United States of America v. Rodolfo Madrigal

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 16, 2023
Decided October 19, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2140
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RODOLFO MADRIGAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United
States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:05-CR-00194(6)
Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
O R D E R
Rodolfo Madrigal was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distrib-
ute cocaine and use of a telephone to facilitate a drug conspiracy. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
843(b), 846. He completed his prison term in October 2020 and began serving 10 years of
supervised release. After Madrigal pleaded guilty in state court to aggravated battery,
the district court revoked the term of supervised release. It imposed 15 months’ impris-
onment with no further supervised release. Madrigal filed a notice of appeal, but his ap-
pointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw under Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).

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No. 22-2140 Page 2
Counsel explains the nature of the case and addresses potential issues that an ap-
peal of this kind would involve. The brief adds that Madrigal’s appeal would soon be-
come moot because he was scheduled to be released from custody. Our review sug-
gested that Madrigal was released from prison on August 1, 2023, so we asked counsel
to file a supplemental statement addressing that point. Counsel confirms that Madrigal
has been released without further supervision and states that she is not aware of any
collateral consequences of the revocation. Madrigal did not respond to counsel’s motion
to withdraw or her supplemental filing. See Circuit Rule 51(b).
Because Madrigal is no longer in custody and does not face collateral conse-
quences from the revocation of supervised release, this appeal can no longer provide
him with relief. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 14–16 (1998). Spencer dealt with the
end of custody following the revocation of parole, while Madrigal’s situation is the end
of custody following revocation of supervised release. Several courts of appeals have
held that the two situations should be treated identically, and we have not found any
contrary decisions. See United States v. Hardy, 545 F.3d 280, 283–84 (4th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Mazzillo, 373 F.3d 181, 182–83 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d
715, 721 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Probber, 170 F.3d 345, 348–49 (2d Cir. 1999);
United States v. Clark, 193 F.3d 845, 847–48 (5th Cir. 1999). We do not see any good rea-
son to disagree with these decisions.
The question remains how we should dispose of this appeal, which cannot be re-
solved on the merits. In civil suits the normal response to mootness is vacatur and re-
mand with instructions to dismiss. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36
(1950). It is not clear whether vacatur is the appropriate step in criminal litigation—but
then neither Madrigal nor his appointed lawyer has asked for vacatur. The only actions
that have been requested of us are to allow counsel to withdraw and to dismiss the ap-
peal. The circumstances make both steps appropriate, so counsel’s motion to withdraw
is granted and the appeal is dismissed.

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