United States of America v. John G. Haslett

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 26, 2023
Decided September 11, 2023
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2253
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOHN G. HASLETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 4:15-CR-40023-SMY
Staci M. Yandle,
Judge.
O R D E R
John Haslett appeals the sentence imposed upon the revocation of his supervised
release, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to
withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We grant counsel’s motion and
dismiss Haslett’s appeal.
Although a defendant does not have an absolute right to counsel in revocation
proceedings, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789–90 (1973), our practice is to follow
the Anders framework in this context. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-2253 Page 2
(7th Cir. 2016). Counsel's brief explains the nature of the case and raises potential issues
that an appeal like this would be expected to involve. Because her analysis appears
thorough, and Haslett has not responded to counsel's motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), we limit
our review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774,
776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Haslett pleaded guilty in 2016 to conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine,
21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(C), and possessing a listed chemical for use in manufacturing
a controlled substance. Id. § 841(c)(2). He was sentenced to 65 months’ imprisonment
and three years’ supervised release. Haslett served his prison term but then violated
numerous conditions of his release by, among other things, testing positive for drugs
and possessing a firearm. The government in turn petitioned to revoke his supervised
release.
At his revocation hearing, Haslett admitted to the drug charges and other
violations; the government moved to dismiss the firearm-possession violation. The
district court then revoked Haslett’s supervised release, calculated a policy-statement
imprisonment range of 12 to 18 months (based on a criminal-history category of IV and
a Grade B violation—possession of methamphetamine), U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a)(2), 7B1.4(a),
and sentenced Haslett in the middle—to 15 months. Additionally, the court sentenced
Haslett to 24 months of supervised release for each underlying offense, to be served
concurrently.
Counsel first tells us that Haslett does not wish to challenge the revocation of his
supervised release, and thus she appropriately declines to explore any challenge to his
admissions or the district court’s decision to revoke. See United States v. Wheeler,
814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016).
Counsel next considers whether Haslett could challenge the court’s calculation of
his policy-statement range, and correctly rejects such a challenge as frivolous. Because
Haslett did not object to the court’s calculation, we would review such a challenge for
plain error. Id. And we see no error, let alone one that is plain. The court properly
determined that Haslett’s most serious admitted violation—possession of
methamphetamine—would be treated as a Class 3 felony under Illinois law, see 720
ILCS 646/60(b)(1), corresponding to a sentencing range of two to five years in prison.
See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-40(a). Because his violation constituted a state offense punishable
by imprisonment exceeding one year, the court properly characterized his violation as
Grade B. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2); United States v. Patlan, 31 F.4th 552, 557 (7th Cir.
2022) (Illinois methamphetamine possession a Grade B violation). And the court

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No. 22-2253 Page 3
correctly set Haslett’s criminal-history category at IV because that was his level at his
original sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a).
Counsel then appropriately declines to argue that Haslett’s 15-month prison term
exceeded the statutory maximum. Because Haslett’s drug charges carried a statutory
maximum between 10 and 25 years, he was convicted of two Class C felonies, see 18
U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C), (c)(2), corresponding to a 2-year statutory
maximum prison term upon revocation of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)
(2015). The court’s 15-month sentence fell below the statutory maximum.
Next, counsel identifies an error in the district court’s imposition of an additional
24 months’ supervised release: the 24-month term for Haslett’s possession conviction
exceeded the 21 months that the court was authorized to impose. Supervised release
following revocation is limited to the maximum supervised-release term for the
underlying offense, less any term of imprisonment for the revocation. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(h). Haslett should have been subjected to no more than 21 months—the
difference between the 36-month maximum term he faced based on his conviction for
possession of a listed chemical, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2), minus his
15-month prison term. Haslett did not object, so we would review for plain error.
See United States v. Allgire, 946 F.3d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 2019). And we agree with counsel
that there was no plain error. Plain error exists only if the error affected Haslett’s
substantial rights (i.e., prejudice). See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). But
because Haslett’s conviction for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine,
§ 841(b)(1)(C), allows for a maximum supervised release term of life, the 24-month term
imposed for this conviction was lawful. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(h). And a simple
modification of the district court’s possession-conviction sentence from 24 to 21 months
will suffice to correct this error. We see no other substantial right that the error may
have been impinged. See Allgire, 946 F.3d at 368.
Counsel then rightly rejects challenging the district court’s reliance on dismissed
conduct—Haslett’s firearm possession—to increase his sentence. District courts may
consider a wide range of conduct at sentencing, including dismissed offenses. United
States v. Bridgewater, 950 F.3d 928, 938–39 (7th Cir. 2020).
Finally, we agree with counsel that any challenge to the reasonableness of
Haslett’s 15-month term of imprisonment would be frivolous. We presume a term
within the policy-statement range like Haslett’s to be reasonable. United States v. Jones,
774 F.3d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 2014). And nothing in the record could rebut that
presumption. The district court adequately addressed the § 3553(a) factors,
acknowledging Haslett’s arguments in mitigation with regard to his mental health and

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No. 22-2253 Page 4
drug problems but concluding that his firearm possession and repeated drug violations
while on supervised release showed that he posed a danger to the community and
required deterrence from future criminal conduct. This explanation more than sufficed.
We therefore MODIFY the judgment by reducing the term of supervised release
for Haslett’s possession conviction to 21 months. With that change, we GRANT
counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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