United States of America v. Kevin C. Beasley

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 22, 2024
Decided April 2, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1700
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KEVIN C. BEASLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 22-20011-001
Colin S. Bruce,
Judge.
O R D E R
Kevin Beasley pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), but he preserved the right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence. F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to 36 months’
imprisonment and 2 years’ supervised release. Beasley appeals, but his appointed
lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We notified Beasley of counsel’s motion, and he did
not respond to it. See CIR . R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and
addresses potential issues that an appeal of this kind would typically involve. Because
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel
discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
In December 2021, Beasley gave cash to Ahzhnae Vassar to purchase a Glock
semiautomatic pistol for him. A week later, Vassar contacted the Champaign, Illinois
Police Department to report that her gun had been stolen from her vehicle. Detective
Cully Schweska of the Champaign Police Department interviewed Vassar and
suspected her of lying. She then stated that she had purchased it for someone named
“Brandon Smith.” She later admitted to police detectives that she had bought the gun
for “Kevin,” who used the Facebook profile “Kevo Stackitup.” She explained that Kevo
had driven her to a gun shop in a dark-colored Jeep, once to select the gun and again to
pick it up. She also showed Detective Schweska the messages arranging the transaction.
Detectives obtained video surveillance footage from the gun shop, which showed
the Jeep (but not the driver’s face). They confirmed that the Jeep was registered to
Beasley’s girlfriend and that Beasley resided with her in an apartment in Urbana.
Detective Schweska then located in a police database an individual named “Kevin
Beasley” whose photo appeared to be the same person as “Kevo Stackitup.” Vassar
confirmed that Beasley was “Kevo Stackitup,” the person who engaged in the firearm
transaction.
Based on this information, Detective Schweska sought a warrant to search
Beasley’s home. In the affidavit, Detective Schweska described the investigation and the
steps he took to identify Beasley as the person who purchased the Glock through
Vassar. Detective Schweska appeared personally before a state judge to attest to the
truthfulness of the information included in the affidavit, and the judge issued the search
warrant. When law enforcement officers arrived at the apartment in Urbana, Beasley
admitted that he lived there and that he, and no one else, used the “Kevo Stackitup”
profile on Facebook. He also admitted to buying the gun from Vassar but said that he
had sold it because he was not permitted to possess firearms. After searching the home,
officers found the firearm that Vassar had purchased.
A grand jury later indicted Beasley, who had a previous conviction for
aggravated robbery, with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Beasley moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, arguing that
the officers lacked probable cause to search the apartment because it was his girlfriend’s

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home, there was no reason to believe that a firearm would be located there, and the
informant (Vassar) was unreliable. He also argued that the good faith exception should
not apply. The district court denied Beasley’s motion, concluding that the officers had
probable cause to search Beasley’s residence. The court explained that although Vassar
was untruthful during her first encounter with Detective Schweska, the detective
corroborated the relevant information independently. In addition, the court noted that
the affidavit outlined Vassar’s prior inconsistencies so that the issuing judge could
consider her reliability. The court also ruled, alternatively, that the good faith exception
applied.
Beasley then conditionally pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement
under Rule 11(a)(2), preserving his right to appellate review of the denial of his
suppression motion. In exchange for Beasley pleading guilty to the firearm-possession
charge, the government agreed to forgo additional charges relating to the firearm
transaction. Under the plea agreement, Beasley also waived “all rights” to appeal or
collaterally attack his conviction and sentence, except that he could raise a claim that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel and challenge the denial of his motion to
suppress. At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court placed Beasley under oath,
conducted a Rule 11 colloquy, determined that there was an adequate factual basis, and
accepted Beasley’s plea.
Before sentencing, the probation office prepared a presentence investigation
report (PSR). Based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal history category of III,
the PSR set the applicable ranges under the Sentencing Guidelines at 57 to 71 months’
imprisonment and 1 to 3 years of supervised release. Neither side objected to these
calculations. In his sentencing memorandum, Beasley requested a sentence of 36
months, while the government requested 57 months.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court confirmed that there were no
objections to the PSR and adopted it in full. The court then heard the parties’ arguments
and weighed the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It explained that
Beasley’s relative youth (age 22 at the time of sentencing), his age when he committed
his prior offenses, along with the potential for his rehabilitation, weighed in favor of a
below-guidelines prison sentence of 36 months, and 2 years of supervised release.
In reviewing potential issues for appeal, counsel informs us that Beasley does not
wish to challenge his conviction. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir.
2012). As for any potential challenges to Beasley’s sentence, counsel discusses the

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validity of the plea agreement because, if it is valid, the appeal waiver in the agreement
would preclude them. See United States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020). As
counsel correctly concludes, it would be frivolous to argue on appeal that the guilty
plea was not knowing and voluntary. The district court fully complied with Rule 11 in
taking the plea, and Beasley acknowledged in the written agreement, and at the hearing
where he was under oath, that he was voluntarily pleading guilty and that he
understood the charge and potential penalties and the rights he was giving up,
including the right to appeal. Further, no exception to the appeal waiver would apply
because his sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2),
and the district court did not base the sentence on any constitutionally impermissible
factors, see United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). Therefore, the
only issues that Beasley could raise on appeal are those specifically excluded from the
appeal waiver.
Accordingly, counsel contemplates challenging the denial of Beasley’s motion to
suppress. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the legal
conclusions de novo and review factual findings for clear error. United States v.
Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 2018).
Counsel first discusses potential challenges to the state judge’s finding of
probable cause to support the search warrant. On this issue, we would afford “great
deference” to the judge who issued the warrant. United States v. Zamudio, 909 F.3d 172,
175 (7th Cir. 2018). Probable cause exists when the “supporting affidavit presents a total
set of circumstances creating a ‘fair probability’ that evidence of a crime will be found.”
Id. Where, as here, the affidavit relies on information provided by an informant, we
consider various factors relevant to the informant’s reliability, including the detail and
specificity of the information, whether it was acquired through firsthand observation,
and the extent to which law enforcement corroborated it independently. United States v.
Adams, 934 F.3d 720, 725 (7th Cir. 2019). Based on these factors, the district court rightly
determined that the use of information provided by Vassar did not invalidate the
warrant. Detective Schweska’s affidavit explained that although Vassar lied during her
first encounter with him, she later gave highly detailed information which
Detective Schweska corroborated through further investigation. For example, he
viewed the gun shop’s surveillance footage, connected the Jeep to Beasley, reviewed
Vassar’s messages negotiating the firearm transaction with “Kevo Stackitup,” and
confirmed that “Kevo Stackitup” was Beasley.

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Counsel further concludes, and we agree, that Beasley has no plausible argument
that the search-warrant affidavit failed to link the potential evidence to the apartment.
On this issue, an affidavit must only establish a “fair probability” that evidence of
criminal conduct will be found at a particular place. United States v. Aljabari,
626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010). Detective Schweska confirmed Beasley’s residence
through reviewing information that Beasley himself had provided to law enforcement
on a previous occasion. This information, which Detective Schweska included in his
affidavit, demonstrates a fair probability that a firearm would be found at Beasley’s
residence, so it would be pointless to challenge the judge’s probable cause
determination. See id. at 945. Finally, because we would conclude that there was
probable cause to support the search warrant, we would not need to address the district
court’s alternate conclusion that the good-faith exception applied. See Zamudio, 909 F.3d
at 177.
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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