Steven John Hecke v. Richard Beck

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 10, 2024*
Decided December 19, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2909
STEVEN JOHN HECKE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RICHARD BECK, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:23-cv-286
Gretchen S. Lund,
Judge.
O R D E R
Steven Hecke, who is now a federal prisoner, sued officials at the Allen County
Jail, alleging that he was subjected to inhumane conditions as well as other violations of
his constitutional and statutory rights during pretrial confinement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Because Hecke’s complaint made numerous allegations against various defendants, the
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal. We have
agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the
facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED . R. APP. P.
34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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district court provided Hecke with several opportunities to amend it. In the end,
however, Hecke failed to abide by the district court’s instructions, and the district judge
upon preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A dismissed the suit pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim.
We commend the district court for its admirable patience in this case, but a
plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order is not grounds for dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6). Furthermore, as the district court acknowledged, the complaint does appear to
state a plausible Fourteenth Amendment claim for unconstitutional conditions of
confinement that flowed from the overcrowding at the jail (although the relevant
allegations are scattered throughout the lengthy and convoluted document).
Accordingly, we vacate and remand.
On remand, the district court certainly can order Hecke to file an amended
complaint gathering all allegations related to the surviving conditions–of–confinement
claim in one place. And, if Hecke fails to comply, the district court has the discretion to
dismiss the case under Rule 41(b).
Discussion
In reviewing the dismissal of Hecke’s complaint for failure to state a claim, we
accept the facts in his complaint (and those in his brief on appeal that are consistent
with his complaint) as true and draw reasonable inferences in his favor. Alamo v. Bliss,
864 F.3d 541, 548–49 (7th Cir. 2017).
Hecke was a federal pretrial detainee at Allen County Jail from January 2020 to
April 2022. In March 2022, a district judge entered a permanent injunction against the
jail because the chronic overcrowding and understaffing at the jail created
unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Morris v. Sheriff of Allen Cnty., No. 1:20-CV-34, 2022 WL 971098, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar.
31, 2022). There, the judge found, among other things, that: detainees were forced to
sleep on floors next to toilets, staff could not perform adequate health and security
inspections due to personnel shortages, there were no emergency call buttons in most
cell blocks, and contraband was widespread and pervasive. See id. Hecke states that he
was a member of the class of plaintiffs in Morris, which appears correct based on the

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No. 24-2909 Page 3
dates of his detention.1 And, because the Morris class sought only injunctive relief,
Hecke filed this case to seek damages.
In doing so, Hecke sued 47 defendants—including employees of the jail and its
private healthcare contractor, county officials and entities, and the U.S. Marshals who
placed him in the jail—alleging that they violated his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights as well as a variety of federal statutes, including the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. In his wide-ranging 69-page complaint and more
than 100 pages of exhibits, Hecke raised more than a dozen counts about his treatment
at the jail, and he alleged that all the problems resulted from the overcrowding and
understaffing described in the Morris litigation.
Among the numerous harms that Hecke described, he alleged that a nurse and
kitchen manager violated his First Amendment rights by refusing to give him a Kosher
diet and that the jail’s chaplain provided only Christian religious and rehabilitative
services. He asserted that correctional officers used lockdowns as collective punishment
for the acts of a few inmates. He alleged that medical staff were deliberately indifferent
to his pinched nerve by refusing to give him ice packs and an extra mat while he was
forced to sleep on the floor because of overcrowded conditions. He described how staff
interfered with detainees’ bathroom access, causing him to soil himself on one occasion.
He also alleged that administrators failed to maintain safe and sanitary conditions,
which caused mold in the showers, fires, non-flushing toilets, and a lack of drinking
water for ten-to-twelve-hour periods. And he maintained that the jail’s medical-services
contractor did not provide adequate mental health treatment.
Screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court ordered
Hecke to amend his complaint because he asserted unrelated claims against different
defendants in the same suit. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2). The court informed Hecke
that he did not plausibly link all the individual defendants and the different conditions
he had challenged to a single policy or practice of Allen County. The court also
explained that it would allow Hecke to decide which claims he wished to pursue in the
current case and which he would bring in separate suits. The court then cautioned
Hecke that if he did not amend his complaint by the deadline, it would “select a related
1 The parties stipulated that certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure was proper and that the class consisted of “all persons currently confined, or who would
in the future be confined, in the Allen County Jail.” The district judge certified the class on March 17,
2020.

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No. 24-2909 Page 4
group of claims and dismiss the others.” Shortly after this order, the case was
reassigned to another district judge.
Hecke filed an objection to the screening order, arguing that each count in his
complaint stemmed from the overcrowding and understaffing at the jail. The newly-
assigned district judge construed Hecke’s objection as a motion to reconsider, denied it,
and instructed Hecke to amend his complaint in compliance with the screening order.
The court explained that—notwithstanding the assertion that the county commissioners
and the U.S. Marshals in charge of pretrial placement were responsible for all the
alleged violations because of systemic overcrowding—§ 1983 liability requires a
defendant’s personal involvement. Again, the court instructed Hecke to amend his
complaint by a certain date and cautioned that it would sever his claims if he did not.
The deadline passed with no amendment, so the district judge selected the first
count–a claim against county officials and U.S. Marshals based on the conditions of
confinement at issue in Morris–as the operative one and dismissed the other claims.
See Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). The court
also dismissed roughly 40 defendants unrelated to the overcrowding and understaffing
problems.
With respect to the remaining count, given the breadth of the complaint, the
district court explained that it could not “easily sort out the allegations relevant to the
overcrowding from those stemming from other causes.” The court therefore instructed
Hecke to file an amended complaint with a short and plain statement of the ways in
which the systemic overcrowding and understaffing harmed him personally. See F ED. R.
C IV. P. 8(a)(2). The judge warned Hecke to respond by the deadline or his case would be
dismissed as abandoned. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 41(b).
Instead of amending his complaint, Hecke filed another motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the claims in his original complaint were properly joined.
In denying this motion, the judge warned Hecke that if he did not amend his complaint
as instructed, he risked “summary dismissal of his original complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim.” Hecke responded with a letter contending
yet again that his original complaint was sufficient, and so the judge dismissed the
complaint “for failure to state a claim” and entered a final judgment.
On appeal, Hecke maintains that he plausibly alleged a practice or custom of
overcrowding and understaffing that caused each constitutional violation alleged in his

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complaint. He argues that the county sheriff and U.S. Marshals were aware of the
violations from his grievances or correspondence, communications with his lawyer, and
the allegations in Morris. Finally, Hecke argues that, at screening, the district judge had
a duty to identify which of his claims plausibly related to the overcrowding and
understaffing at the jail.
On appeal, we first clarify what is before us. The district court cautioned Hecke
on several occasions that the case would be dismissed under Rule 41(b) if he did not
comply with the court’s orders and amend his complaint as instructed. If the district
court had dismissed the case under Rule 41(b), we would review the ruling for abuse of
discretion. See McInnis v. Duncan, 697 F.3d 661, 662 (7th Cir. 2012). But, after whittling
down the complaint to the first count, the district court changed tack when Hecke failed
to file an amended complaint and dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because
it alleged a panoply of harms unrelated to the overcrowded conditions at the jail.
Because the district court dismissed the case at preliminary screening under Rule
12(b)(6), our review is de novo. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015). A
pro se complaint should be liberally construed. Id. Hecke needs to plead only “sufficient
facts to suggest a plausible claim for relief.” Balle v. Kennedy, 73 F.4th 545, 557 (7th Cir.
2023) (quoting Shaw v. Kemper, 52 F.4th 331, 333–34 (7th Cir. 2022)). And for claims to be
properly joined, they must be against the same defendants or arise from the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 18(a),
20(a)(2); Wheeler, 689 F.3d at 683. Dismissal is not an appropriate remedy for misjoinder,
however. See UWM Student Ass’n v. Lovell, 888 F.3d 854, 857 (7th Cir. 2018). Nor is
length a proper reason for dismissing a complaint unless the length makes the pleading
unintelligible. Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 797–98 (7th Cir. 2011). When a complaint
adequately performs its notice function, “the presence of extraneous matter does not
warrant dismissal.” Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820–21 (7th Cir. 2001).
Under these standards, the original complaint, as narrowed by the district judge
to the first count, states a claim for relief under the Fourteenth Amendment, which
protects pretrial detainees from unconstitutional conditions of confinement. To state a
claim, Hecke must allege that the conditions are objectively unreasonable. See Hardeman
v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 822–23 (7th Cir. 2019). The denial of basic human needs—such
as “reasonably adequate ventilation, sanitation, bedding, hygienic materials, and
utilities”—can amount to a constitutional deprivation. Id. at 820 (citation omitted).

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Here, Hecke’s complaint describes multiple harmful conditions that make it
plausible that he was subjected to objectively unreasonable conditions caused by the
overcrowding at the jail. These include: being forced to sleep on the floor with a back
injury, exposure to human waste from nonfunctioning toilets for ten to twelve hours at
a time, lack of access to water, and exposure to smoke from fires started with
contraband devices. Depending on the frequency or duration of the conditions, any of
them could be objectively unreasonable. See Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 824. And the fact that
the complaint contained allegations of other unrelated claims does not mean that it
should be dismissed in toto. See Davis, 269 F.3d at 820–21.
Still, the district judge was correct to observe that many of the incidents alleged
in the complaint do not arise from the same transaction or occurrence. A plaintiff may
join multiple defendants only when the claims arise from the same set of events and
share a common question of law or fact. Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 502–03 (7th Cir.
2018) (citing F ED. R. C IV. P. 20(a)(2)(A)). What’s more, multiple claims against a single
defendant are allowable, but “Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with
unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.
2007). Therefore, the judge appropriately dismissed the unrelated claims and
defendants from the suit; if Hecke wishes to pursue relief against those defendants, he
must do so in separate lawsuits.
Hecke insists that every count in the original complaint was related to the
systemic overcrowding and understaffing problems at issue in the Morris litigation. But
we agree with the district judge that this goes too far. For example, it is difficult to see
how discrimination against non-Christians or inadequate mental health treatment by a
non-county entity predictably flow from overcrowding. And, because Hecke refused to
limit his complaint to one claim, the district court had the authority to select one and
dismiss unrelated defendants, leaving only the administrators responsible for managing
the jail and the federal officials who placed Hecke there.2 The judge’s only misstep was
in dismissing the remainder of the complaint for “failure to state a claim” under Rule
2 The theory of relief against the U.S. Marshals in charge of detainee placement is failure to
protect. But § 1983 provides a cause of action against state, not federal, actors. A limited set of
constitutional claims can be brought against federal officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), but no Bivens remedy has been implied for claims about
conditions of confinement, and the Supreme Court has strongly discouraged the expansion of Bivens to
new contexts. Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 491–92 (2022). And Hecke has not purported to bring any claim
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The complaint therefore promises to become narrower still.

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12(b)(6) rather than for Hecke’s refusal to comply with the court’s order under Rule
41(b).
As a result, we must vacate the judgment and remand. On remand, the district
court in its discretion may require Hecke to streamline his complaint to facts relevant to
the surviving claim. And, if Hecke does not comply, the judge can dismiss the case
confidently under Rule 41(b); it has given Hecke enough warnings.
Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND for further proceedings
consistent with this order.

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