Jaclynn Hooker v. Nathaniel Hooker

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 11, 2023*
Decided September 12, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2914
JACLYNN HOOKER,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
NATHANIEL HOOKER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 22 C 2999
Virginia M. Kendall,
Judge.
O R D E R
Nathaniel Hooker seeks review of two decisions: The first remanded his child-
custody proceedings to state court, and the second awarded attorney’s fees to his ex-
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-2914 Page 2
wife for the expense of a frivolous removal. We previously limited this appeal to a
challenge of the latter ruling because we lack jurisdiction to review the remand order.
Because Nathanial continues to dispute the remand without addressing the fee award,
we now affirm the decision to award attorney’s fees.
In 2018, the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois, adjudicated the divorce and
child-custody proceedings of Nathaniel and Jaclynn Hooker. (For clarity, we refer to the
parties by their first names.) A few years later, Jaclynn moved to modify Nathaniel’s
child-support obligations because his income had increased substantially. Nathaniel
removed the divorce case to federal court, arguing that the district court had
jurisdiction because he is a federal employee, he receives benefits from the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs, and the state court proceedings allegedly violated his
federal constitutional rights. Jaclynn moved to remand the case to state court, and,
invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), she requested reasonable attorney fees and costs for
Nathaniel’s improper removal to federal court.
The district court agreed that removal was improper because it had no subject-
matter jurisdiction over the family-court matter. It explained that Nathaniel’s child-
support obligations did not raise a federal question; further, any diversity jurisdiction
was defeated by the domestic-relations exception, see Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S.
689, 703 (1992), and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413,
415–16 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). The court
remanded the case to state court, reviewed the evidence for Jaclynn’s fee request, and
ultimately ordered Nathaniel to pay $12,450.
Sixty-four days after the remand order and twenty-eight days after the ruling
awarding fees in an amount certain, Nathaniel filed a notice of appeal purportedly
challenging both decisions. We told the parties to submit jurisdictional memoranda
addressing whether the remand decision was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Nathaniel’s memorandum is unpersuasive. He argues that under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d)—which permits review of removal in cases that involve (1) a federal officer
acting under color of his office, id. § 1442, or (2) federal civil rights, id. § 1443—we can
review the decision to remand here. He again asserts that being a federal employee and
raising constitutional claims entitled him to remove. He also contends that because the
order for attorney’s fees was predicated on the merits of the removal order, both orders
are appealable.

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No. 22-2914 Page 3
We concluded otherwise. See Limiting Order, App. Dkt. 16 (Feb. 17, 2023).
Although we have jurisdiction to review a case remanded to state court based on the
exceptions in § 1447(d), Northern League, Inc. v. Gidney, 558 F.3d 614, 614 (7th Cir. 2009),
none applies here. Nathaniel’s child-support obligations are not related to acts taken
pursuant to his federal office, 28 U.S.C. § 1442. And his cursory mention of civil rights
violations does not provide us with jurisdiction under § 1443: It hardly meets the
standard of Rule 28(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Yasinskyy v.
Holder, 724 F.3d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 2013). (We add that, based on F ED. R. A PP . P.
4(a)(1)(A), Nathaniel appealed the remand decision too late even if his theories held
water.) Thus, we limited the appeal to the award of fees and costs for the removal,
which we have jurisdiction to review even when the remand order is not before us.
See, e.g., PNC Bank, N.A. v. Spencer, 763 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2014); Micrometl Corp. v.
Tranzact Techs., Inc., 656 F.3d 467, 469–70 (7th Cir. 2011).
Despite the clear limiting order, Nathaniel devotes his entire brief to challenging
the remand to state court. Because he fails to develop any argument about the order
requiring him to pay costs and attorney’s fees, he has waived the only issue on appeal.
See Bradley v. Village of Univeristy Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023).
Finally, Jaclynn requests attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this appeal.
Litigants are entitled to reasonable costs and fees for defending on appeal the award of
fees granted under § 1447(c), with or without a separate motion. See, e.g., PNC Bank,
N.A., 763 F.3d at 655; Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, we DISMISS for lack of jurisdiction Nathaniel’s appeal of the
remand order, AFFIRM the award of fees and costs, and GRANT Jaclynn’s request for
appellate fees and costs and ORDER her to submit, within 14 days, a statement of the
reasonable costs and fees incurred in this appeal; Nathaniel will have 14 days thereafter
to respond.

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