United States of America v. Jajuan A. Hunt

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 4, 2024
Decided January 4, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1616
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAJUAN A. HUNT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 20-cr-40057-001
Sara Darrow,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Jajuan Hunt pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon,
see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 120 months in prison. Hunt filed a
notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks
to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains
the nature of the appeal and addresses issues that an appeal of this kind might be
expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, and Hunt did not
respond to the motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel
discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant the motion
and dismiss the appeal.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-1616 Page 2
After police were called to investigate Hunt’s involvement in a two-vehicle
accident, they saw an open can of beer in the center console of his vehicle. This
prompted a search of his car, and in the glove compartment they found a pistol with an
obliterated serial number. They arrested Hunt for driving under the influence. He later
admitted to police that he bought the firearm and knew that, as a felon, he was
prohibited from purchasing a gun.
Hunt moved to suppress evidence from the vehicle search, arguing that the
police did not conduct a valid search incident to arrest because they lacked reasonable
suspicion that the vehicle contained additional evidence of his driving under the
influence. The district court denied the motion. The court explained that the police
conducted a lawful search incident to arrest based on their reasonable belief that the
vehicle contained evidence of a DUI offense. Regardless, the court added, the evidence
inevitably would have been discovered through routine procedures related to an
inventory search of the vehicle.
Hunt then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the
court’s denial of his motion to suppress. At sentencing, the district court calculated a
guidelines range of 100 to 120 months in prison (based on Hunt’s total offense level of
25 and criminal history category of V, capped at 120 months due to the statutory
maximum). After considering mitigating and aggravating factors, the court sentenced
him to 120 months and 3 years’ supervised release.
Counsel reports that after he advised Hunt of the risks and benefits of
withdrawing his guilty plea, Hunt confirmed that he wishes to challenge only the
denial of his motion to suppress as well as his sentence. Counsel therefore properly
refrains from discussing the validity of Hunt’s guilty plea. See United States v. Konczak,
683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel first considers but appropriately rejects challenging the district court’s
ruling on Hunt’s motion to suppress. Officers may conduct a warrantless search of a
vehicle incident to arrest if they reasonably believe that the vehicle contains evidence of
the offense of arrest. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). Here, Hunt—upon
questioning after the car accident—slurred his speech, admitted taking two shots of
liquor, and failed two field sobriety tests. Police also saw an open beer can in plain view
in the vehicle’s center console. See United States v. Wimbush, 337 F.3d 947, 951 (7th Cir.
2003) (discovery of open container of alcohol in vehicle justified warrantless search of

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No. 23-1616 Page 3
vehicle). When conducting a search incident to arrest, police may search all areas in the
vehicle in which evidence of criminal activity may be found, including trunks and glove
compartments, see Gant, 556 U.S. at 346–47 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
820–21 (1982)), such as the one in which police found Hunt’s firearm. Further, as
counsel also notes, even absent a valid search, the evidence inevitably would have been
discovered during an inventory of Hunt’s vehicle, given the police department’s policy
of making an inventory of items found in cars that have been impounded.
See United States v. Cartwright, 630 F.3d 610, 613–15 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding
application of inevitable discovery doctrine for vehicle towed under a “sufficiently
standardized” police policy).
Counsel next considers whether Hunt could mount a non-frivolous challenge to
the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the firearm statute under which he was
convicted, in the aftermath of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct.
2111 (2022). In Bruen, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment requires the
government to prove that firearm statutes, like § 922(g)(1), are “consistent with this
Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” 142 S. Ct. at 2126. But Hunt did not
challenge the statute’s constitutionality in the district court, so our review would be for
plain error. See Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2021). And given our recent
acknowledgment that the historical assessment on this question is inconclusive,
see Atkinson v. Garland, 70 F.4th 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2023), we agree with counsel that
any error, if there was one, would not be plain. See United States v. Miles, 86 F.4th 734,
740–41 (7th Cir. 2023).
Further, counsel considers whether Hunt could raise any nonfrivolous argument
regarding the four-point enhancement to his offense level for possessing a firearm in
connection with another felony offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). But we agree with
counsel that the district court did not err in determining that the government had
shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Hunt admitted to trading crack
cocaine for the firearm. Video evidence from police questioning recorded Hunt stating
that he exchanged “an 8-ball” (slang for an eighth of an ounce of cocaine) for the
firearm. See United States v. Slone, 990 F.3d 568, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2021) (enhancement
justified by evidence pointing to proximity of firearm and defendant’s past dealings in
drugs).
Counsel relatedly considers challenging the court’s alternative finding that the
four-level enhancement would also be supported based on Hunt’s felony offense of
intimidation. 720 ILCS 5/12-6; U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Here too we agree with counsel

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No. 23-1616 Page 4
that this challenge would be frivolous because the district court reasonably accepted the
government’s version of events, see United States v. Waldman, 835 F.3d 751, 756 (7th Cir.
2016), based on Hunt’s threat to shoot the occupant of another vehicle involved in the
accident after she called the police.
Finally, counsel considers and rightly rejects challenging the substantive
reasonableness of Hunt’s sentence. We presume that a sentence within the applicable
guidelines range is reasonable. See United States v. Cunningham, 883 F.3d 690, 701
(7th Cir. 2018). Counsel does not identify a reason to challenge that presumption, and
we discern none. The district court reasonably weighed the § 3553(a) factors by
emphasizing the seriousness of the offense (driving while intoxicated showed an
“incredibly reckless” disregard for public safety), the need for deterrence (Hunt’s past
incarceration did not deter him from possessing a firearm), and Hunt’s personal
characteristics (having a challenging childhood and anger management issues).
See id. at 701–02.
Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

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