United States of America v. Michael A. Davis

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2259
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL A. D AVIS ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 22-CR-22 — Philip P. Simon, Judge.
____________________
SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 5, 2024∗ — D ECIDED O CTOBER 7, 2024
____________________
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and S T . EVE and LEE , Circuit
Judges.
S T . EVE , Circuit Judge. On February 22, 2022, police officers
responded to a chilling 911 call from a fifteen-year-old in
∗ We granted the joint motion to waive oral argument, and the appeal
is therefore submitted on the briefs and the record. Fed. R. App. P.
34(a)(2)(C).

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2 No. 23-2259
Gary, Indiana. The teenage caller reported that Michael Davis
had threatened to kill her mother, was outside their home,
and had an assault rifle in his car. She urged emergency dis-
patch to hurry, and relayed updates to the 911 operator as her
family sought safety at the local police station.
Within ten minutes of the 911 call, police caught up with
Davis, who was following the family’s minivan. Officers ar-
rested him and searched his vehicle, recovering a loaded,
semi-automatic shotgun with an obliterated serial number.
Davis was subsequently charged with possessing a fire-
arm illegally, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). After unsuc-
cessfully moving to suppress the shotgun, he pleaded guilty
but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.
Before us, Davis renews his contention that the warrant-
less search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment, re-
quiring the suppression of the shotgun. Because the search
falls squarely within the search incident to arrest and automo-
bile exceptions to the warrant requirement, we affirm the dis-
trict court’s denial of his motion.
I. Background
In the wee hours of the morning of February 22, 2022, Mi-
chael Davis began beating and kicking at the door of his for-
mer girlfriend, A.C., and her four children.
Davis went to A.C.’s home to pick up some clothes he had
left in the back of her minivan. A.C. answered the door but
refused to return the clothes, demanding Davis first give her
back some jewelry. Angered, Davis picked up a brick and ges-
tured toward her minivan. A.C. called the police. An officer
responded, declined to facilitate a property exchange, and in-
structed A.C. to file a report.

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No. 23-2259 3
Davis left shortly after the police did, but his behavior con-
tinued to escalate. A.C. was pregnant, and Davis sent her a
text message threatening to kill her baby. Fearful of Davis’s
increasing hostility, A.C. called off their plan to reconvene at
the house to exchange the clothes and jewelry. She also in-
structed her children to call 911 if Davis came back.
Undeterred, Davis returned to the house as A.C. was pre-
paring her kids for school. At 7:12 a.m., A.C.’s 15-year-old
daughter called 911. Audibly distressed, she told the public
safety officer that “there’s a man here and he’s trying to kill
us.” She urged the officer to “please hurry up.” A.C.’s daugh-
ter explained that Davis had threatened her mom and had an
assault rifle in his car. She described the clothes Davis was
wearing and gave the officer his name. She then let the 911
operator know that her family was leaving home for the po-
lice station in a brown Honda Odessey. She also told the of-
ficer that Davis drove a tan GMC Terrain.
Sergeant Manuel responded to the 911 call. Dispatch had
informed him via radio and through written emergency notes
that there was a “male threatening to kill a pregnant female,
apparently he has an assault rifle in the car.” Dispatch also
communicated the description of Davis and his SUV given by
A.C.’s daughter. And when A.C. and her family left their
home, dispatch updated Sgt. Manuel with a description of the
family’s minivan.
Approximately ten minutes later, Sgt. Manuel spotted Da-
vis’s tan GMC driving behind A.C.’s brown Honda. After
A.C. hailed him and gestured to Davis’s SUV, he pulled them
both over. Sgt. Manuel asked Davis to exit his vehicle, patted
him down, confirmed his identity, and handcuffed him. Sgt.

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4 No. 23-2259
Manuel then radioed for backup. Officers Vonbank and
McCoy responded.
After handcuffing Davis, Sgt. Manuel searched his vehicle.
Witness testimony conflicts on the precise timing of the
search. Sgt. Manuel testified that he did not formally arrest
Davis or search his car until after Officer Vonbank inter-
viewed A.C. and confirmed the allegations in the 911 call. Of-
ficer Vonbank, Davis, and A.C. testified that Sgt. Manuel ar-
rested Davis and searched his car before Vonbank completed
his interview.
Inside Davis’s car, Sgt. Manuel found a loaded, AR-style
shotgun with an obliterated serial number. Davis was
charged with being a felon in unlawful possession of a fire-
arm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Davis filed a motion to suppress the firearm and a subse-
quent post-arrest statement, contending that the officers un-
lawfully searched his vehicle. The district court held a two-
day evidentiary hearing. Ultimately, the court denied Davis’s
motion, finding the warrantless search fell within both the
search incident to arrest and the automobile exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
Davis entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right
to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The district
judge imposed a sentence of ninety-two months’ imprison-
ment and two years’ supervised release; this appeal followed.
II. Discussion
On appeal of a district court’s denial of a motion to sup-
press, we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo and its
factual findings for clear error. United States v. Williams, 106
F.4th 639, 653 (7th Cir. 2024).

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No. 23-2259 5
Warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions.” United States v. Sala-
zar, 69 F.4th 474, 477 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)). This case concerns two of these ex-
ceptions: search incident to arrest and the automobile excep-
tion.
Either exception would justify the warrantless search of
the SUV, and Davis asks us to find that neither applies. His
claim raises two issues on appeal. First, whether the officers
had probable cause to arrest him, as the search incident to ar-
rest exception requires. Second, whether it was reasonable to
believe his vehicle contained evidence of a crime, as both the
search incident to arrest and automobile exceptions require.1
A. Probable Cause to Arrest
Officers may search an automobile incident to the lawful
arrest of its recent occupant under two circumstances: when
“the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search,” United States v. Reedy,
989 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 351),
or when “it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evi-
dence of the offense of arrest.” Id. The search incident to arrest
exception derives from dual concerns for “officer safety and
evidence preservation,” Gant, 556 U.S. at 338, and its two
prongs reflect those concerns. See id. at 346.
1 The government also argues that the inevitable discovery doctrine
forecloses suppression of the shotgun. Because the search falls squarely
within both the search incident to arrest and the automobile exceptions,
we need not decide this issue.

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6 No. 23-2259
It bears emphasizing, however, that warrantless searches
incident to arrest are permissible only when the underlying
arrest is lawful. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177 (2008)
(explaining the exception covers any “lawful arrest” (quoting
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973))). A warrant-
less arrest does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment when
supported by probable cause. United States v. Paige, 870 F.3d
693, 699 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Moore, 553 U.S. at 177 (equating
“a lawful arrest with an arrest based on probable cause”).
Officers have probable cause to arrest when the facts and
circumstances known to them “reasonably support a belief
that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about
to commit a crime.” Doe v. Gray, 75 F.4th 710, 718 (7th Cir.
2023) (quoting Braun v. Village of Palatine, 56 F.4th 542, 548 (7th
Cir. 2022)); see also United States v. Hill, 818 F.3d 289, 294 (7th
Cir. 2016) (describing the inquiry as a commonsense exami-
nation of the totality of the circumstances). So, when officers
make an arrest for a violation of state law, probable cause de-
pends on “the elements of the predicate criminal offense(s) as
defined by state law.” Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706,
715 (7th Cir. 2013).
Davis seizes upon factual ambiguity about when his de-
tention morphed into an arrest and whether officers spoke
with A.C. before arresting him to argue the district court erred
in finding probable cause. This claim misunderstands the
court’s ruling. The district court assumed without deciding
that Davis was under arrest for intimidation prior to Officer
Vonbank’s conversation with A.C. and found probable cause
to arrest regardless. We agree.
Under Indiana’s definition of “intimidation,” a person
“who communicates a threat with the intent ... that another

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No. 23-2259 7
person be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out,
[commits a Level 6 felony] if the threat is ... to commit a forci-
ble felony.” Gates v. State, 192 N.E.3d 222, 225 (Ind. Ct. App.
2022) (quoting Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(4); (b)(1)(A)) (altera-
tion in original). Forcible felonies include felonies involving
“the use or threat of force against a human being, or in which
there is imminent danger of bodily injury to a human being.”
Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-138.
At the time he handcuffed Davis, Sgt. Manuel knew from
radio communication and written emergency dispatch notes
that a 911 caller had reported a “male threatening to kill
them,” who stood outside their home, with an assault rifle in
his car. Sgt. Manuel also knew the man’s name was Michael
Davis, and that he drove a tan GMC Terrain. Additionally,
Sgt. Manuel knew that A.C. and her family had fled their
home in a brown Honda Odyssey.
We have previously held that eyewitness and victim re-
ports establishing the elements of a crime, absent credibility
concerns, almost always suffice to find probable cause to ar-
rest. United States v. McCauley, 659 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir.
2011); see also McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“Normally, an officer may base a determination of probable
cause on information from the putative victim if the officer
reasonably believes that the victim is telling the truth.”).
Here, A.C.’s teenage daughter established the elements of
felony intimidation when she reported Davis’s threats in her
911 call. The district court found her report credible, and Da-
vis does not challenge its determination on appeal.
What’s more, Sgt. Manuel did not solely rely on the 911
report—he corroborated it. Within 15 minutes of the call, Sgt.

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8 No. 23-2259
Manuel spotted a tan GMC Terrain following a brown Honda
Odyssey a short distance from the caller’s residence. He ob-
served A.C. hail him and gesture to the tan SUV behind her,
indicating that Davis was the subject of the 911 call. Sgt. Ma-
nuel pulled both cars over, observed that Davis matched the
description given in the 911 report, and confirmed Davis’s
identity. He then placed Davis in handcuffs.
Even assuming Sgt. Manuel arrested Davis when he hand-
cuffed him, before Officer Vonbank completed his interview
of A.C., there was nonetheless probable cause to arrest him
for felony intimidation.
B. Probable Cause to Search
Davis also challenges the lawfulness of the search by ar-
guing that Sgt. Manuel lacked a sufficient quantum of suspi-
cion to search his vehicle. His claim takes aim at the applica-
bility of both the search incident to arrest and automobile ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement.
These exceptions “are interrelated, but not identical.”
United States v. Edwards, 769 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2014). Of-
ficers may search a vehicle incident to arrest when it is “rea-
sonable to believe” the car contains evidence of the offense of
arrest. Reedy, 989 F.3d at 555. The automobile exception to the
warrant requirement is not tied to an arrest. Edwards, 769 F.3d
at 514. It “permits an officer to search a vehicle without a war-
rant if the search is supported by probable cause,” regardless
of any arrest. United States v. Ochoa-Lopez, 31 F.4th 1024, 1026
(7th Cir. 2022). Sgt. Manuel’s search was supported by proba-
ble cause. As a result, the search met the requirements of both
exceptions.

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No. 23-2259 9
“Probable cause to search a vehicle exists when, based on
the totality of the circumstances, ‘there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a par-
ticular place.’” United States v. Sands, 815 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
The inquiry is objective and conducted ex ante. See Bruce v.
Guernsey, 777 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2015). We ask whether
“the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search
… viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable
police officer” support a finding of probable cause. Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
Credible, corroborated reports from victims and witnesses
can also establish probable cause to search. See United States v.
Charles, 801 F.3d 855, 860–61 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that a
corroborated 911 report gave officers probable cause to search
the suspect’s car); Edwards, 769 F.3d 509, 516 (7th Cir. 2014)
(remarking that “[w]hen a car is reported stolen and is recov-
ered, the police have probable cause to look in the car for some
evidence of ownership”); see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 46–48 (1970) (finding probable cause to search a car
for guns and stolen money after speaking with the victim and
witnesses to a robbery).
In United States v. Charles, a woman called 911, reported a
man with a gun had threatened her, and gave a detailed de-
scription of him. 801 F.3d at 860. Emergency dispatch relayed
the contents of the call to responding officers. Just two
minutes later, officers corroborated the allegations by locating
a suspect matching the woman’s description near the scene of
the crime. Id. at 861. We found probable cause to search the
suspect’s vehicle for the gun on these facts. Id.

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10 No. 23-2259
Here, the dispatch report, along with Sgt. Manuel’s rapid
corroboration of Davis’s identity, vehicle, and proximity to
A.C., established probable cause to believe that Davis’s vehi-
cle contained evidence of intimidation. In particular, Sgt. Ma-
nuel had probable cause to search the SUV for the assault rifle,
as evidence that Davis had intentionally placed A.C. and her
family in fear he would fulfill his threat to kill her baby.
Contrary to Davis’s contention, a suspect need not bran-
dish a firearm for it to be evidence of intimidation. Our prob-
able cause inquiry is a commonsense examination of the total-
ity of the circumstances. Hill, 818 F.3d at 294. When a victim
reports a threat of violence and expresses fear that the threat
maker is armed, officers may reasonably infer that the suspect
used the weapon to intimidate. Those officers may then con-
clude the weapon is evidence of intimidation.
* * *
The search of Davis’s car was lawful, falling within both
the search incident to arrest and automobile exceptions to the
warrant requirement. For these reasons, the judgment of the
district court is
AFFIRMED.

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