United States of America v. Christopher Williams

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 20, 2023*
Decided December 22, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1929
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:16-cr-00249-JMS-MJD-4
Jane Magnus-Stinson,
Judge.
O R D E R
Christopher Williams, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his motions for
compassionate release and sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-1929 Page 2
district judge did not abuse her discretion by ruling that Williams offered no
extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, so we affirm.
In 2017 Williams pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Williams had previously
been convicted of a state felony drug offense, so he was subject to a statutory minimum
sentence of 240 months under the law at that time. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2017). The
court sentenced him above his guidelines range to 276 months. He did not appeal.
Williams moved in 2019 for compassionate release, arguing primarily that the
First Step Act’s amendments to § 841(b)(1)(A) constituted an extraordinary and
compelling reason for release because he would face a lower sentence if sentenced
today. Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(a)(2)(A), 132 Stat. 5220 (2018). The judge denied the
motion, citing United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021), which precludes
consideration of a nonretroactive change in the law as an extraordinary and compelling
reason for a sentence reduction. And because Williams had not furnished an
extraordinary and compelling reason for release, the judge declined to address the
sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
About six months later, Williams moved again for compassionate release, citing
as extraordinary and compelling reasons (1) the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022), which, he maintained, permits
consideration of changes in sentencing laws; (2) the disparities created by sentencing
courts in their handling of compassionate-release motions; and (3) his rehabilitation in
prison. The judge rejected these arguments and denied this motion as well.
On appeal Williams argues that Thacker was overruled by Concepcion and that
this court announced as much in United States v. Newbern, 51 F.4th 230 (7th Cir. 2022).
But Williams misapprehends Concepcion and Newbern. Both cases address what a
district court may consider when resentencing defendants after finding that they are
entitled to a sentence reduction. Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 500; Newbern, 51 F.4th at 231–32.
Neither case concerned the “threshold question” whether a prisoner has established an
extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction. United States v.
King, 40 F.4th 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2022). As we have explained, Concepcion does not alter
our understanding from Thacker that nonretroactive sentencing changes—including the
changes to § 841(b)—cannot establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for
release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). King, 40 F.4th at 596; United States v. Von Vader, 58 F.4th
369, 371 (7th Cir. 2023). Newbern never mentioned Thacker, let alone announced its
overruling.

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No. 23-1929 Page 3
Next, Williams contends that the district court failed to consider collectively all
his arguments for release. But the judge evaluated each of Williams’s arguments and
specified that “alone or in conjunction with” one another they failed to establish an
extraordinary and compelling reason to release him. The judge appropriately evaluated
Williams’s circumstances and considerations, see United States v. Vaughn, 62 F.4th 1071,
1073 (7th Cir. 2023), rightly concluding that (1) the amendments to § 841(b)(1)(A) are a
nonretroactive statutory change that do not warrant compassionate release,1 see King,
40 F.4th at 596; (2) arguments about sentencing disparities are the “ordinary business of
the legal system,” id. at 595; and (3) rehabilitation is not a stand-alone reason for release,
United States v. Peoples, 41 F.4th 837, 842 (7th Cir. 2022).
AFFIRMED
1 We acknowledge that the Sentencing Commission’s proposed amendments to
the Guidelines took effect on November 1, 2023. As relevant to Williams’s motion,
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) permits courts to consider a change in the law when, among
other considerations, the defendant has served more than 10 years of his sentence. But
because Williams has not served more than 10 years, the new guideline does not alter
our analysis here.

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