Autumn Rodgers v. Genesis Behavioral Services - Crossroads

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 2, 2023 *
Decided November 3, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-3010
AUTUMN RODGERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GENESIS BEHAVIORAL SERVICES –
CROSSROADS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 22-CV-993
Stephen C. Dries,
Magistrate Judge.
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-3010 Page 2
O R D E R
Autumn Rodgers sued the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Genesis
Behavioral Services – Crossroads1 (a residential services facility contracted with the
Department), and an employee of the facility. She alleged that while she was receiving
court-ordered inpatient treatment at Crossroads, the employee stole thousands of
dollars from her bank account. At screening, the district court dismissed her complaint
for failure to state a claim, and we affirm.
As an alternative to being jailed for an unspecified crime, Rodgers spent 90 days
at Crossroads for mental health and substance abuse treatment. While Rodgers was
there, a staff member, Cindy, took Rodgers to an ATM to withdraw cash to rent an
apartment that Cindy promised would be for Rodgers when she was released. Cindy
later used Rodgers’s debit card information, without permission, to transfer money to
an account belonging to Cindy’s incarcerated son. There was no apartment waiting for
Rodgers when she completed her 90-day program, and she became homeless.
Rodgers sued Cindy, Crossroads, and the Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
asserting that Cindy had stolen upwards of $2000 from her bank account. A magistrate
judge, presiding with the parties' consent, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), reviewed Rodgers’s
complaint and dismissed it for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Understanding Rodgers to allege violations of her Fourteenth Amendment protection
against deprivation of property without due process of law, the district court
determined that Rodgers did not state a claim against Cindy because the thefts were
random and unauthorized acts for which Rodgers had adequate post-deprivation
remedies under state law. The court further determined that Rodgers failed to state a
claim against the Department and Crossroads because neither is a “person” nor a
separate legal entity that can be sued under § 1983. Rodgers appeals the dismissal, a
decision we review de novo. Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1027
(7th Cir. 2013).
We generously construe Rodgers’s pro se brief, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007), in which she argues generally that she brought a valid claim and proposes
amendments to her complaint. These arguments are not well-developed, but we prefer
1 Based on public records of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, we
substitute the correct name of the residential services program that the plaintiff-
appellant identified as “Cross Roads Dual Diagnosis Facility.”

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No. 22-3010 Page 3
to decide cases on the merits when we can. Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC,
802 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2015).
Rodgers does not persuade us that the district court was wrong to dismiss her
complaint. First, even if we assume that Cindy was a state actor for purposes of § 1983,
Rodgers does not dispute the district court’s characterization of Cindy’s actions as
random and unauthorized, which is how the law generally views incidents of theft by
state actors. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Gable v. City of Chicago,
296 F.3d 531, 540 (7th Cir. 2002). Under Hudson, an intentional, unauthorized
deprivation of property does not violate the procedural requirements of the Due
Process Clause if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the plaintiff’s loss is
available. 468 U.S. at 533. We have previously held that Wisconsin’s post-deprivation
procedures—the inmate-complaint system, certiorari review under state law, and tort
remedies—are adequate, and Rodgers does not argue otherwise. See Hamlin v.
Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1996); see also W IS . STAT . §§ 893.35; 893.51; 893.52.
Dismissing the claims against the Department and Crossroads was also
appropriate. The Department, a division of the state, is not a “person” under § 1983.
Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); de Lima Silva v. Dep't of Corr.,
917 F.3d 546, 565 n.15 (7th Cir. 2019). But Crossroads, which appears to be private,
might be subject to suit under § 1983 based on the complaint’s assertion that it provides
services for people in the Department’s custody: Companies that contract to provide
essential government services are subject to at least the same rules that apply to public
entities and thus may be liable for constitutional violations under § 1983. See Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Glisson v. Indiana Dep't of Corr., 849 F.3d 372,
378–79 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
Even so, Crossroads cannot be liable under § 1983 solely for employing the
wrongdoer; Crossroads is a proper defendant only if its policies or customs caused
Rodgers’s injury. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Iskander v.
Vill. of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that Monell applies to
private companies functioning as state actors); see also Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources,
Inc., 932 F.3d 513, 521–22 (7th Cir. 2019). To the extent the complaint says anything
about Crossroads’ policies, Rodgers asserted that Cindy’s actions ran afoul of them. She
therefore failed to state a claim against the facility.
Normally, district courts should give litigants the opportunity to amend a
complaint at least once after dismissal, unless amendment would be futile. Runnion ex

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rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts, 786 F.3d 510, 519–20 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the court entered
judgment simultaneously with dismissing Rodgers’s complaint, without explaining
why she should not have the chance to amend. Id; see also Zimmerman v. Bornick,
25 F.4th 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2022) (collecting cases). Under our de novo review, however,
we conclude that amendment would be futile. In her appellate brief, Rodgers appears to
propose amending her complaint to seek relief under the First and Eighth
Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and various Wisconsin statutes. But
her potential legal theories are beside the point; a complaint must narrate a person’s
grievance with sufficient factual content to make it plausible that she is entitled to relief.
Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014); Koger v. Dart, 950 F.3d 971, 974 (7th Cir.
2020). Nothing Rodgers suggests adding would fix the problems with her claims.
AFFIRMED

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