United States of America v. Joseph Haskins

24-1679Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit21 gen 2025

Testo completo

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 16, 2025
Decided January 21, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1679
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH HASKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:21CR00305-001
James Patrick Hanlon,
Judge.
O R D E R
Joseph Haskins was convicted by a jury of possessing with intent to distribute
methamphetamine and sentenced to 396 months’ imprisonment. He appeals, but his
appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of
the case and addresses issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve.
Because the analysis appears thorough, and Haskins has not responded to counsel’s
motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel raises. United
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1679 Page 2
States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant the motion and dismiss the
appeal.
Police officers in Muncie, Indiana, received information in the summer of 2021
that Haskins was dealing methamphetamine from his residence. They arranged two
controlled buys. They then obtained a search warrant for Haskins’s home, where they
found bags containing about 400 grams of methamphetamine, over $12,000 in cash
(including marked bills), and two digital scales. They arrested Haskins and recovered
his phone, which contained multiple text messages about selling methamphetamine.
Haskins was charged soon thereafter with possessing with the intent to distribute over
50 grams of methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Haskins moved to suppress the evidence recovered during the searches. He
argued that the affidavit for the warrant did not show probable cause because it lacked
information about the confidential informant’s reliability. But the district judge
determined that the facts detailed in the affidavit about the two controlled buys of
methamphetamine sufficiently established probable cause and did not require
additional information about the confidential informant’s reliability.
Haskins pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial. During a two-day trial, the
jury heard testimony from five local and federal officers. Collectively, they testified
about the search of Haskins’s home, his arrest, the contents of the cell phone, and
expertise in drug trafficking. Haskins did not put on a defense. The jury found him
guilty of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.
The probation office prepared a presentence investigation report recounting
Haskins’s offense conduct and criminal history. The PSR calculated a guidelines range
of 360 months to life in prison (based on a total offense level of 37 and a criminal history
category of VI). U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(4), 4B1.1(a)–(b), 5A.
At the sentencing hearing, the district judge confirmed that there were no
objections to the PSR and adopted its factual findings, offense level computation, and
criminal history calculation. The judge then weighed the sentencing factors under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), considering Haskins’s characteristics and the devastating effects
methamphetamine has had on the community. The judge then sentenced him to
396 months’ imprisonment with 5 years’ supervised release to follow.
In his Anders brief, counsel first considers but rejects arguing that Haskins could
raise a nonfrivolous challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress based on the

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No. 24-1679 Page 3
silence in the search warrant affidavit about the confidential informant’s reliability. We
agree that this challenge would be frivolous. Probable cause for a search warrant is
established based on a totality of the circumstances, United States v. Carswell, 996 F.3d
785, 791 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)), and the details in
the affidavit about the two controlled buys were sufficient to establish probable cause
regardless of the reliability of the underlying tip from a confidential informant,
see United States v. Haynes, 882 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2018).
Next, counsel appropriately rejects any challenge to the district judge’s
guidelines calculation. The judge properly calculated Haskins’s total offense level at 37,
given his base offense level of 32, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(4), increased by 5 levels
because of his career offender status predicated on prior convictions for battery and
narcotics dealing, see § 4B1.1(a), (b)(1). And the judge correctly assessed his criminal
history category at VI based on the 17 points he incurred for his prior convictions.
See § 4A1.1, 5A.
We also agree with counsel that any challenge to the substantive reasonableness
of Haskins’s within-guidelines sentence would be frivolous. The judge adequately
justified the 396-month sentence based on the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
See United States v. Cook, 108 F.4th 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2024). The judge referred to
Haskins’s history and characteristics (characterizing his criminal history as “atrocious”
and his upbringing “reasonably normal”); the seriousness of the offense (viewing it as
“an extremely serious offense” involving “an extremely horrible, dangerous drug”); the
need to protect the public (concluding that “his track record demonstrates that the only
way to stop him from dealing drugs, threatening people, unlawfully using guns, and
shooting at people, is to have him incarcerated”); his potential need for medical care
(considering his history of substance abuse and possible undiagnosed mental health
conditions); and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similar
defendants. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A), (2)(C), (2)(D), (6).
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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