William C. Froemming v. City of West Allis

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 16, 2024*
Decided January 24, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2380
WILLIAM C. FROEMMING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF WEST ALLIS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the
United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 19-CV-996-JPS
J. P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
O R D E R
William Froemming sued the City of West Allis, Wisconsin, its police chief, and
three police officers raising several constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
stemming from his arrest, including claims for excessive use of force, retaliation, and
malicious prosecution. Pretrial rulings narrowed the case to the excessive-force claim
and the question of municipal liability. At trial the judge directed a verdict for the police
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appeal is
frivolous. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(A).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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chief and the City on municipal liability, and the jury found for the officers on the
excessive-force claim. Froemming appeals, asserting that the judge was biased against
him. This argument is frivolous, so we affirm the judgment and grant the defendants’
motion for sanctions against Froemming.
The events underlying this lawsuit took place in the summer of 2016 when a
police officer observed Froemming parked in a rental car on the side of the road at
around 3 a.m. The car lights were on, and Froemming was sleeping inside. The officer
knocked on the window, asked Froemming to roll it down, and tried to question him.
Because Froemming was confrontational and uncooperative, the officer called for
backup. Froemming refused to comply with the officers’ instructions, and eventually
the officers physically removed him from the car and placed him under arrest. He was
charged with and convicted of several municipal offenses, including refusing a
breathalyzer test, resisting an officer, and possessing THC.
Froemming then filed this pro se § 1983 action alleging that the officers used
excessive force, retaliated against him, and maliciously prosecuted him based on
perjured testimony and falsified evidence, all in violation of his rights under the First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He also named the police chief and the City as
defendants, claiming that the police department had a pattern or practice of violating
people’s constitutional rights in this way. After years of contentious litigation, only the
excessive-force and municipal-liability claims remained for trial.
Before trial Froemming filed a motion alleging misconduct by opposing counsel
and the judge. He argued that one of the defense attorneys should be removed from the
case, alleging that she repeatedly lied to him and the court. He also claimed that the
judge was biased and sought his recusal from the case. The judge denied the motion
across the board because it was unsupported by the record or any legal authority.
The trial lasted two days. Froemming presented his case on the first day,
primarily questioning the individual defendants with the apparent aim of
demonstrating that they were lying about what occurred on the night of his arrest and
afterward. While examining the police chief, Froemming inquired about a letter the
chief had written responding to his complaints about the officers. Froemming
contended that the chief was perjuring himself by contradicting the letter. He was
permitted to question the chief about the letter, but he never offered it as evidence, so it
was not published to the jury. After Froemming repeatedly asked about what he
insisted were contradictions between the chief’s testimony and the letter, the judge
directed him to move on. At the end of Froemming’s case-in-chief, the judge entered a

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directed verdict for the police chief and the City on the municipal-liability claim,
leaving only the excessive-force claim for the jury.
On the second day of trial, Froemming appeared in court with a bandage on his
head from an overnight injury. He claimed that he had been attacked the night before
and insinuated that the defense lawyers had arranged the assault. He was agitated,
combative, and smelled of alcohol; he repeatedly violated the court security officer’s
orders to stay away from the defense table. Additional security officers were
summoned to the courtroom to assist. Froemming sought a delay based on the alleged
“attack” and his injury, but the judge said the trial would proceed. When the jury was
brought into the courtroom to resume the trial, Froemming demanded a mistrial,
accused one of the defense attorneys of lying, and repeated his claim of being attacked
in retaliation for filing the lawsuit. The judge excused the jury and declined to grant a
mistrial. Froemming then refused to participate and left the courthouse. The judge
elected to move forward with the trial, sending the jury to deliberate without a closing
argument from Froemming. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants.
Froemming filed a posttrial motion again seeking a mistrial based on the alleged
“attack,” which he continued to claim had been orchestrated by the defense attorneys.
He also argued that the judge wrongly excluded the police chief’s letter from evidence,
hampering his cross-examination. The defendants, in turn, sought sanctions against
Froemming for filing frivolous claims and motions and other litigation misconduct.
The judge denied Froemming’s mistrial motion. Starting with the argument
about an overnight assault during the trial, the judge found that Froemming’s claim
was conclusively refuted by extensive video evidence the defendants had obtained from
security cameras at the hotel across the street from the courthouse, where Froemming
had stayed during trial, and other businesses nearby. As the judge explained in
painstaking detail, the video evidence plainly showed that Froemming had not been
attacked on the night in question but rather had been drunk and fell face down on the
sidewalk while wandering the streets in the middle of the night. The video evidence
also included bodycam video from Milwaukee police officers who responded to a call
by a passing motorist who stopped to assist Froemming with his head injury. The
bodycam video showed Froemming in a highly intoxicated, argumentative, and
incoherent state, unable to remember how he was injured.
The judge also rejected the claim of evidentiary error regarding the police chief’s
letter, explaining that he had given Froemming ample opportunity to cross-examine the
chief about it and had not precluded its introduction into evidence. (Froemming had

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failed to offer the letter into evidence at all.) Finally, the judge determined that sanctions
were warranted based on Froemming’s egregious and persistent litigation misconduct,
including (among other things): “repeatedly disparaging opposing counsel without
foundation, misrepresenting events, demonstrating a lack of decorum and civility, and
needlessly and baselessly delaying proceedings.” The judge therefore granted the
sanctions motion and ordered Froemming to pay the costs of empaneling the jury and
the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees related to the motion for a mistrial.
On appeal Froemming argues that the judge was biased and should have
declared a mistrial and recused himself from the case; he requests a new trial before a
different judge. His brief does not dispute the jury’s verdict, develop a substantive
argument for reversal, or otherwise meaningfully engage with the substance of the trial.
So the defendants moved for dismissal or summary affirmance, as well as sanctions,
F ED. R. A PP . P. 38, based on Froemming’s baseless claim of judicial bias and his failure to
develop an argument or provide legal authority in support of reversal. Among other
defects in Froemming’s brief, the defendants highlighted that nearly all of the legal
citations were fabricated. We opted to take the motion with the merits of the appeal.
As we’ve just noted, apart from his allegations about the judge, Froemming has
not developed a coherent substantive challenge to the outcome of the trial and has
therefore waived any other arguments, including his undeveloped accusation of
discovery misconduct against the defendants’ attorneys. See Shipley v. Chi. Bd. of Election
Comm’rs, 947 F.3d 1056, 1062–63 (7th Cir. 2020).
Froemming’s claim of judicial bias is frivolous. He complains that the judge
deprived him of the opportunity to introduce the police chief’s letter into evidence and
refused to stop the trial after he was “attacked” in retaliation for pursuing this case.
First, the judge did not exclude the letter. Froemming never offered it as a trial exhibit.
Moreover, Froemming was permitted to use the letter for impeachment, and over the
defendants’ objections, he extensively questioned the police chief about it. See generally
F ED. R. EVID. 613. Second, the judge’s decision to move forward with the trial despite
Froemming’s “attack” claim is not evidence of bias. The claim was patently incredible
and indeed was conclusively refuted when the defendants later produced security and
bodycam video evidence clearly showing that Froemming had not been attacked but
rather was injured when he stumbled and fell while wandering aimlessly in the area
around his hotel in a highly intoxicated state.
In short, Froemming’s claim of judicial bias is wholly unsupported and, on this
record, a flagrant abuse of the judicial process. There is no evidence whatsoever of a

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disqualifying conflict of interest or other grounds for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) or
(b). Adverse rulings are not evidence of bias. See United States v. Walsh, 47 F.4th 491, 499
(7th Cir. 2022) (citing Liteky v. United States, 410 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). Froemming points
to a few exasperated remarks by the judge, but “judicial remarks during the course of a
trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their
cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
Far from being evidence of bias, see id., any expressions of frustration by the
judge were quite measured and completely understandable given Froemming’s abusive
conduct. To repeat, Froemming was persistently disruptive and abrasive, and he made
wild and baseless accusations of misconduct by opposing counsel and the court. The
judge showed considerable patience with Froemming’s obstreperous behavior during
lengthy and contentious pretrial litigation and at trial, but he reasonably put his foot
down when Froemming’s antics delayed the jury’s entrance into the courtroom or
occurred in the jurors’ presence. See United States v. Barr, 960 F.3d 906, 921 (7th Cir.
2020) (explaining that a judge expressing “dissatisfaction, annoyance, or even anger”
with an attorney is not grounds for recusal).
That brings us to the defendants’ motion for Rule 38 sanctions. Froemming’s
appellate brief consists of unfounded allegations against the district judge and defense
attorneys, and his tone is inflammatory and antagonistic, continuing the pattern of
misconduct he exhibited in the district court. Additionally, his brief contains numerous
citations to cases and other sources that do not exist and false quotations from ones that
do. Froemming asserts that any shortcoming in his research or briefing are honest
mistakes caused by his “lack of complete knowledge and experience.” Given his long
pattern of misconduct in this case, that defense is utterly unconvincing. The district
judge warned Froemming several times that he must cease his frivolous filings and
requests and belligerent conduct at trial. When the warnings went unheeded, the judge
ultimately imposed financial sanctions that Froemming has failed to pay. Repeated
warnings and sanctions did not deter Froemming from continuing the same misconduct
on appeal.
Accordingly, we fine Froemming $5,000. Within 14 days of this order,
Froemming must tender a check payable to the Clerk of this Court for the full amount
of the sanction. Further, the clerks of all federal courts in this circuit shall return unfiled
any papers submitted either directly or indirectly by or on behalf of Froemming until he
pays the full sanction. See Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995);
F ED. R. A PP . P. 38. This filing bar excludes criminal cases and applications for writs of

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habeas corpus, see Mack, 45 F.3d at 186–87, and will be lifted immediately once
Froemming makes full payment, see In re City of Chicago, 500 F.3d 582, 585–86 (7th Cir.
2007). If despite his best efforts Froemming is unable to pay in full all outstanding
sanctions, he is authorized to submit to this court a motion to modify or rescind this
order no earlier than two years from the date of this order. See id.; Mack, 45 F.3d at 186.
The judgment is AFFIRMED and the motion for Rule 38 sanctions is GRANTED
as described above. The motion to dismiss or summarily affirm is DENIED as
unnecessary.

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