Irma Elizabeth Munoz -Rivera v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-3124
I RMA ELIZABETH M UNOZ -R IVERA, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
M ERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General
of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of An Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Nos. A209-299-363, A209-299-364,
A209-299-365.
____________________
A RGUED M AY 25, 2023 — DECIDED A UGUST 24, 2023
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, R OVNER , and LEE, Circuit Judges.
R OVNER , Circuit Judge. Irma Munoz-Rivera and her
daughters, Ana Cristina and Maria, fled Guatemala where
they allege they were victims of domestic abuse, and sought
asylum in the United States, entering without inspection in

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2 No. 22-3124
August 2016.1 The immigration judge found that Munoz’s
claims were not supported by credible evidence and denied
her petition. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and
ordered removal to their countries of citizenship, which is
Honduras for Munoz and Guatemala for Ana and Maria.
Because the decisions were supported by substantial
evidence, this court must deny Munoz’s petition for review.
I.
Munoz was born in and is a citizen of Honduras. She
moved to Guatemala at age twenty-five to join some family
members, but never acquired lawful status there. In
Guatemala, she entered into a twelve-year relationship with
Esduardo Mazariegos, with whom she had two daughters,
Ana and Maria, who by birth became citizens of Guatemala.
When Munoz was pregnant with Maria, Esduardo began a
relationship with another woman, Alejandra Oneida
Escalante, and his relationship with Munoz deteriorated.2
Munoz and her children left Guatemala for the United
States in August 2016. She applied for asylum under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(A) along with withholding of removal under
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), and relief under the Convention
Against Torture. The daughters sought derivative beneficiary
status under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3), and as such their claim for
1 Irma Munoz-Rivera refers to herself as Ms. Munoz in her brief, and
so we will do the same.
2 The immigration judge and Board referred to Esduardo Mazariegos
(also referred to as Esduardo Gomez) as “Esduardo,” and Alejandra
Oneida Escalante Sabillon (also referred to as Oneida Alejandra) as
“Oneida,” and so, for simplicity, we will do the same.

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No. 22-3124 3
relief is entirely based on the success of Munoz’s claim. See
N.L.A. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 425, 432–33 (7th Cir. 2014).
At her credible fear interview held shortly after her arrival
in the United States, Munoz stated that she was afraid of
Oneida who had insulted and threatened her and wanted her
to leave Guatemala. In response to a direct question about
physical harm, Munoz stated that she had not been physically
harmed by Oneida or anyone else. She also stated that the po-
lice would protect her in Guatemala. In an updated asylum
application, however, she claimed that she was the victim of
domestic violence at the hands of Esduardo. The declaration
submitted with her application added that Oneida had threat-
ened to kill her, and also described an incident in which her
husband chased her with an axe. In her legal brief in support
of the application she added that Esduardo repeatedly hit her
and her daughters.
At her trial before the immigration judge, Munoz testified
that Esduardo was physically and mentally abusive, and that
the abuse began primarily when and because Esduardo began
a relationship with Oneida. In testimony, she described
Esduardo’s taunts and verbal abuse, as well as the axe-chas-
ing event whereupon she fell and received five stitches on her
head. She also testified that she tried to leave the house, but
Esduardo found her and threatened to take her daughters if
she tried to leave again. She asserted that she could not go to
the police because they would not help a foreigner, but that
Esduardo’s mother would often intervene when Esduardo
was abusive. Munoz left for the United States because she
feared that Esduardo’s mother, who had become ill with can-
cer, would no longer be able to protect her. According to
Munoz’s testimony, Esduardo and Oneida wanted her to

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4 No. 22-3124
leave Guatemala, but she feared they would continue to har-
ass her if she went to Honduras, as Oneida had family there
and would “find a way to continue bothering” her. Adminis-
trative Record (A.R.) at 154. Munoz’s cousin in Honduras told
Munoz that Oneida and Esduardo reached out to her and said
that they will not leave Munoz alone and will look for her
wherever she is.
On cross examination, when the Department of Homeland
Security attorney asked Munoz why she had told the asylum
officer that that she had not been harmed by anyone other
than Oneida, Munoz replied “[b]ecause she was the only one
who had harmed me, and he who hurt me a lot.” A.R. at 152.
The Department attorney asked Munoz if Oneida ever hit her,
and she responded “No, she only threatened me.” A.R. at 156.
And when asked if Esduardo ever hit her, she responded,
“[h]e will come to threaten me, and my mother-in-law would
defend me.” Id. When the Department attorney asked why
she testified on direct examination that Esduardo hurt her a
lot, she answered that it “was true because he mistreated me
a lot” and would “say mean things” all the time. A.R. at 157–
58. The Department lawyer also asked her why Oneida would
still pursue her in Honduras if Oneida’s goal was for Munoz
to leave Guatemala. Munoz simply responded that Oneida
“would find a way to continue bothering me.” A.R. at 154.
On re-direct examination, Munoz’s attorney asked, “did
your ex-partner ever hit you?” Munoz replied, “No, he just
mistreated me verbally with his threats.” A.R. at 159. When
asked why she testified earlier that he did physically hit her,
she replied, “no just when he was chasing” her and she fell
and hurt her head. Id. She added that he would chase her
around with a knife every week for ten years and once “threw

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No. 22-3124 5
the door” on her and hurt her finger. A.R. at 159–61. She also
testified on re-direct that she was uncomfortable sharing this
information with the male asylum officer at her credible fear
interview.
Munoz also testified about an incident in 2010 when she
alleged that Oneida kidnapped Ana. Munoz explained that
she sent Ana to the store, and an hour later a cousin called to
say that Ana was with Oneida in Huehuetenango, which was
about two hours away.3 The immigration judge asked how
she could have received a call from her cousin about the kid-
napping one hour after it happened if Ana was taken two
hours away, and Munoz responded, “Well, because he was
over there and Huehuetenango.” A.R. at 169–70. When asked
why Oneida would take her daughter, Munoz stated that it
was because Oneida wanted Esduardo “to come to her
[Oneida’s] house.” A.R. at 170. But Munoz also confirmed that
Esduardo was living with Oneida at the time of the kidnap-
ping. According to her testimony, she went to the police de-
partment, but the police told her not to press charges, and
Oneida also begged her not to press charges. She stated that
she nevertheless filed a police report that same day, but when
questioned as to why the police report was dated 2016, she
explained that she did not receive a copy until 2016.
The immigration judge held that Munoz’s testimony was
not credible based on the cumulative effect of the inconsistent,
vague, and evasive testimony, and thus she did not meet her
burden under the REAL ID Act. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
3 Munoz stated that Ana was five years old at the time of the events,
but the government’s brief notes that if the kidnapping happened in 2010,
Ana would have been seven or eight.

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6 No. 22-3124
302 (2005); 8 U.S.C.A. § (b)(1)(B)(iii). Moreover, the immigra-
tion judge found that the documentary evidence did not re-
habilitate her claim, and therefore denied her application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge also de-
nied Munoz’s request to have Ana testify as the judge ex-
plained that she did not think her testimony would be rele-
vant and she did not “see any benefits of having a child or
minor testify about an event that she probably did not under-
stand when she was 5 years old.” A.R. at 171. The Board af-
firmed, finding that the immigration judge based her credibil-
ity finding on specific and cogent reasons, agreeing that the
testimony was inconsistent, implausible, and vague. The
Board found that Munoz “also did not challenge the Immi-
gration judge’s findings she made as to the respondent’s im-
plausible and vague testimony … [and] did not address the
inconsistency regarding when she filed the police report,”
and thus waived any challenge to those findings made by the
immigration judge. A.R. at 4. Because the Board agreed with
the decision of the immigration judge, we review the immi-
gration judge’s decision as supplemented by the Board. Cui v.
Garland, 71 F.4th 592, 599 (7th Cir. 2023).
II.
Munoz bears the burden of proving that she is a refugee
who is unwilling or unable to return to her home country “be-
cause of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic-
ular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42),
1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Victims of domestic violence may meet this
burden if they “would experience extraordinary abuse if they
were sent back to their home country.” Sarhan v. Holder, 658

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No. 22-3124 7
F.3d 649, 662 (7th Cir. 2011). But when the abuse is at the
hands of a private person, rather than the government, the
acts cannot be called “persecution” unless the government is
unwilling or helpless to protect against the abuse. Gatimi v.
Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616–17 (7th Cir. 2009). Munoz makes a
fleeting claim that she belongs to a social group of “Honduran
women being treated as property.” Munoz Brief at 4. Social
group claims, however, are a specific type of asylum claim
and require particular proffers about the cognizability of the
group. See, e.g., Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 668–70 (7th Cir.
2013). Although Munoz uses the words “social group,” she
does not set forth any arguments to support such a claim. In
any event, we need not belabor whether she meets the defini-
tion of a social group because, as we address below, the im-
migration judge and Board decisions rejecting her claims are
supported by more than sufficient evidence, and Munoz has
waived challenges to many of those findings.
A. Waiver
A court may review a final order of removal only if the
applicant first exhausts “’all administrative remedies availa-
ble to the alien as of right,’ 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), and … this
includes the obligation first to present to the Board any argu-
ments that lie within its power to address.” Issaq v. Holder, 617
F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ghaffar v. Mukasey, 551
F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2008)).4 To exhaust a claim, the
4 Recently, the Supreme Court held that § 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion re-
quirement is not jurisdictional and does not require asylum seekers to re-
quest discretionary forms of review, like reconsideration of an unfavora-
ble Board determination. Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 1103, 1116-20
(2023). It does still, however, require exhaustion of remedies “available …
(continued)

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8 No. 22-3124
petitioner must argue it specifically and with enough detail to
put the Board on notice that the petitioner is trying to chal-
lenge the immigration judge’s decision based on that argu-
ment. Kithongo v. Garland, 33 F.4th 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2022). “It
is not enough that the new argument bears some relation to
the evidentiary record.” Nyandwi v. Garland, 15 F.4th 836, 841
(7th Cir. 2021).
The immigration judge made numerous findings regard-
ing Munoz’s credibility and her corroborative evidence. But
in Munoz’s appeal to the Board, the only argument she made
regarding the credibility determination was that the credible
fear interview should be deemed to be unreliable. She did not
directly challenge the judge’s credibility findings regarding
her vague and inconsistent testimony. For example, among
other things, she did nothing to address the inconsistencies
between her asylum application and her testimony regarding
her husband’s alleged abuse, and she did not address the
problems with the contradictory portions of the description of
the kidnapping or the problematic police report dates. Be-
cause Munoz’s arguments failed to engage substantively with
most of the immigration judge’s factual findings regarding
credibility, the Board held that she “waived any challenge” to
those findings. A.R. at 4. See Kithongo, 33 F.4th at 457–58. We
agree.
The Board also noted that Munoz did not address the im-
migration judge’s findings on the corroborating evidence. The
sole argument Munoz made regarding the corroborating evi-
dence was that the judge failed to consider it. But as the Board
as of right” like the initial immigration hearing and appeal to the Board.
Id. at 1116.

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No. 22-3124 9
noted, the immigration judge did indeed consider the corrob-
orating evidence, but found that it too lacked credibility or
reliability. The Board properly noted that an immigration
judge is permitted to make reasonable inferences among the
plausible possibilities and explanations in the record and that
the reasons cited by the immigration judge were an adequate
basis for her adverse credibility finding under the totality of
the circumstances.
Munoz compounds the problem by also failing to chal-
lenge the immigration judge’s credibility findings in her brief
before this court. She merely argues that the immigration
judge was “simply incorrect” that Ms. Munoz was not credi-
ble, and that she rehabilitated her testimony by explaining the
inconsistencies. Munoz Brief at 5. She also argues that her
“misstatements did not go to the heart of her claim.” Id. As for
the corroborating evidence, Munoz argues once again that the
immigration judge failed to consider the police report and the
testimony of her expert witness. None of these arguments
substantively challenge the immigration judge’s credibility
findings, and thus those challenges are waived.
B. Credibility
But even were we to give Munoz the benefit of the doubt
that her conclusive statement that the immigration judge
erred was enough of a challenge to the credibility finding, her
argument is not that the immigration judge applied the incor-
rect criteria, or otherwise legally erred. Instead, Munoz ar-
gues that given the evidence, the immigration judge should
have found her to be credible. But an assessment of credibility
is a factual finding to which we must give the immigration
judge’s finding great deference. Cui, 71 F.4th at 600.

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10 No. 22-3124
As a preliminary matter, Munoz’s claim that her inconsist-
encies did not go to the heart of her claim is both legally irrel-
evant and factually inaccurate. Under the REAL ID Act, an
immigration judge may base an adverse credibility finding on
any inconsistencies or falsehoods in the applicant’s testimony,
without regard to whether they go to the heart of the appli-
cant’s claim. Cojocari v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir.
2017) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). And although the
immigration judge must “distinguish between inconsisten-
cies ... that are material and those that are not,” in this case,
inconsistencies around whether Munoz’s husband physically
harmed her or not, and whether evidence supported her claim
that her daughter was kidnapped, are the very essence of her
claim. See Cui, 71 F.4th at 599.
Asylum cases often turn on the immigration judge’s cred-
ibility determinations and when they do, an “adverse credi-
bility determination will doom an applicant’s claimed eligi-
bility.” Dai v. Garland, 24 F. 4th 628, 635 (7th Cir. 2022). We
give great deference to an immigration judge’s factual find-
ings and uphold them so long as they are supported by sub-
stantial evidence. Cui, 71 F.4th at 600. This is particularly true
for credibility findings, which we overturn only in “extraor-
dinary circumstances.” Id. (quoting Santashbekov v. Lynch, 834
F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 2016)). The only question for an appel-
late court reviewing the agency’s factual determinations “is
whether any reasonable adjudicator could have found as the
agency did.” Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1678 (2021)
(emphasis in original). In other words, we will reverse only if
the record evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Lozano-
Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822, 826 (7th Cir. 2016).

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No. 22-3124 11
The immigration judge properly described the legal
framework for assessing credibility noting that “the respond-
ent’s testimony alone is sufficient to satisfy her burden of
proof only if the court determines that the testimony is credi-
ble, persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to
demonstrate that the respondent is a refugee.” A.R. at 52 (cit-
ing INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii)). And the immigration judge
properly noted that she could base her adverse credibility
findings on inconsistencies in the evidence and assess
Munoz’s credibility “using whatever combination of consid-
erations seems best in the situation at hand.” Id.
The immigration judge then thoroughly assessed Munoz’s
credibility, by considering her “demeanor, candor, respon-
siveness, the inherent plausibility of her claim, the con-
sistency between oral and written statements, and the internal
consistency of her statement” and found that she was not
credible. A.R. at 52. The immigration judge noted that she
considered the totality of the circumstances and relied on the
cumulative effect of the inconsistencies in her assessment.
Munoz argues that the evidence compels a contrary con-
clusion, but this is impossible to reconcile with the evidence
before the immigration judge. The immigration judge (and
then the Board) set forth in great detail the inconsistencies that
it found most troubling. The immigration judge based her as-
sessment on Munoz’s “dramatically differing accounts” re-
garding domestic abuse, including whether she was physi-
cally harmed at all and if so, by whom, and the implausibility
of her narrative about Oneida and her ability and desire to
continue harming her in Honduras. A.R. at 52–53. The immi-
gration judge found the testimony about the kidnapping to be
vague, evasive, and riddled with inconsistencies including

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12 No. 22-3124
about exactly what happened and the dates of the alleged po-
lice report of the incident. The immigration judge set forth
these findings in much greater detail than we need to describe
in our deferential review. See id.
Munoz argues that “on re-direct examination, [she] pro-
vided a reasonable explanation for any prior inconsistencies
because she was hesitant to openly discuss her being a victim
of domestic violence to male border officials.” Munoz Brief at
5. But the immigration judge considered her testimony on re-
direct “that she was not comfortable discussing the relation-
ship at the interview with a male asylum officer,” A.R. at 51,
but nevertheless found that Munoz was not credible. This is
the exact type of evidence weighing to which we must give
the agency great deference. Feto v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 907, 911–
12 (7th Cir. 2006). We cannot say that no reasonable adjudica-
tor could have found as the agency did. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct.
at 1678.
Munoz also claims again in this appeal that the immigra-
tion judge failed to consider any corroborating evidence that
rehabilitated her credibility, including the police report de-
scribing the daughter’s kidnapping and the expert testimony.
The immigration judge did, in fact, consider this corroborat-
ing evidence. The immigration judge considered the police re-
port but found it unreliable due to the discrepancy about the
dates. The immigration judge also considered the testimony
of the expert but concluded that it had little probative value
because his statement was based on his conversation with Ms.
Munoz and her declaration, which the court had already
found to be unreliable. The court also considered the fact that
Munoz did not submit corroborating evidence from her
cousin who told her that Oneida and Esduardo were still

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No. 22-3124 13
looking for her. Finally, the judge acknowledged that the
country-condition reports corroborated problems with do-
mestic violence, and she was cognizant of the fact that victims
of domestic abuse often have trouble testifying about it, but
nevertheless she was unconvinced of Munoz’s credibility. The
immigration judge did not fail to consider the corroborating
evidence, Munoz simply does not agree with the agency’s
conclusions about it. Once again, we are not a rubber stamp
for immigration judges’ findings, but our review is indeed
deferential. Feto, 433 F.3d at 911.
C. Ana’s Testimony
In a single sentence of her brief before the Board, Munoz
stated that the judge “Failed to allow Ms. Munoz’s oldest
daughter to testify [at] their hearing, which in itself could be
deemed a violation of due process under the 5th [A]mend-
ment.” A.R. at 24. She did not allege how she was prejudiced
by any possible violation. Nor did she do so in her brief in this
appeal. This argument is therefore waived. Puffer v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven arguments
that have been raised may still be waived on appeal if they are
underdeveloped, conclusory, or unsupported by law.”)
D. Withholding of Removal and CAT
Because Munoz has not met the lower burden for asylum,
she cannot meet the higher burdens required for withholding
of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) and protection under the
Convention Against Torture. Alvarenga-Flores v. Sessions, 901
F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 2018).

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14 No. 22-3124
III.
Munoz offers no basis for us to conclude that the record
compelled a different result than that reached by the agency.
Consequently, the petition for review is DENIED.

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