Steve L. Manson v. Tyler Koch

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 22, 2024*
Decided October 29, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2703
STEVE L. MANSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TYLER KOCH,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 21-3076
Sara Darrow,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Steve Manson, a former Illinois prisoner, sued a correctional officer for violating
his constitutional rights by denying him access to meals while COVID-19 movement
restrictions were in effect. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before ultimately entering summary
judgment for the defendant, the district court denied Manson’s motions for recruited
counsel, contempt against the prison, and sanctions against opposing counsel. On
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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appeal, Manson challenges only the pre-judgment rulings. Because the district court did
not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
From December 4, 2019, until April 2, 2021, Manson was imprisoned at Western
Illinois Correctional Center in Mount Sterling, Illinois. At this time, the prison had
precautions in place to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. One related to the
placement and retrieval of prisoners’ meals. For lunch and dinner, correctional officers
brought carts of food trays to the prisoners’ housing units and placed them inside each
wing near the door. The prison’s rules required each prisoner to retrieve a food tray and
return to his assigned cell to eat. Because he had a bad knee and used crutches, Manson
would ask a guard to bring a food tray to his cell, though Manson did not have a “feed
in cell” pass. According to Manson, Officer Tyler Koch refused to do so whenever he
was on duty, causing Manson to miss meals.
Manson brought this § 1983 suit against prison officials for denying him meals.
Along with his complaint, Manson filed a motion for recruited counsel. The district
court screened Manson’s complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and allowed him to proceed
on a claim that Koch had deprived him of food in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The court denied Manson’s motion for recruited counsel because he did not
demonstrate that he had attempted to obtain counsel on his own.
Manson was released from prison within a month of filing his lawsuit. As the
case progressed, Manson filed additional motions for recruited counsel, and the district
court denied each motion because, although Manson discussed his attempts to contact
lawyers, he failed to show that he had made reasonable efforts consistent with the
court’s instructions. For example, the court told Manson to write to law firms or
attorneys and provide copies of the letters and any responses; instead, Manson
described efforts to contact various lawyers by telephone and alleged that they
requested a fee for denial letters. The court also concluded that Manson appeared
capable of litigating the relatively straightforward case on his own.
At Manson’s request, the court issued a subpoena to Western Illinois
Correctional Center for audio and video evidence that Manson wished to obtain.
Manson later moved to hold the prison in contempt for not turning over the materials.
The district court denied this motion, explaining that Manson had not established that
he had properly served the subpoena on the non-party prison.

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No. 23-2703 Page 3
At one point, the defendant moved for an extension of time to complete
discovery and gave as one reason that counsel could not schedule Manson’s deposition
because his phone number had been “disconnected.” Manson responded with a motion
for sanctions against defense counsel for “lying” about the phone number being
disconnected. The court denied the motion because Manson did not show that the
statement prejudiced him or affected the case in any manner—the discovery extension
would have been granted anyway because the parties had been unable to schedule
Manson’s deposition.
The court later entered summary judgment for Koch. It concluded that Manson
provided no evidence that Koch was personally responsible for Manson missing meals
and that, even if he were responsible, Manson did not present evidence that he had
missed so many meals that the deprivation posed a significant risk to his health.
On appeal, Manson does not dispute the summary-judgment decision. He
challenges only the rulings on the motions to recruit counsel, to hold the prison in
contempt, and to sanction defense counsel. We review those decisions for abuse of
discretion. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (recruitment of
counsel); Seventh Ave., Inc. v. Shaf Int’l, Inc., 909 F.3d 878, 880 (7th Cir. 2018) (contempt);
Harrington v. Duszak, 971 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 2020) (denial of sanctions).
Manson first argues that the district court should have recruited counsel because
his case is complex, and he was incapable of litigating for himself. When deciding
whether to recruit counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), courts must first ask whether
“the indigent plaintiff [has] made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been
effectively precluded from doing so,” and if so, whether “given the difficulty of the
case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654.
Determining whether a plaintiff has made reasonable efforts himself “is a mandatory,
threshold inquiry that must be determined before moving to the second inquiry.”
Balle v. Kennedy, 73 F.4th 545, 559 (7th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).
Here, the district court permissibly concluded that Manson—who was not
incarcerated for most of the litigation—never substantiated his reasonable efforts to find
counsel independently. In ruling on the first motion, the court explained that Manson
could make that showing by providing a copy of letters he sent to counsel along with
any responses. Yet Manson did not do so in any of his three other motions: each time,
Manson stated that he had attempted to obtain counsel, but he failed to provide
objective evidence to substantiate his efforts, despite the court’s instructions. The

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district court could have denied Manson’s motions on this basis alone. See id. at 559–60.
Still, in denying the next three motions, the court also ruled that Manson was competent
to litigate his own case because he had been able to adequately communicate his claims
to the court, and the facts of the case did not appear overly complex. The district court
applied the correct standard, and its decisions were well within its discretion.
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Manson’s motion to
hold non-party Western Illinois Correctional Center in contempt for failing to produce
materials in response to a subpoena. Under Rule 45(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a court may hold a person in contempt “who, having been served, fails
without adequate excuse to obey the subpoena or an order related to it” (emphasis
added). The record here, however, does not show that Manson served the relevant
subpoena on the prison, and Manson does not contend on appeal that he did.† Absent
that showing, the district court had no authority to hold the prison in contempt under
Rule 45 or otherwise. See Autotech Techs. LP v. Integral Rsch. & Dev. Corp., 499 F.3d 737,
749 (7th Cir. 2007) (abuse of discretion when the district court entered contempt order
against party that was not properly served).
Finally, Manson argues that the district court should have sanctioned defense
counsel for allegedly lying to the court when moving for an extension of time to
complete discovery. But the district court reasonably explained that, even if it was
inaccurate for counsel to say the phone line had been “disconnected,” Manson did not
deny refusing to schedule a deposition, which necessitated the discovery extension. It
was not an abuse of discretion, see Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991), for
the court to deny sanctions based on its conclusion that any misstatement was not
material to the case or prejudicial to Manson.
AFFIRMED
† There is some indication that the prison received a subpoena from Manson
because in his contempt motion, Manson states that the prison told him that it did not
have the materials he was seeking. Koch suggests that Manson is confusing this case
with another pending lawsuit, in which the prison is a defendant. Regardless, if the
prison did not provide materials because they were not in its possession, contempt
would not be appropriate.

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