JOSEPH DeLAROSA v. Village of Romeoville

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 15, 2024*
Decided October 18, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1715
JOSEPH DeLAROSA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
VILLAGE OF ROMEOVILLE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 23 CV 7049
Jeremy C. Daniel,
Judge.
O R D E R
Joseph DeLarosa appeals the judgment dismissing his civil rights suit against the
Village of Romeoville and several of its officers. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court
dismissed the complaint because DeLarosa failed to state a claim. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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DeLarosa maintains that the defendant officers violated his rights under federal
and state law by searching his home without probable cause, arresting him, and then
detaining him in jail. The following narrative draws upon facts from documents that
DeLarosa attached to his amended complaint—documents that may be considered
when ruling on a motion to dismiss. See Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir.
2013). The search stemmed from reports made in 2016 by two construction companies
to Romeoville police that some of their equipment, including four welders, had been
stolen. More than two months later, one of the companies’ employees notified the police
that the stolen welders were being advertised for sale on Facebook. An investigation led
the officers to DeLarosa’s home. While there, an officer peered through a window of
DeLarosa’s detached garage and saw an allegedly stolen welder. Based on this
observation, the officers obtained a warrant and executed a search of the property. They
found allegedly stolen equipment, including the welders. DeLarosa eventually was
charged in state court with three counts of theft.
The charges did not stick. In June 2021, the state trial court granted DeLarosa’s
motion to suppress, finding that the search warrant was tainted by an unlawful search
because the officer’s garage-window observations occurred within the curtilage of
DeLarosa’s home. The state then dismissed the charges.
Two years later, in June 2023, DeLarosa filed this suit. In a wide-ranging § 1983
complaint, DeLarosa asserted 22 counts under the Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth
Amendment, and Illinois state law.
The district court dismissed the case. The court concluded that most of
DeLarosa’s claims were time-barred: Some claims were barred by the two-year statute
of limitations for unreasonable searches and seizures that accrued at the time the search
and seizure occurred (counts II, III, and V), see Neita v. City of Chi., 830 F.3d 494, 498 (7th
Cir. 2016) (citing 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/13-202), and other claims were barred under the
one-year statute of limitations for claims brought against local governments and their
agents under the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act (counts VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XV, XVI, XVII, XIX, XX, and XXII), 745 Ill.
Comp. Stat. Ann. § 10/8-101. The court also dismissed DeLarosa’s Fourteenth
Amendment claims because the rights asserted—substantive due process violations—
were grounded in the Fourth Amendment (counts XIII, XIV, and XXI). And the court
determined that DeLarosa’s Fourth Amendment claims related to malicious prosecution
(counts I, IV, and VI) were implausible based on documents he attached to the
complaint showing that the officers had probable cause to search his home. Finally, the

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court dismissed DeLarosa’s conspiracy claim (count XVIII) for failure to establish an
underlying constitutional violation.
We review the district court’s dismissal de novo. Lax v. Mayorkas, 20 F.4th 1178,
1181 (7th Cir. 2021). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead facts
sufficient to show that a claim for relief is plausible on its face. Gociman v. Loyola Univ. of
Chicago, 41 F.4th 873, 881 (7th Cir. 2022). Pro se litigants are afforded a liberal reading of
the complaint. Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam)).
Turning first to the time-barred claims, DeLarosa maintains that his Fourth
Amendment claims (counts I, II, III, IV, V and VI) were timely because he was barred
under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994), from bringing these claims until
his criminal case was dismissed. DeLarosa is correct that Heck applies to his malicious
prosecution claims (counts I, IV, and VI), McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 116–117
(2019), and that those claims are therefore timely. But Heck does not apply to an action
that would impugn an anticipated future conviction. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
393 (2007). DeLarosa’s claims for unreasonable search and seizure (counts II, III, and V)
accrued when the search and seizure were conducted, Neita, 830 F.3d at 498, and the
subsequent prosecution did not delay accrual, see Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362, 363 (7th
Cir. 2010). In Illinois, Fourth Amendment claims for unreasonable search and seizure
are governed by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See Neita,
830 F.3d at 498 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/13-202). As the district court
rightly concluded, DeLarosa’s Fourth Amendment claims were untimely because he did
not file his complaint until June 2023—almost six and a half years after his January 2017
search and arrest.
As for his state law claims (counts VII, VIII, IX X, XI, XII, XV, XVI, XVII, XIX, XX,
and XXII), DeLarosa asserts that these are governed by the two-year statute of
limitations that applies to personal injury claims. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/13-202. But
§ 5/13-202 is not the applicable statute. As the district court explained, his state law
claims were governed by the one-year statute of limitations that applies to claims
against local governments and governmental employees. See Williams v. Lampe, 399 F.3d
867, 870 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 10/8-101). The one-year
limitation applies even to state-law claims that are joined with § 1983 claims governed
by a two-year statute of limitations. Williams, 399 F.3d at 870. DeLarosa’s criminal
charges were dismissed on June 21, 2021 (the latest possible date for his claims to
accrue), and he did not initiate his civil case until June 21, 2023 – one year too late.

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Next, Delarosa argues that the court improperly construed two of his Fourteenth
Amendment claims (counts XIV and XXI) as Fourth Amendment claims. (He concedes
in his reply brief that the court properly dismissed his third claim brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment (count XIII).) He argues that count XIV, which alleges that the
officers took equipment from his home, is a Fourteenth Amendment claim because the
officers deprived him of his property without due process. But DeLarosa’s claim that
police interfered with his property interest falls squarely under the Fourth Amendment,
see Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC, 978 F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 2020), and substantive due
process claims cannot be maintained where a specific constitutional provision protects
the right at issue, Alexander v. McKinney, 692 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 2012).
DeLarosa also argues that the court misunderstood count XXI as a fabrication-
based wrongful detention claim rather than a § 1983 conspiracy claim. But in count
XVIII, he already asserted a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim, which the district court
properly dismissed because he had failed to plausibly allege an underlying
constitutional violation. See Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 620 (7th Cir. 2017).
We return to DeLarosa’s Heck-barred malicious prosecution claims under the
Fourth Amendment (I, IV, and VI). To succeed on a Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution theory, he must show that the prosecution was initiated without probable
cause and ended without conviction. See Thompson v. Clark, 594 U.S. 36, 49 (2022). He
argues, first, that the district court erred by relying on “improperly admitted” court
documents that defendants had attached as exhibits to their motion to dismiss.
But this argument misapprehends the basis for the court’s conclusion. In
dismissing DeLarosa’s malicious prosecution claims, the court relied only on the
transcripts and records that DeLarosa attached to his amended complaint. This reliance
was proper, as courts may consider documents attached or referred to in the complaint
when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Williamson, 714 F.3d at 436.
DeLarosa relatedly argues that the state court’s decision to suppress the evidence
in his criminal case proves that probable cause was lacking because the officers (1) must
have manufactured the statements used to obtain their search warrant and (2) are not
credible witnesses. But this argument also misconstrues the state court’s decision. The
state court found that the officers did have probable cause to search DeLarosa’s home
based on the officers’ attestations that—while investigating a report of stolen welders—
an officer viewed an allegedly stolen welder in his garage. Moreover, the exclusionary
rule does not apply in § 1983 suits against police officers. Martin v. Marinez, 934 F.3d

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594, 599 (7th Cir. 2019). In DeLarosa’s case, then, the officer’s search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment did not negate the probable cause, thereby undermining any claim
of malicious prosecution. Id.
We have considered DeLarosa’s remaining arguments, but they are too
undeveloped to warrant discussion. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8); Anderson v. Hardman,
241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001).
AFFIRMED

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