Terrance Olden v. Scott Jackson

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 2, 2024 *
Decided October 29, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1570
TERRANCE OLDEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SCOTT JACKSON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 3:20-cv-03037-SLD
Sara L. Darrow,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Terrance Olden, an Illinois prisoner, sued several prison staff members at
Western Illinois Correctional Center in Mount Sterling, Illinois, for deliberate
indifference to his safety after his cellmate attacked him with a cooking pot.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants,
concluding that Olden had not exhausted his administrative remedies for one
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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defendant and had failed to present any facts from which a reasonable jury could
conclude the others were deliberately indifferent. We affirm.
Background
We recite the facts in the light most favorable to Olden, the party opposing
summary judgment. See LaBrec v. Walker, 948 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 2020). In June 2018,
Olden was placed with a cellmate, George Elie, with whom he clashed over cleanliness
and hygiene. The pair argued about how infrequently Elie showered and washed his
clothes, and Elie began stealing items from Olden’s property box. After a month of
living together, Olden sought placement in another cell, but he did not hear back from
the Placement Office, Internal Affairs, or the prison’s warden.
Olden then turned to prison staff for help. He told Dr. Ashwin Jayachandran, a
physician who provided telepsychiatry services, that he felt threatened by his cellmate
and needed to move. Olden also addressed his concerns with Rochelle Briney, a mental
health professional with whom he met for monthly therapy. Olden told Briney either in
person or through request slips that he did not feel comfortable in his cell and wanted
to move. In late July, Olden labeled a request slip “urgent,” stating that he and Elie
were not getting along, he wanted to move to a different cell so he could listen to music,
and he needed to meet with Briney immediately. Briney saw him soon after, and Olden
told her that his cellmate was getting aggressive, bullying him, and might “wind up
wanting to fight.” At some point (the record is not clear when), Briney told Olden that
she would look into having him moved, but she did not have the power to move him
herself. The last time Olden met with Briney for therapy, he said he did not feel
comfortable with Elie and wanted to move out of his cell.
On September 20, six days after his last meeting with Briney, Olden decided he
could live with Elie no longer and packed up his belongings. He left his cell to attend
Bible study. On the way, Olden saw Officer Cameron Avery and told him that Elie was
stealing items from his commissary box, he and Elie were not getting along and he
feared for his safety, and he wanted to move. Avery responded he would see what he
could do. Olden then saw Lieutenant Scott Jackson and told him the same thing.
Jackson instructed Olden to write to the Placement Office. After bible study, Olden saw
Avery again and repeated his request to be moved, stating, “I don’t want to go in there,
man, because I know something gonna wind up happening.” Avery responded that
Olden could either return to his cell or receive a ticket. Olden returned to his cell.

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No. 23-1570 Page 3
After Olden entered the cell, Elie hit him in the head with a cooking pot and
punched him. Olden fought back until staff arrived and broke up the fight. He
sustained multiple injuries from the attack, including bruises and abrasions, and he
developed migraines.
Olden later filed a grievance concerning the fight and the events leading up to it.
He detailed his conversations with Avery and Jackson, and he further explained that he
had sought a different placement for months but that “no effort was made” by the
Placement Office, “Telepsyci,” or Briney to help him. An officer denied the grievance,
and Olden’s appeal of the denial was unsuccessful.
Olden then filed this lawsuit, alleging the defendants violated his constitutional
rights by failing to protect him from Elie’s attack. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. Dr. Jayachandran argued that Olden failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies because his grievance did not provide a name or any other information that
would identify the doctor to the grievance officer. Briney, Avery, and Jackson asserted
that Olden failed to present facts from which a reasonable jury could infer that they
were subjectively aware of a specific, impending, or substantial threat to his safety.
They contended Olden complained generally about his cellmate but he did not alert
them to any specific threat or the imminent need to act.
The district court agreed on all points and granted the defendants’ motions for
summary judgment. The court also denied Olden’s several requests for counsel.
Analysis
On appeal, Olden challenges the district court’s conclusions that the defendants
were entitled to summary judgment. We review the district court’s entry of summary
judgment de novo. LaBrec, 948 F.3d at 839.
I. Rochelle Briney
Olden argues first that the district court erred in concluding he had not
communicated a specific threat to Briney. The court reasoned that Olden’s statements to
Briney were too generalized to convey a specific risk to his safety. But Olden contends
that his statements to Briney in late July that Elie was getting “aggressive” and
“bullying” him communicated a “specific, credible, and imminent risk of serious harm.”
See Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 481 (7th Cir. 2015).

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We see no error. Olden’s statements were not sufficient to show that Briney
would have known that he faced a specific, impending threat to his safety. Although
Olden generally conveyed his concerns that Elie was becoming “aggressive” and that he
thought Elie might “wind up wanting to fight,” he did not elaborate further and never
told Briney that Elie had threatened to harm him. Indeed, Olden testified that his main
issue with Elie during this time was his hygiene, cleanliness, and thievery. On their
own, Olden’s statements would not have alerted Briney to the need to act to prevent
imminent violence. Compare Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 776 (7th Cir. 2008)
(detainee’s “vague” statements that “he was afraid and that he wanted to be moved”
did not put jail officials on notice of specific threat to safety), with Gevas, 798 F.3d at 481
(prisoner’s statements that cellmate threatened to stab him for “snitching” on prior
cellmate alerted staff of imminent danger). And nothing else in the record shows that
Briney was aware of an excessive risk to Olden’s safety. For example, no evidence
suggested that Elie had a history of violent behavior, was affiliated with a gang, or had
any other characteristic indicating that his aggression would turn violent. See LaBrec,
948 F.3d at 841, 843–45 (explaining that courts must consider “the circumstances as a
whole” when determining whether officers were subjectively aware of risk to prisoner).
Even if Olden’s statements to Briney were sufficient to alert her to a substantial
safety threat, the timeline of Olden’s complaints to Briney does not support a
conclusion that any risk was imminent. Olden testified that he told Briney about Elie’s
aggression and bullying after meeting with her in late July, two months before the
attack. But when Olden met with Briney six days before the attack in late September,
she could not have known that any risk was imminent: Olden told her only that he did
not feel comfortable with Elie and wanted to move out of his cell. Because tension
between Olden and Elie did not appear to be escalating, Briney would not have been on
notice that immediate action was necessary. See, e.g., Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 954
(7th Cir. 2011) (defendants were unaware of imminent harm to prisoner who had been
previously attacked by cellmate but with whom conflict appeared to have settled).
Olden responds that because Briney had met him soon after he sent the request
slip and stated she did not have authority to move him, she tacitly acknowledged the
threat of harm to him. But the record does not support this inference. Briney testified
that if she had identified a threat, she would have filed an incident report and notified a
shift commander. And as stated above, neither Olden’s communications and their
timing nor the circumstances would have placed her on notice of impending harm. Her

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actions thus do not convey that she perceived an immediate, credible, and substantial
risk to Olden.
II. Officer Avery and Lieutenant Jackson
Olden argues next that the district court similarly overlooked the statements he
made to Officer Avery and Lieutenant Jackson on the day of the attack. But like Briney,
Avery and Jackson were entitled to summary judgment because a reasonable jury could
not conclude that they were aware of a substantial risk to Olden’s safety. Olden told
Avery and Jackson that he wanted to move cells because he and Elie were not getting
along, Elie was stealing items from him, and Olden was scared that “something” was
going to happen. But like his conversations with Briney, none of these statements were
sufficient to convey to the officers that Olden faced a risk of impending and serious
harm. See Grieveson, 538 F.3d at 776; see also Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir.
2008) (after testifying against other inmates, prisoner’s statements that some inmates
were “pressuring” him and “asking questions” did not alert officers of threat).
Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Avery and Jackson were
aware of any other circumstances that would have rendered plausible Olden’s concerns
about his safety. See LaBrec, 948 F.3d at 846 (officers were not aware of substantial risk of
harm where they knew only that prisoner did not feel safe with cellmate, had visited
Psychological Services, and had anxiety attack).
Olden responds his case is distinguishable from Grieveson and Dale because,
unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, he repeatedly complained about his safety concerns
and identified a specific “threat”—his cellmate—as the source of those concerns. But
repeated complaints about a specific person are not necessarily sufficient to establish
that prison staff were aware of the risk of harm. Like in Grieveson and Dale, Olden’s
statements did not offer enough information to prison staff to support the inference of a
specific, impending risk of harm. See Grieveson, 538 F.3d at 776; Dale, 548 F.3d at 569.
III. Dr. Jayachandran
Olden also contends that the district court wrongly concluded that he had failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies for his claim against Dr. Jayachandran. Olden
asserts that the word “Telepsyci” fulfilled the purpose of the exhaustion requirement—
to give the prison an opportunity to address a prisoner’s complaint—because it
sufficiently identified Dr. Jayachandran. But without any other descriptors, “Telepsyci”
did not give the prison enough information to investigate the subject of the grievance.

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See King v. Dart, 63 F.4th 602, 608 (7th Cir. 2023). Dr. Jayachandran presented evidence
that four different psychiatrists provided services at the prison, and that three worked
on any given day. Olden did not provide a date or time of his appointment or provide
any other information to distinguish the doctor from the three other psychiatrists who
worked at the prison. See, e.g., id. at 608 (detainee failed to exhaust because description
of “Division 9 CCDOC Staff” in grievance did not sufficiently identify defendant “or
any other correctional officer” as person responsible for his injury).
Olden counters that because his grievance was addressed on the merits,
Dr. Jayachandran cannot rely on the failure to exhaust as a defense. See Maddox v. Love,
655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011). But Maddox is distinguishable. There, the prisoner’s
failure to name the defendant in the grievance did not prevent the prison from
identifying the defendant and responding to the prisoner’s complaints. Id. Here,
however, the prison could not fairly identify that Olden was referring to
Dr. Jayachandran and could not address the issue on the merits. See King, 63 F.4th at
608–09 (distinguishing Maddox and explaining that detainee failed to exhaust because
jail was not aware of issue with unnamed officer, although remainder of grievance
against other jail staff was otherwise addressed on the merits). The court’s entry of
summary judgment for Dr. Jayachandran was therefore proper.
IV. Remaining Arguments on Appeal
Olden’s remaining contentions lack merit. He asserts generally that the district
court improperly made credibility determinations, but he does not identify any specific
instance of error, and we see none. Next, he argues that the court applied the incorrect
legal standard when denying his requests for counsel. But the court engaged in the
correct analysis in both orders denying Olden’s requests for counsel: It noted that the
pending motions for which Olden sought assistance were not complex and that his
filings had been literate and on point. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654–56 (7th Cir.
2007) (en banc). The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in denying Olden’s
requests. See id.
AFFIRMED

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