Israel Juan M. Urzua Ortega v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-3253
I SRAEL JUAN M. U RZUA O RTEGA
Petitioner,
v.
M ERRICK B. GARLAND,
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A099-025-449
____________________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 12, 2022— DECIDED M ARCH 29, 2024
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, K IRSCH , and JACKSON -A KIWUMI ,
Circuit Judges.
K IRSCH , Circuit Judge. Israel Juan Miguel Urzua Ortega, a
native and citizen of Mexico, illegally reentered the United
States, and his prior order of removal was reinstated. Ortega
sought withholding of removal under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). Both an immigration
judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals found Ortega

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2 No. 21-3253
ineligible for withholding of removal. Because substantial ev-
idence supports the agency’s determination that Ortega failed
to establish that he would be persecuted by individuals whom
the Mexican government would be unable or unwilling to
control, we deny the petition.
I
Israel Juan Miguel Urzua Ortega is a native and citizen of
Mexico and has spent most of his life in Mexico City. Ortega
and his family have experienced multiple attacks and threats
of violence. When Ortega was young, his father was mur-
dered. While the perpetrators were charged and sentenced,
Ortega later learned that the murder was ordered by his fa-
ther’s cousin, Tacho, who is a member of the Sinaloa cartel.
When Ortega was a teenager and serving in the military,
someone—who Ortega believes was sent by Tacho—verbally
threatened to kill him and shot him in the leg. Ortega told his
military general, who sent a captain-led escort to investigate
the shooting, but the shooter had fled.
After Ortega left the military to work in security as an ar-
mored truck driver, he began receiving threatening messages
on his beeper device, but he did not tell anyone about the
threats. Ortega then changed jobs and started working as a
firefighter, and he again received threatening messages. He
informed the firefighter general, who agreed to transfer him
to a different station. But he continued receiving similar mes-
sages and had to be transferred to a third station. When leav-
ing the third station one day, Ortega was followed by individ-
uals in a vehicle, but he outmaneuvered them and called the
police from a gas station. The police arrived, but Ortega did
not file a police report. The next day, Ortega was again fol-
lowed by individuals in a vehicle, one of whom pointed a gun

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No. 21-3253 3
at him. He was once more able to outmaneuver the car, and
he called police detectives. The detectives assisted him right
away and recommended that he file a report with the prose-
cutor’s office, which he did.
Soon after, in 2002, Ortega quit his job and came to the
United States without authorization. He returned to Mexico
in 2006 after his mother informed him that Tacho was threat-
ening his son. While trying to reenter the United States via
airplane using a fake visa, Ortega was discovered and ordered
removed. But he eventually reentered the United States with-
out authorization on foot at the land border. Even while re-
siding in the United States, Ortega continued receiving nu-
merous threatening messages and phone calls, which he sus-
pects were from individuals associated with Tacho.
In 2021, Ortega was arrested for driving on a revoked li-
cense, and the Department of Homeland Security reinstated
his 2006 removal order. Ortega claimed a fear of returning to
Mexico, but the asylum officer determined that he did not
have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. An immigra-
tion judge vacated the decision, and withholding proceedings
followed. After holding a hearing, the IJ denied Ortega’s with-
holding application, finding that he “failed to establish that
he would be persecuted by the government or groups or in-
dividuals that the government is unwilling or unable to con-
trol if he returns to Mexico.” In so holding, the IJ noted that
the Mexican government was exceptionally responsive to the
prior threats against Ortega and his family, Tacho was incar-
cerated in Mexico, and Ortega had continued to receive

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4 No. 21-3253
threats even while living in the United States. The Board of
Immigration Appeals adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.
II
“Where, as here, the BIA’s decision adopts and affirms the
IJ’s conclusion as well as provides its own analysis, we review
both decisions.” Guzman-Garcia v. Garland, 996 F.3d 480, 483
(7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Legal questions are reviewed de
novo, and findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evi-
dence. Id. We will affirm so long as the agency’s decision “is
supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evi-
dence.” Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822, 826 (7th Cir.
2016) (citation omitted). This standard is “extremely deferen-
tial,” and we will reverse “only if the facts compel the oppo-
site conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).
To qualify for withholding of removal, Ortega may show
that he would be persecuted in Mexico because of his mem-
bership in a particular social group, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A),
which here is his membership in the Urzua Ortega family. See
Gonzalez Ruano v. Barr, 922 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 2019) (“We
and other circuits have recognized that membership in a nu-
clear family can satisfy the social group requirement.”) (cita-
tions omitted). The feared persecution “must be attributable
to the government or to a nongovernmental entity that the
government is unable or unwilling to control.” Cruz-Martinez
v. Sessions, 885 F.3d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). Ac-
tions of private citizens—such as Tacho—do not suffice “un-
less the government is complicit in those acts or is unable or
unwilling to take steps to prevent them.” Halim v. Holder, 755
F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see also Hor
v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 502 (7th Cir. 2005) (granting a peti-
tion for review because the Algerian government was unable

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No. 21-3253 5
to protect the petitioner); Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154,
163 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[U]nwillingness and inability are distinct
issues, and [] an applicant may be able to prove inability with-
out proving unwillingness where the government’s willing
efforts to protect its citizens fall short.”).
Ortega argues that the IJ’s decision, as affirmed by the BIA,
was not supported by substantial evidence because it failed to
consider current conditions in Mexico and changes to his per-
sonal circumstances. Regarding current country conditions,
Ortega claims that the BIA should have reviewed the IJ’s de-
cision de novo because the IJ ignored this evidence and thus
committed legal error. But, as the BIA correctly found, the IJ’s
decision explicitly referred to country conditions evidence, in-
cluding the high rate of crime that goes unresolved and un-
punished and the widespread corruption within the Mexican
government. The BIA therefore properly reviewed the IJ’s de-
termination on country conditions evidence for clear error, 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i), and the BIA’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Importantly, “generalized conditions
affecting large segments of a population do not, by them-
selves, prove that [Ortega] faces persecution” and thus have
“no significance” unless he can establish that he “is likely to
be singled out for persecution.” Raghunathan v. Holder, 604
F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Turning to Ortega’s personal circumstances, he argues
that the Mexican government is less likely to protect him be-
cause he is no longer employed by a Mexican government en-
tity and has not been since 2002. This is mere speculation, and
we are allowed to rely on the government’s past actions when
assessing the risk of future persecution. See, e.g., Hernandez-
Baena v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that

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6 No. 21-3253
substantial evidence supported the IJ’s “conclusion that peti-
tioners’ fear of future persecution was not objectively reason-
able” where the police previously “responded immediately”
to death threats). There is substantial evidence that Mexican
authorities were willing to protect Ortega in the past. An es-
cort was sent to investigate when Ortega was shot in the leg;
Ortega was allowed to transfer fire stations twice after he re-
ceived threatening messages; the police arrived the first time
Ortega was followed by a vehicle (though he did not proceed
with a police report); and when Ortega was again followed
the next day, detectives helped him right away and recom-
mended that he file a report with the prosecutor’s office. There
is also substantial evidence that Mexican authorities are able
to protect Ortega and his family. Officials previously charged
and sentenced the individuals who murdered Ortega’s father.
Further, Tacho is currently in prison, which undermines Or-
tega’s concern that the Mexican government is unable to con-
trol him.
Under our highly deferential standard of review, we find
that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s decision, as af-
firmed by the BIA, that Ortega failed to establish that Mexico
would be unable or unwilling to protect him. Accordingly, we
deny the petition for review.
DENIED

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