Harry Ross Rapp v. Ssm Agnesian Health

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 24, 2024*
Decided July 25, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1033
HARRY ROSS RAPP,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SSM AGNESIAN HEALTH, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 23-CV-1603-JPS
J. P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
O R D E R
Harry Rapp, a citizen of Wisconsin, sued Pat Guell, also of Wisconsin, plus SSM
Agnesian Health, a hospital in Wisconsin (operating under “SSM Health St. Agnes
Hospital”), and Kimberly Rogers, from Colorado, for injuries from an incident at SSM.
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1033 Page 2
The district court screened his complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and correctly
dismissed it without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We thus affirm.
Rapp alleges that Rogers had Guell photograph Rapp’s wife as she lay in hospice
at SSM in Wisconsin. He accuses Rogers, Guell, and SSM, of violating his and his late
wife’s privacy, inflicting “malicious” distress, committing elder abuse, and negligence.
Because Rapp asked for leave to sue in forma pauperis, the district court screened his
complaint, see § 1915(e)(2), and dismissed it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The
court noted that Rapp brought only state-law claims and that two of the defendants
appeared to be citizens of the same state as Rapp, destroying complete diversity of
citizenship. Also because Rapp did not describe a violation of federal law or allege that
the defendants acted under color of state law, federal-question jurisdiction was absent.
The court allowed Rapp to amend his complaint to cure these defects. It also warned
Rapp his failure to do so would result in the suit’s dismissal without prejudice.
Rapp amended his complaint but did not address the identified defects: He did
not address the observation that two defendants had the same state citizenship as Rapp,
allege that the defendants acted under color of state law, or invoke federal law. The
court dismissed the suit without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, Rapp argues that his suit arises under federal-question jurisdiction,
but we disagree. To invoke federal-question jurisdiction, a complaint must state a claim
arising under federal law. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1331; E. Cent. Ill. Pipe Trades Health &
Welfare Fund v. Prather Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 3 F.4th 954, 958–59 (7th Cir. 2021)
(explaining federal-question jurisdiction). Rapp states in his notice of appeal that the
defendants violated his “federal” right to “a reasonable expectation of privacy.”
Because he does not elaborate, we assume that he is referring to a federal right under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. But this right is imposed against federal or
state government actors. See, e.g., DiDonato v. Panatera, 24 F.4th 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 2022)
(state actors under Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Bebris, 4 F.4th 551, 560
(7th Cir. 2021) (federal actors under Fourth Amendment). Rapp did not allege that the
defendants are such actors; rather, he stressed that the defendants are private actors.
Nor does Rapp demonstrate that jurisdiction is secured by diversity of
citizenship, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the other potential ground for federal jurisdiction. Rapp
does not contest the district court’s observation that he and two of the defendants
appeared to be citizens of the same state (Wisconsin): First, Rapp alleged that Guell
resides only in Wisconsin, and even though residence is not synonymous with

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No. 24-1033 Page 3
citizenship, the district court properly required Rapp to allege Guell’s citizenship.
See F ED. R. C IV. P. 8(a)(1). Second, SSM appeared to be a Wisconsin citizen because it is
incorporated in Wisconsin as SSM Health Care Corporation, see Wis. Dep’t of Fin. Inst.,
Search Corporate Records, https://apps.dfi.wi.gov/apps/corpSearch/Search.aspx (search
“SSM Health Care Corporation”), and a corporation is a citizen of the state in which it is
incorporated, § 1332(c)(1). The longstanding rule is that federal jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship requires “complete diversity” between the parties—the plaintiff
cannot be a citizen of the same state as any defendant. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806); Page v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 2 F.4th 630, 636 (7th Cir.
2021). The district court gave Rapp a chance to allege in an amended complaint the
diversity of citizenship between these two defendants and Rapp. But he did not, despite
his obligation under Rule 8(a)(1) to state the grounds of federal jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed his case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED

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