumstantial evidence, which allows the trier of fact
to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.”
Mullin v. Temco Mach., Inc., 732 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, in
the prison disciplinary hearing context where prisoners’ ac-
cess to different spaces is severely restricted, it is not surpris-
ing that Prude does not have direct evidence of private com-
munications between conspiring guards.
Because evidence in the record, when viewed together and
in the light most favorable to Prude, plausibly supports the
inference that Meli’s interference in Prude’s hearing violated

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14 No. 21-1320
his right to an impartial decisionmaker, we reverse the grant
of summary judgment on this claim.7
2. Qualified Immunity
The district court held in the alternative that Meli was en-
titled to qualified immunity on any due process claims. This
too was an error.
“Qualified immunity requires a two-part inquiry: we must
determine (1) whether facts alleged or shown by a plaintiff
make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) if so,
whether that right was clearly established at the time of the
defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914
F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 232 (2009)). We have already explained that Prude’s evi-
dence at summary judgment satisfies the first prong of this
test. We now focus on whether the right to an unbiased deci-
sionmaker was clearly established.
“Th[e] inquiry [into whether a constitutional right is
clearly established] must be undertaken in light of the specific
7 Prude also alleges that Meli violated his due process rights by pro-
hibiting him from presenting evidence, such as his letter from Meyeroff,
at the hearing. See Piggie, 344 F.3d at 678 (“[A]n inmate is entitled to dis-
closure of material, exculpatory evidence in prison disciplinary hearings
unless such disclosure would unduly threaten institutional concerns.”).
Any error was harmless, however, because Prude fails to explain why the
evidence would have altered the outcome. See id. (finding any error harm-
less because, “even if this factual dispute were to be resolved in Piggie’s
favor, we are unable to see how Piggie was harmed by the screening of-
ficer’s alleged conduct”). Prude bears the burden of showing prejudice at
his hearing, Vaughn v. Willis, 853 F.2d 1372, 1376 (7th Cir. 1988), and so his
failure to explain how any of the requested evidence would have helped
him is fatal to this claim.

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No. 21-1320 15
context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Mul-
lenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (cleaned up).
“A right is clearly established when it is defined clearly
enough to put officers on notice of their duties under the cir-
cumstances they confront. … This does not require a prior
case directly on point, but existing precedent must have
placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond de-
bate.” Est. of Clark v. Walker, 865 F.3d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 2017)
(cleaned up). In Meli’s case, the question is therefore whether
it was “beyond debate” that an investigating officer cannot
conspire with or control a hearing officer to directly deter-
mine the outcome of a disciplinary hearing.
The answer is a straightforward yes. If the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendment protections of due process mean any-
thing, they mean a right to a fair, impartial decisionmaker. See
Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 814 (2002) (noting the
impartiality requirement is “jealously guarded” to “ensure[]
that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence
of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assur-
ance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.”
(quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)). No
reasonable official could believe that predetermining the out-
come of a disciplinary hearing—no matter how that is accom-
plished—is consistent with due process. See Taylor v. Riojas,
141 S. Ct. 52, 53–54 (2020) (explaining that “a general consti-
tutional rule already identified in the decisional law may ap-
ply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question”
(quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
B. Prude’s Motion to Amend and Reinstate Westra
The district court also erred in denying Prude’s motion to
amend his complaint and reinstate Westra as a defendant. The

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16 No. 21-1320
district court held that the complaint did not plausibly state a
claim against Westra and that it was untimely.
“Rule 15(a) provides that a court ‘should freely give leave
[to amend] when justice so requires.’” KAP Holdings, LLC v.
Mar-Cone Appliance Parts Co., 55 F.4th 517, 529 (7th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). We review a district court’s de-
cision to deny a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. Id.
at 528.
The district court abused its discretion by holding that the
new allegations “suggest that Westra merely followed Meli’s
orders, not that he acted out of bias against Prude.” As out-
lined above, our case law does not require that a deci-
sionmaker have personal animus against a prisoner to violate
his right to due process. Rather, his due process rights are vi-
olated when he is denied an impartial decisionmaker. See
Scruggs, 485 F.3d at 939; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563–71. If, as Prude’s
complaint alleged, Meli and Westra “worked together … in
issuing a punishment” against him; Westra’s actions were “al-
ready la[i]d out by” Meli prior to the hearing; and Westra was
“following orders” to find Prude guilty and give him a partic-
ular punishment; then Westra was not impartial.
Further, the district court allowed Prude to amend his
complaint to include allegations about a conspiracy between
Meli and Westra to predetermine his guilt less than three
weeks before Prude sought to include the same claim against
Westra. The district court found no prejudice when it permit-
ted essentially the same claim to proceed against Meli, and the
court provides no explanation for how this three-week delay
prejudiced Westra or Meli. So, this Court has no way of re-
viewing the district court’s denial because we do not know
what prejudice it expected, how, or to whom. See United States

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No. 21-1320 17
v. Marion, 590 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Some minimal
explanation is required.”).
Prude’s motion to amend his complaint and reinstate Wes-
tra as a defendant was both based on a plausible denial of his
right to due process and timely. We now reinstate the claims
against Westra and remand for appropriate discovery.
C. Evidence Considered by the District Court
Finally, Prude contends that the district court erred in re-
fusing to consider Westra’s and Kamphuis’s statements as in-
admissible hearsay. “To be considered on summary judg-
ment, evidence must be admissible at trial, …. If the evidence
is inadmissible hearsay, the courts may not consider it. And
when a document contains multiple layers of hearsay, … each
layer must be admissible.” Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 830
(7th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). “We review the district court’s
evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.” Davies v.
Benbenek, 836 F.3d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 2016).
1. Westra’s Hearing Statements
The district court refused to consider several of Westra’s
alleged statements. These included both statements before the
hearing (“you know my hands are tied on the 180 day [disci-
plinary separation] and seized $10,000 that I have to give
you”) and after the hearing (“you really must’ve pissed Meli
off. You already know what the sentence is which is the same
sentence Meli offered you”).
The court reasoned that these statements were “inadmis-
sible hearsay, since Westra is not a party to this lawsuit and
he was not Meli’s agent.” But if the district court had not
abused its discretion in denying Prude’s motion to reinstate

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18 No. 21-1320
Westra, Westra would have been a defendant and his state-
ments would have been admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).
Westra’s statement are also admissible because they are
not being introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2) (noting an out-of-court statement
constitutes hearsay only when it is offered into evidence “to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”). Wes-
tra’s statements were not offered to prove that his “hands
were tied,” that Prude must have really “pissed Meli off” or
that Prude “already kn[ew]” what sentence Westra would
give him. Rather, they were offered to show Westra’s belief
that the outcome of the hearing was set, even before any evi-
dence had been presented. See Cairel, 821 F.3d at 830 (“[T]hose
statements were not hearsay because they were not offered to
prove that they were true.”). The court abused its discretion
by excluding Westra’s statements.
2. Kamphuis’s Written Statements
The district court did, however, correctly exclude as hear-
say the document allegedly filled out by Kamphuis. Prude
submitted a request form to Kamphuis with questions about
Meli’s pre-hearing statements. In relevant part, he asked, “Is
it true that Meli authorized my funds to be put in the state
general fund regardless of what Westra decides at the disci-
plinary hearing (yes or no answer requested only)?” Kam-
phuis apparently responded, “Yes,” and signed the docu-
ment. This includes two layers of potential hearsay, the state-
ment by Meli to Kamphuis and her relay of that statement to
Prude. Each layer must be analyzed before the document can
be admitted. Cairel, 821 F.3d at 830.

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No. 21-1320 19
Meli’s statement to Kamphuis is from a party opponent
and is being offered against him. Under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), his
statements are not hearsay. Kamphuis’s relaying of that state-
ment, however, poses a problem for Prude. Kamphuis is not
a party to this suit and her statements are only relevant if they
are true, which makes them inadmissible hearsay. Although
Prude tries to shoehorn her statements into two separate hear-
say exceptions, neither fits the bill.
Prude initially argues that Kamphuis’s statement “facially
appears to be a statement by a public office setting out the ac-
tivities of that office.” See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8). But Prude fails
to explain—to this Court or the court below—how or why her
statements fall within that exception. It was not an abuse of
discretion to reject this argument.
Prude then contends that the catch-all “residual excep-
tion” under Rule 807 applies to Kamphuis’s statements. An
exception to the bar on hearsay, Rule 807 “provides that a suf-
ficiently trustworthy hearsay statement is admissible if ‘it is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reason-
able efforts.’” Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214,
233 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)). “We construe
the Rule 807 requirements narrowly.” Id. (citing Burton v.
Kohn L. Firm, S.C., 934 F.3d 572, 583 (7th Cir. 2019)). Here,
Prude offered Kamphuis’s statement to prove that Meli had
predetermined Prude’s sentence. That is exactly what Meli
himself allegedly told Prude—and those statements were al-
ready in the summary judgment record. Accordingly, the
Kamphuis letter is not “more probative” on this point than
other available evidence, and the district court did not abuse
its broad discretion in refusing to consider it.

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20 No. 21-1320
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.

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