Denis Navratil v. CITY OF RACINE and CORY MASON

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1208
DENIS NAVRATIL, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
C ITY OF R ACINE and C ORY M ASON ,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 2:21-cv-00181-SCD — Stephen C. Dries, Magistrate Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2023 — DECIDED M AY 6, 2024
____________________
Before HAMILTON , K IRSCH , and PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON , Circuit Judge. On April 24, 2020, plaintiff-
appellant Denis Navratil attended a rally at the Wisconsin
State Capitol to protest the recent statewide “Safer at Home
Order” that limited public gatherings, travel, and business
operations to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. The rally itself
was a violation of the Safer at Home Order. Also, a permit is
required to hold rallies at the State Capitol, and the permit
application for the April 24 rally had been denied because of

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2 No. 23-1208
the COVID-19 pandemic and the Safer at Home Order. By
April 24, 2020, 291 people had died of COVID-19 in the state
of Wisconsin. There were over 5,000 confirmed cases in the
state, with more than 200 new cases being diagnosed each
day.1
In this lawsuit, Denis Navratil, his wife Dimple Navratil,
and their business, Dimple’s LLC, have asserted several
constitutional claims against the City of Racine and Mayor
Cory Mason, as well as a defamation claim against Mason. At
the heart of all the claims was the city’s decision not to give
an emergency grant to Dimple’s LLC because Denis had gone
to the April 24 rally. Presiding with the consent of the parties
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), a magistrate judge granted summary
judgment for both defendants on all claims. Plaintiffs have
appealed, and we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
plaintiffs as the non-moving parties are entitled to the benefit
of all conflicts in the evidence and to reasonable inferences in
their favor. Whitaker v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health Services, 849
F.3d 681, 682 (7th Cir. 2017). All facts are drawn from the
district court’s account of the facts for purposes of summary
judgment unless otherwise noted. See Navratil v. City of
Racine, No. 21-cv-181-SCD, 2023 WL 9190207 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 5,
2023).
1 Statistics are from Johns Hopkins University & Medicine’s Corona-
virus Resource Center’s Data Timeline for the state of Wisconsin,
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/us/wisconsin
[https://perma.cc/T6MM-8N6T].

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No. 23-1208 3
The World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a
global pandemic on March 11, 2020. In an effort to slow the
virus’s spread, Wisconsin Governor Tony Evers and
Department of Health Services Secretary-designee Andrea
Palm issued the Safer at Home Order, which prohibited
people from going out in public except to perform limited
“essential activities.” The order caused many non-essential
businesses, including restaurants and retail stores, to close
temporarily.
The City of Racine, Wisconsin made emergency funds
available to mitigate economic damage to non-essential busi-
nesses forced to close under the Safer at Home Order. As part
of the grant application process, Racine Mayor Cory Mason
met with an ad hoc committee to review grant applications.
Mayor Mason and committee members reviewed applications
from businesses that met certain objective criteria to qualify
for the funds. The funds available for emergency grants were
quite limited, though. Mayor Mason had sole discretion to
determine which qualifying applicants received emergency
funding. The city could not guarantee that a business meeting
the qualifying criteria would receive funding.
Plaintiffs Denis and Dimple Navratil are married and
operate Dimple’s Fine Imports in Racine, Wisconsin. Dimple’s
Fine Imports is an import and gift store that is under the
control of Dimple’s LLC. Dimple is the sole owner of Dimple’s
LLC, and Dennis works as the store manager.
Dimple applied for emergency funding through Dimple’s
LLC in March 2020 during the first round of city grants. The
city distributed $250,000 to eighteen different businesses, but
Dimple’s LLC was not awarded a grant in that initial round
of funding.

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4 No. 23-1208
On April 24, 2020, Dimple again applied for funding
through the LLC during the second round of city grants. That
was the same day that Denis attended the “Wisconsin
Freedom Rally #Reopen Wisconsin” in Madison, Wisconsin.
The rally took place at the Wisconsin State Capitol to
protest the restrictions imposed by the Safer at Home Order,
including business closures. The rally itself violated the Safer
at Home Order’s ban on public gatherings. Also, for large
events at the State Capitol, a permit is required under
Wisconsin Statute § 16.845 and Wisconsin Administrative
Code § 2.04. The April 24 rally organizers were denied a
permit because the gathering would violate the Safer at Home
Order.
At the April 24 rally, Denis spoke with a television news
reporter, and a video clip of the interview was aired on a local
news station. Denis told the reporter that he was present at
the rally “out of curiosity” and as an “observer” because he
could “understand both sides of the argument for COVID
restrictions.” He also told the reporter that he believed the
Safer at Home Order was harmful to small businesses. Racine
Mayor Mason saw the interview.
The city denied Dimple’s LLC’s second application on
May 12, 2020. In that round of grants, nearly 200 businesses
had applied for about $650,000 in available grant money.
The day after that denial, on May 13, 2020, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court invalidated the Safer at Home Order. The
court based its decision on state administrative law, without
reaching any federal constitutional issues.
About seven weeks later, on June 26, 2020, Mayor Mason
told the Racine Journal Times that he denied Dimple’s LLC’s

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No. 23-1208 5
application in the second round of grants because of Denis’s
attendance at the April 24 rally. The mayor’s press statement
read in full:
As Mayor, it is my duty to protect the public
health of our City’s residents. While I certainly
support the rights of free speech and assembly,
I cannot in good conscious [sic] send scarce City
resources to a person or business that willingly
jeopardized public health, especially when they
were competing with other businesses who
were not flagrantly violating safety measures. If
an applicant was openly violating the statewide
“Safer at Home” order and the public health
emergency under which the City was operating
to help mitigate the spread of coronavirus, that
applicant would compete less favorably. For in-
stance, participating in mass gatherings outside
of our community, such as the rally that was
held at the State Capitol – such large gatherings
have been linked to cases of COVID-19 around
the state – and then returning to our City, only
served to put our residents at unnecessary risk
and, thus, factored into the funding considera-
tion. When it comes to disbursing discretionary
funds aimed at helping businesses who were
sacrificing to protect public health, the City is
not going to reward business owners who took
reckless behaviors that risked the health of our
community.
Dkt. 45 at 7. Testimony in this case showed that Mayor Mason
brought up Denis’s attendance at the April 24 rally when he

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6 No. 23-1208
and the ad hoc committee discussed Dimple’s LLC’s applica-
tion for the second round of funding. Dkt 52-3 at 17, 19; Dkt.
52-1 at 2–3. Also, during a telephone call with Dimple after
the denial of her LLC’s second application, Mayor Mason ex-
plained that he denied the grant because of Denis’s attend-
ance at the April 24 rally. Dimple’s contemporaneous notes of
the call say, “He said it was against the compliance to … be in
[the] rally. Then I connected that he was talking about Denis
going to Madison protest.” Dkt 49-2 at 3.
On February 15, 2021, the Navratils and Dimple’s LLC
filed this suit against the City of Racine and Mayor Mason
alleging that the denial of their grant application violated
their constitutional rights to free speech, equal protection, and
due process. The Navratils and Dimple’s LLC further alleged
that Mayor Mason defamed Denis in the June 2020 press
statement describing the reason he denied the application.
The city and Mayor Mason moved to dismiss some claims.
The district court granted the motion, dismissing Dimple’s
LLC’s First Amendment retaliation claim, Denis’s equal pro-
tection and due process claims, and Dimple’s equal protection
and due process claims. The appellants do not challenge any
of these dismissals on appeal. Dkt. 65.
The city and Mayor Mason eventually moved for
summary judgment on the remaining claims: Denis’s First
Amendment retaliation claim, Dimple’s LLC’s equal
protection claim, Dimple’s LLC’s due process claim, and
Denis’s defamation claim. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants on all claims, and this
appeal followed.

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No. 23-1208 7
II. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving parties and drawing all reasonable inferences
in their favor. E.g., Carmody v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Illi-
nois, 893 F.3d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is
proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact exists
when ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Estate of Simpson v. Gor-
bett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017), quoting Anderson v. Lib-
erty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
III. Analysis
A. First Amendment Retaliation
The district court granted summary judgment to the city
and Mayor Mason on Denis’s First Amendment retaliation
claim.2 To avoid summary judgment on a section 1983 claim
of First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must offer evidence
showing that: “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the
First Amendment, (2) he suffered an adverse action that
would likely deter future First Amendment activity, and
(3) the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating
factor in the defendants’ decision to retaliate.” Gekas v.
Vasiliades, 814 F.3d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations
omitted). Here, Denis’s claim fails on the first element. His
attendance at the April 24, 2020 rally was not protected First
2 Any retaliation claim by Dimple Navratil was waived in the district
court. Navratil, 2023 WL 9190207 at *4 n.4.

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8 No. 23-1208
Amendment activity because the rally was prohibited by two
valid time, place, and manner restrictions—the Safer at Home
Order and the state permit requirement.
1. Valid Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
Whether certain speech or activity is protected under the
First Amendment is a question of law for the court. Kubiak v.
City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2016). The First
Amendment protects freedom of speech, the right to assemble
peaceably, and the right to petition the government for
redress of grievances, but those rights are not absolute. E.g.,
Heffron v. Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 647 (1981) (“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee
the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places
or in any manner that may be desired.”). As explained by the
Supreme Court, “even in a public forum the government may
impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner
of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that
they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information.’” Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), quoting Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
We assume for purposes of this appeal that Denis’s
attendance at the rally was expressive conduct that constitutes
speech pursuant to the First Amendment. See, e.g., Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974) (explaining that
conduct must be “sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication” to constitute a “form of protected
expression”). His conduct was not protected, however, from

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No. 23-1208 9
reasonable and content-neutral restrictions on the time, place,
and manner of his expression.3
a. Safer at Home Order
The Safer at Home Order was content-neutral and de-
signed to serve a significant government interest—protecting
public health and safety. See, e.g., Elim Romanian Pentecostal
Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d 341, 343, 347 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirm-
ing denial of preliminary injunction after district court found
Illinois governor’s executive order limiting gathering sizes
during COVID-19 pandemic was supported by compelling
need to safeguard public health during pandemic).
As we explained in Elim Church in June 2020, “we do not
evaluate orders issued in response to public-health
emergencies by the standard that might be appropriate for
years-long notice-and-comment rulemaking.” Id. at 347, citing
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). This deference is
appropriate. The Constitution “principally entrusts ‘[t]he
safety and the health of the people’ to the politically
accountable officials of the States ‘to guard and protect.’”
South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613,
1613 (2020) (mem.) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (alteration in
original), quoting Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38. “When those
officials ‘undertake[ ] to act in areas fraught with medical and
scientific uncertainties,’ their latitude ‘must be especially
3 Denis asserts that he attended the April 24 rally merely as an “ob-
server” because he could see “both sides” of the issue. Dkt. 50-1 at 4–5.
The district court inferred that Denis’s attendance at the rally was thus not
expressive conduct because simply observing an event does not com-
municate any particular message. 2023 WL 9190207 at *4. Defendants do
not challenge on appeal whether Denis’s attendance at the rally was ex-
pressive conduct, so we do not address this alternative holding.

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10 No. 23-1208
broad.’” Id. (alteration in original), quoting Marshall v. United
States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974).
Plaintiffs argue that the Safer at Home Order was too
broad to be a valid time, place, and manner restriction
because it banned public gatherings. April 2020 was scarcely
a month into the COVID-19 pandemic and our understanding
of the virus’s spread. State and local officials were working to
slow the transmission of the virus, to “flatten the curve,” to
protect public health, and to limit the severe demands that
COVID-19 cases were placing on the health-care system.
Placing limits on public gatherings within the state was
tailored to “prevent[ ] the transmission of viral particles …
from one person to the next.” Illinois Republican Party v.
Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2020). With the benefit of
hindsight and additional scientific evidence, we assume that
reasonable minds might disagree on whether any particular
restrictions among those early responses were the most
effective means of stopping the spread of COVID-19. But our
analysis is focused on what state and local officials knew at
the time. See Elim Church, 962 F.3d at 347 (“Perhaps with more
time—and more data from contact tracing—Illinois could
figure out just how dangerous religious services are
compared with warehouses and similar activities, but no one
contends that such data were available when Executive Order
2020-32 was promulgated (or, for that matter, now).”).
Here, it is clear at the time of its issuance that a temporary
ban on large public gatherings during a global pandemic was
a valid time, place, and manner restriction on speech. It was
reasonable, and it was content-neutral. Denis’s attendance at
the April 24 rally violated the Safer at Home Order. Therefore,

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No. 23-1208 11
his attendance was not protected First Amendment activity
and he cannot establish a retaliation claim.
b. State Permit Requirement
Wisconsin Statute § 16.845 authorizes the state to establish
permitting requirements for gatherings on state property,
including the State Capitol Park where the April 24 rally was
held. Under the regulations for permits for events on State
grounds, permits can be denied on the basis that a proposed
event is a hazard to the safety of the public or involves an
activity prohibited by law. Wis. Admin. Code § 2.04 (Aug.
2014). The Wisconsin permitting scheme for the Capitol is a
quintessential time, place, and manner restriction. See Thomas
v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 322, 324 (2002)
(permitting scheme for park events that allowed denials
based on risks to public health and safety was valid time,
place, and manner restriction); Gaylor v. Thompson, 939 F.
Supp. 1363, 1370–71 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (holding that permitting
scheme for displaying signs in Wisconsin State Capitol was
not unconstitutional).
The April 24 rally organizers were denied a permit
because the Safer at Home Order prohibited large public
gatherings for public health reasons during the pandemic.
The April 24 rally violated the state permit requirement,
which is another reason that Denis’s attendance at the rally
was not protected First Amendment activity.
2. Later Invalidation of the Safer at Home Order
Plaintiffs argue that Denis’s attendance at the April 24
rally was in fact protected First Amendment activity because
the Wisconsin Supreme Court later held the Safer at Home
Order invalid. That later decision does not affect our

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12 No. 23-1208
conclusion. The court struck down the Safer at Home Order
in Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, 942 N.W.2d 900.
The court based its decision on a failure to follow proper state
administrative law procedural rulemaking requirements and
an over-stepping of statutorily delegated authority. Id. ¶¶ 3–
4. At no point did any court find the Safer at Home Order vi-
olated the First Amendment.
The Safer at Home Order’s later invalidation on state-law
grounds does not retroactively render Denis’s attendance at
the rally protected First Amendment activity. Particularly not
where, as here, the argument would be used to support
liability against a municipality relying on a facially valid law
to protect public health. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192,
209 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“[S]tate officials and those with
whom they deal are entitled to rely on a presumptively valid
state statute, enacted in good faith and by no means plainly
unlawful.”); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 317,
320–21 (1967) (affirming criminal contempt convictions for
violating state-court injunction of dubious constitutionality
restricting public demonstrations for civil rights). Because
Denis did not engage in protected First Amendment activity,
we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the city and
Mayor Mason on Denis’s First Amendment retaliation claim.4
4 By affirming on this ground, we bypass questions about whether
Denis has a viable claim for a violation of his own First Amendment rights,
given that the alleged adverse action was taken against his spouse’s LLC
instead of him personally.

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No. 23-1208 13
B. Equal Protection
1. Political Animus Theory
Plaintiffs argue that the city and Mayor Mason violated
Dimple’s LLC’s right to equal protection under the law on the
theory that its grant application was denied based on Mayor
Mason’s political animus toward the Navratils. The admissi-
ble evidence submitted on summary judgment does not raise
a genuine issue of fact on this theory but shows instead, be-
yond reasonable dispute, that Dimple’s LLC was denied
funding based on Denis’s attendance at the April 24 rally in
violation of the Safer at Home Order.
Ample evidence supports the defendants’ assertion that
Dimple’s LLC’s grant application was denied because of
Denis’s attendance at the April 24 rally. The question on
appeal is whether plaintiffs offered evidence sufficient to raise
a genuine factual dispute about that reason. Plaintiffs rely
most heavily on the deposition testimony of James Palenick,
City Administrator during the emergency grant process, as
evidence of Mayor Mason’s political animus.
Palenick testified that in the discussion of Dimple’s LLC’s
grant application, Mayor Mason explained he was not
supportive of the application because of Denis’s attendance at
the April 24 rally. Palenick testified that Mayor Mason said,
“if he had anything to say, that [Dimple’s LLC] wouldn’t get
a grant.” Dkt. 52-1 at 2–3. That comment is not evidence of
political animus, but only further confirmation that Dimple’s
LLC was denied emergency funding due to Denis’s rally
attendance. According to Palenick, Denis’s attendance at the
rally was the only reason Mayor Mason gave for opposing
Dimple’s LLC’s grant application.

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14 No. 23-1208
Palenick went on to testify that he believed the denial of
Dimple’s LLC’s application was “political in nature.” Id. at 4.
When pressed on what his belief was based upon, however,
Palenick explained that it was mostly Republicans who op-
posed the Safer at Home Order and that Mayor Mason had
longtime ties to the Democratic party. Id. Palenick also testi-
fied, that he did not know whether Mayor Mason knew the
Navratils’ political affiliations, but rather assumed Mayor
Mason did because politics “was his business.” Id.
Palenick’s belief about Mayor Mason’s political motiva-
tion was not supported by any factual basis in the admissible
evidence. It is well-established that “inferences that are sup-
ported by only speculation or conjecture will not defeat a
summary judgment motion.” Design Basics, LLC v. Lexington
Homes, Inc., 858 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir. 2017), quoting Herzog
v. Graphic Packaging Int'l, Inc., 742 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014).
Palenick’s statement that Dimple’s LLC’s grant denial was
politically motivated was no more than conjecture and
supposition that a Democratic mayor must necessarily have
animus toward a Republican constituent. That is not enough
to defeat summary judgment. See FKFJ, Inc. v. Village of Worth,
11 F.4th 574, 587 (7th Cir. 2021) (affirming grant of summary
judgment to defendants: “[w]hile it is clear from [plaintiffs’]
testimony that they believe [defendant] is the reason they
went out of business and she intentionally tried to drive them
out of town, they have failed to present evidence to support
their beliefs” (emphasis in original)); see also Circle City
Broadcasting I, LLC v. AT&T Services, Inc., __ F.4th __, 2024 WL
1634093 at *5 (7th Cir. 2024) (affirming grant of summary
judgment to defendants because plaintiff’s theory that
defendants discriminated against plaintiff company on the

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No. 23-1208 15
basis of the company owner’s race was not backed by
evidence and instead based on conjecture); Garrett v. Barnes,
961 F.2d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding directed verdict
for defendants: “It may be easy to become cynical about
politics and politicians, but public perception of political
machinations, innuendo, and speculation cannot be the basis
of a jury verdict—and there is nothing else in this case.”);
Endicott v. Huddleston, 644 F.2d 1208, 1215 (7th Cir. 1980)
(affirming grant of defendants’ motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and explaining, “all [plaintiff]
has shown is that he is a Democrat and that the defendants
are Republicans…. Even drawing all reasonable inferences
from the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, we conclude there was insufficient evidence from
which a jury could find that the defendants’ actions were
motivated by political considerations”).
The evidence at summary judgment thus showed only one
reason for denying Dimple’s LLC’s grant application: Denis’s
attendance at the April 24 rally in violation of the Safer at
Home Order. The purpose of the city’s emergency grants was
to keep afloat small businesses forced to close or limit opera-
tions by the Safer at Home Order. Basing a denial on Denis’s
attendance at the rally was not subject to any heightened scru-
tiny under the Equal Protection Clause, and the defendants’
stated reason for the denial easily passes muster as rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose. It was not unrea-
sonable to deny discretionary grant funds to a business whose
manager seemed to have violated the law, thereby contrib-
uting to the public health crisis that created the need for emer-
gency funding in the first place. The denial of Dimple’s LLC’s
grant application was not a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.

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16 No. 23-1208
2. Class-of-One Theory
Dimple’s LLC also argues a class-of-one equal protection
theory. To prevail on a “class-of-one” equal protection claim,
a plaintiff must show that it was “treated differently from oth-
ers similarly situated, without a rational basis for the differ-
ential treatment.” Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 441 (7th
Cir. 2013). To be similarly situated the comparators must be
“identical or directly comparable in all material respects” to
the plaintiff. LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Winnetka, 628
F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2010).
Dimple’s LLC’s theory is that other grant applicants who
violated the Safer at Home Order nevertheless received
funding. Plaintiffs have provided evidence that some
successful applicants likely violated the Safer at Home Order.
The problem for plaintiffs on this theory, however, is that they
have offered no evidence that, at the time the city was
considering the second round of emergency funding
applications, Mayor Mason knew that any other applicants
had violated the order. See Dkt. 52-3 at 14 (Mayor Mason
testifying Denis was the only applicant he knew to have
violated the Safer at Home Order at the time grants were
being considered). Mayor Mason also testified that if he had
known other applicants were violating the order, he would
have also denied their applications. Id. at 14, 16. Even if we
take such explanations with a grain of salt for purposes of
summary judgment, plaintiffs still have not offered
affirmative evidence of any similarly situated comparators—
businesses that Mayor Mason knew violated the Safer at
Home Order but received funding—to support this claim.

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No. 23-1208 17
C. Due Process Claims
1. Procedural Due Process
Dimple’s LLC also argues that the city’s denial of its grant
application violated its right to procedural due process. The
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the government
without due process of law. “[W]e consider first whether the
plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in property
or liberty, and if that is established, we consider whether the
state’s procedures comport with due process.” Rock River
Health Care, LLC v. Eagleson, 14 F.4th 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2021).
Here, Dimple’s LLC cannot show it had any protected prop-
erty or liberty interest in the city’s COVID-19 emergency
grants.
It is well-settled that there is no property interest in a
purely discretionary government benefit. See, e.g., Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“To have a property in-
terest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it. … He must, instead, have a le-
gitimate claim of entitlement to it.”); Bell v. City of Country
Club Hills, 841 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2016) (“A protected prop-
erty interest exists only when the state’s discretion is clearly
limited such that the plaintiff cannot be denied the interest
unless specific conditions are met.” (cleaned up)). Cf. Rock
River Health Care, 14 F.4th at 774 (“Because [the Medicaid re-
imbursement rate] is defined by statute, and is not a discre-
tionary determination, it is the type of entitlement that trig-
gers due process protection.”).
The city’s emergency funding program had certain re-
quirements for eligibility, but once those requirements were

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18 No. 23-1208
met, the actual award of funds was left to Mayor Mason’s dis-
cretion. Neither the city nor any governing legal rules guar-
anteed that a business meeting the criteria would receive
funding because the funds available were limited. Dimple’s
LLC simply had no constitutionally protected property inter-
est in the emergency funds.
Dimple’s LLC also argues that the denial of emergency
funds deprived it of a liberty interest in its right to run its
store. We reject this theory. Denying Dimple’s LLC a discre-
tionary grant did not deprive it of any legal right to continue
to operate, unlike the revocation of a business license or a ret-
roactive revision of zoning laws. Cf. Pro’s Sports Bar & Grill,
Inc. v. City of Country Club Hills, 589 F.3d 865, 870–71 (7th Cir.
2009) (business had protected property interest in liquor li-
cense and could not be deprived of renewed license without
due process of law). Dimple’s LLC was not deprived of any
constitutionally protected property or liberty interest, so its
procedural due process claim fails at the threshold.
2. Substantive Due Process
Plaintiffs also assert that the denial of the emergency fund-
ing application “shocks the conscience.” Suffice it to say that
the decision to deny one application for limited funds does
not meet the extraordinarily high “shocks the conscience”
standard. See generally County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 846 (1998) (“[T]he cognizable level of executive abuse of
power [is] that which shocks the conscience,” and “only the
most egregious official conduct” can meet this standard.).
It was not unreasonable, and certainly not conscience-
shocking, for the city to decide that a business whose key em-
ployee violated COVID-19 restrictions should not receive

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No. 23-1208 19
limited COVID-19 emergency funding. This practical policy
decision is not in the same realm as government actions that
have been found conscience-shocking. Compare Rochin v. Cal-
ifornia, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952) (forcibly pumping criminal
suspect’s stomach shocked the conscience), and Hess v. Garcia,
72 F.4th 753, 757, 767 (7th Cir. 2023) (police officer’s repeated
sexual assault of minor student during class-required police
car ride-along could be found to shock the conscience), with
Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 750 (7th Cir. 2012)
(police officers harassing plaintiff by issuing 24 bogus parking
tickets did not shock the conscience), and GEFT Outdoors, LLC
v. City of Westfield, 922 F.3d 357, 368 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming
denial of preliminary injunction and explaining that city at-
torney’s threat to arrest plaintiff for violating ordinance did
not shock the conscience). We affirm summary judgment on
Dimple’s LLC’s due process claims.
D. Defamation
Plaintiffs also contend that Mayor Mason’s June 2020 press
statement defamed Denis. First, Denis contends that Mayor
Mason’s statement that Denis “returned to our City” is false.
Second, Denis claims that the explanation that funds would
not be granted to people who “willingly jeopardized public
health” and “took reckless behaviors that risked the health of
our community” defamed him.
The elements of a Wisconsin common law action for defa-
mation are familiar:
(1) a false statement; (2) communicated by
speech, conduct or in writing to a person other
than the one defamed; and (3) the communica-
tion is unprivileged and tends to harm one’s

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20 No. 23-1208
reputation, lowering him or her in the estima-
tion of the community or deterring third per-
sons from associating or dealing with him or
her.
Laughland v. Beckett, 2015 WI App 70, ¶ 22, 870 N.W.2d 466,
473 (internal quotations omitted).
Truth is a complete defense to a defamation claim so long
as the statement is “substantially true.” Lathan v. Journal Co.,
140 N.W.2d 417, 423 (Wis. 1966). Denis contends that the state-
ment that he returned to “our City” was false because he ac-
tually lived in the adjoining Village of Wind Point and did not
return to Racine specifically until fourteen days after the rally.
His home in Wind Point is within half a mile of the Racine city
line. The Navratils referred to themselves in their emergency
grant application and the amended complaint in this action as
living at a Racine address.
We agree with the district court. “Whether Denis actually
returned to the City itself or merely to the area is inconsequen-
tial—the mayor’s point was simply that it was dangerous for
someone to attend a rally and then return to the community.”
Navratil, 2023 WL 9190207 at *8. Mayor Mason’s statement
that Denis returned to the city was substantially true. The dif-
ference between Wind Point and Racine cannot support his
defamation claim.
Also, statements of pure opinion are not actionable under
defamation law, and a mixed-opinion statement is actionable
only “if it implies the assertion of undisclosed defamatory
facts as the basis of the opinion.” Laughland, 2015 WI App 70,
¶ 27 (internal quotations omitted). Mayor Mason’s statements
that Denis “willingly jeopardized public health” and “took

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No. 23-1208 21
reckless behaviors that risked the health of our community”
are pure opinion statements. They conveyed Mayor Mason’s
belief that Denis’s attendance at the rally was “reckless” and
“jeopardized” public health.
The June press statement was issued to explain why
Dimple’s LLC was denied an emergency funding grant. In
this context, the statement did not imply undisclosed,
defamatory facts, but explained only that Mayor Mason
declined to award emergency funding to a business whose
key employee engaged in behavior—attending a rally—that
the mayor believed to be a dangerous activity in the midst of
a global pandemic and in violation of public health measures.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on
Denis’s defamation claim.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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