United States of America v. Andre Caswell

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 2, 2023
Decided November 3, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1007
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANDRE CASWELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:17-CR-00254(1)
Sharon Johnson Coleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Andre Caswell engaged in financial aid fraud. He used others’ identities to apply
for federal student-aid funds from community colleges; he in turn converted these
funds for his personal use. He eventually pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor counts of
conversion of government property, 18 U.S.C. § 641, and was sentenced to one year of
imprisonment. Although his plea agreement contains a broad appellate waiver, Caswell
filed a notice of appeal. His appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-1007 Page 2
moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief
explains the nature of the case and raises potential issues that an appeal like this would
be expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, and Caswell has
not responded to the motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that
counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel confirms that Caswell wishes to withdraw his guilty plea, see United
States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671
(7th Cir. 2002), so she explores whether there is a nonfrivolous basis to do so under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. We agree with her that any
challenge to the plea would be frivolous. Caswell did not move to withdraw his guilty
plea in the district court, so our review would be for plain error. United States v.
Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013). And a review of the plea-colloquy transcript
reflects that the court substantially complied with Rule 11. Even though the court
omitted mention of Caswell’s right to representation at trial, see FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(b)(1)(D), that oversight was harmless because Caswell was represented at the
colloquy by counsel, and nothing in the record suggests he did not know that counsel
could continue to represent him if he opted to proceed to trial. See United States v. Lovett,
844 F.2d 487, 491–92 (7th Cir. 1988). Counsel also informs us that Caswell believes that
his plea is invalid because it was coerced by a former gang affiliate. But she
appropriately rejects raising this challenge. Caswell told the district court that he was
freely pleading guilty without force or coercion, and these sworn statements are
presumed true. See United States v. Smith, 989 F.3d 575, 582 (7th Cir. 2021).
Finally, counsel considers whether Caswell could challenge his sentence and
correctly concludes that his appellate waiver would foreclose any challenge. In his plea
agreement, Caswell waived “all appellate issues,” including “any part” of the sentence
or the manner in which it was imposed. Because an appellate waiver “stands or falls
with the underlying agreement and plea,” and his plea is valid, we would be required
to enforce his waiver. United States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020). Counsel also
appropriately rejects any argument that an exception to the appeal waiver could apply:
Caswell’s twelve-month sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum, 18 U.S.C.
§ 641, and the court did not consider any constitutionally impermissible factor at
sentencing, Nulf, 978 F.3d at 506.
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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