United States of America v. Ronald Williams

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2079
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
R ONALD WILLIAMS ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:18-cr-00323-2 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 16, 2024 — DECIDED J ANUARY 31, 2025
____________________
Before RIPPLE, BRENNAN , and JACKSON -A KIWUMI , Circuit
Judges.
JACKSON -A KIWUMI , Circuit Judge. Ronald Williams was a
driver for hire. He drove customers to the store, to the doctor,
wherever they needed to go. One of the jobs Williams ac-
cepted in April 2018 was transporting two teenage girls doing
commercial sex work at his co-defendant’s command. A jury
convicted both Williams and his co-defendant of sex traffick-
ing and conspiracy to commit sex trafficking. Williams

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2 No. 23-2079
challenges whether the jury had sufficient evidence to find
him guilty. The jury did, so we affirm.
I
We recount the facts as they unfolded at trial, where the
two victims were identified by the aliases Hannah Brown and
Cyan Smith. When Williams met the girls, Hannah was sev-
enteen years old, and Cyan had just turned sixteen. The teens
hailed from South Bend, Indiana, and were vulnerable to ex-
ploitation. Hannah had cycled in and out of foster care and
juvenile group homes. Both she and Cyan had a history of
mental health challenges.
In April 2018, Hannah met Cyan after running away from
a youth home. Hannah moved in with Cyan and her family.
Both Hannah and Cyan felt like they needed to earn money.
An opportunity seemed to present itself when an acquaint-
ance of Hannah’s connected her with a man named Kennedy
Spencer, who had a history of profiting from commercial sex
encounters. On April 4, 2018, Hannah contacted Spencer on
Facebook, and he assured her that she and Cyan could earn
“serious money” performing commercial sex acts.
Ronald Williams was an unlicensed driver for hire Spen-
cer knew from the neighborhood. Spencer had hired Williams
for jobs like taking his mother to the hospital and his nephew
to school. Spencer had also hired Williams as transportation
for commercial sex encounters Spencer arranged. On the
night that Spencer and Hannah first connected, Spencer
texted Williams, “Got new fresh meat,” and said that Hannah
and Cyan planned to arrive in Chicago on Sunday. Williams
told Spencer, “let me know.” Spencer also sent Williams ex-
plicit photos of Hannah.

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No. 23-2079 3
About a week after Hannah moved in with Cyan’s family,
Cyan suffered an assault that sent her to the hospital. From
there, she sent Spencer pictures of herself to explain why she
was not on her way to Chicago. Text messages between Spen-
cer and Williams show their displeasure at Cyan staying in
South Bend. On April 9, 2018, Williams texted Spencer, asking
whether Cyan showed up. Spencer said that Cyan had not
come to Chicago and shared her hospital pictures with Wil-
liams. Williams responded that if Cyan “went to the hospital
there has to be a police report” and stated he would “ask [his]
girl [in] South [Bend if] she heard anything.”
Cyan’s mother blamed Hannah for the assault and refused
to let Hannah stay with Cyan’s family any longer. With no-
where else to go, Hannah went to meet Spencer in Chicago on
April 9, 2018.
Spencer, anticipating Hannah’s arrival, texted Williams to
ask if Williams could provide transport for a commercial sex
appointment in Ottawa, Indiana. Williams assented and in-
quired about Spencer’s staffing plans, asking “who you sup-
posed to use[?]” Spencer responded by sending him a picture
of Hannah, saying “This 1 is on the train.” At 9:43 p.m., Spen-
cer texted Williams: “Got the package.”
Hannah met Williams the day after she arrived in Chicago.
She testified that Williams told her that he made money doing
“the same thing as” Spencer. Spencer, for his part, told her she
“could be honest with” Williams, and that assurance, she said,
led her to truthfully tell Williams that she was only seventeen
years old. In the month that followed, Williams drove Han-
nah to commercial sex appointments “[a] handful of times”
and received a cut of the money that Hannah made during

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4 No. 23-2079
the sexual encounters. He offered to lower the fee he charged
for driving her if she had sex with him.
Meanwhile, Spencer maintained contact with Cyan, who
was still in South Bend. They talked on the phone almost
every day, and Cyan came to consider Spencer “a friend.” In
late April, Cyan felt renewed pressure to make money, so she
decided to join Spencer in Chicago. She was particularly per-
suaded by Spencer’s description of a customer called Stan
who, Spencer said, would pay Cyan $2,000 to accompany him
to a casino and spend the night with him, no sex involved.
When Cyan arrived in Chicago, Spencer and Williams
picked her up at the train station in Williams’s car. Cyan tes-
tified at trial that while she sat in the car, she heard Spencer
and Williams express their anger towards Hannah. Spencer
complained that Hannah had left him for another trafficker.
Over the course of that week, Cyan continued to hear about
Spencer’s anger towards Hannah, to the point where he
threatened to beat Hannah up if he saw her.
Spencer and Williams drove Cyan to a house, where a man
was waiting. They walked her into the house, left her there,
and Cyan had a sexual encounter with the man. The man paid
Cyan, and she left the house to find Spencer and Williams
waiting for her. Cyan told them that she was upset because
she did not know what was going on and did not expect to
perform commercial sex acts so soon. Spencer told her that
they forgot to tell her. Cyan told Spencer that she only wanted
to “see guys like Stan” who “didn’t want to have sex with
[her] for money.” Spencer said that was fine, and Williams
drove Spencer and Cyan back to Spencer’s house.

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No. 23-2079 5
During the time that Cyan stayed with Spencer, Williams
continued to drive her to commercial sex appointments “[a]t
least once a day.” Whenever Williams drove Cyan, Spencer
would take the money that Cyan received from clients and
give one third to Cyan and one third to Williams. Cyan also
testified that Williams took her to Burger King on one occa-
sion. After about a week, Cyan escaped from Spencer’s house.
Spencer and Williams subsequently were charged with
sex trafficking and conspiracy to commit sex trafficking. The
indictment set forth three counts against both men: conspir-
acy to commit sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c)
(Count 1), sex trafficking Cyan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591
(Count 2), and sex trafficking Hannah in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591 (Count 3). The men were tried jointly, and on, Novem-
ber 1, 2022, a jury found both men guilty of all three counts.
Williams now appeals his conviction.
II
Williams bears a heavy burden in this appeal. We will
overturn a jury verdict for insufficient evidence only “if the
record is devoid of evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Curtis, 324 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2003). We view all evidence
“in the light most favorable to the verdict.” United States v.
Mullins, 800 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2015). Having done so, we
conclude Williams has not met his burden because the jury
had sufficient evidence to convict. Before we explain why, we
provide background on the charges against Williams and the
jury’s verdict.

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6 No. 23-2079
1. The charges
Williams was convicted for violating two statutes, 18
U.S.C. § 1591 and 18 U.S.C. § 1594. Section 1591 criminalizes
sex trafficking children. See 18 U.S.C.S § 1591. Section 1594(c)
makes it a crime to conspire to violate Section 1591.
Section 1591 provides multiple pathways by which a jury
can find a defendant guilty. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a):
(a) Whoever knowingly--
(1) … recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides,
obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by
any means a person; or
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of
value, from [doing the same],
knowing, or … in reckless disregard of the fact, that means
of force, threats of force, fraud, [or] coercion … will be
used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act,
or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and
will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act [is guilty
of sex trafficking].
In other words, a defendant is guilty if he or she know-
ingly facilitates or makes money from a commercial sex en-
counter and has reason to know that the victim was either
forced or tricked into engaging in commercial sex, or has rea-
son to know that the victim is a child.
The statute is particularly attentive to combatting the sex
trafficking of children. Under the statute, if a defendant facil-
itates sex trafficking, the victim was under the age of eighteen,
and “the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe
the person[,] . . . the Government need not prove that the

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No. 23-2079 7
defendant knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that the
person had not attained the age of 18 years.” 18 U.S.C. §
1591(c). Stated differently, if a defendant had a reasonable op-
portunity to observe the underage victim, the defendant’s
knowledge of the victim’s age is irrelevant.
2. The jury verdict
The verdict form does not specify the precise pathway by
which the jury found Williams guilty of Counts 2 and 3. For
Count 2, sex trafficking Cyan, here is the relevant portion of
the verdict form:
COUNT TWO (Cont’d)
If you find defendant RONALD WILLIAMS not
guilty of COUNT TWO, then DO NOT answer the follow-
ing TWO questions, and proceed to the next page.
If you find defendant RONALD WILLIAMS
guilty of COUNT TWO, then answer the following
TWO questions before proceeding to the next page.
1. We find that the government has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant RONALD
WILLIAMS knew or recklessly disregarded the
fact that fraud, coercion or any combination of
such means would be used to cause Cyan Smith to
engage in a commercial sex act:
NO  YES 

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8 No. 23-2079
2. We find that the government has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that EITHER:
a. Defendant RONALD WILLIAMS:
(1) knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored,
transported, provided, obtained, or main-
tained by any means Cyan Smith; and
(2) knew or recklessly disregarded that Cyan
Smith was under 18 years of age or had a
reasonable opportunity to observe Cyan
Smith; and
(3) knew or recklessly disregarded that Cyan
Smith would be caused to engage in a
commercial sex act;
OR
b. Defendant RONALD WILLIAMS
(1) knowingly benefitted, financially or by re-
ceiving a thing of value, from participa-
tion in a venture which has engaged in an
act of recruiting, enticing, harboring,
transporting, providing, obtaining, or
maintaining by any means Cyan Smith;
and
(2) knew or recklessly disregarded that Cyan
Smith was under 18 years of age; and
(3) knew or recklessly disregarded that Cyan
Smith would be caused to engage in a
commercial sex act.

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No. 23-2079 9
NO  YES 
And for Count 3, sex trafficking Hannah, here is the rele-
vant portion of the verdict form:
COUNT THREE (Cont’d)
If you find defendant RONALD WILLIAMS not
guilty of COUNT THREE, then DO NOT answer the fol-
lowing TWO questions, and proceed to the next page and
sign the verdict form.
If you find defendant RONALD WILLIAMS guilty
of COUNT THREE, then answer the following TWO
questions before proceeding to the next page and signing
the verdict form.
1. We find that the government has proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendant RONALD
WILLIAMS knew or recklessly disregarded the
fact that fraud would be used to cause Hannah
Brown to engage in a commercial sex act:
NO  YES 
2. We find that the government has proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that EITHER:
a. Defendant RONALD WILLIAMS:

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10 No. 23-2079
(1) knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored,
transported, provided, obtained, or
maintained by any means Hannah
Brown; and
(2) knew or recklessly disregarded that
Hannah Brown was under 18 years of
age or had a reasonable opportunity to
observe Hannah Brown; and
(3) knew or recklessly disregarded that
Hannah Brown would be caused to en-
gage in a commercial sex act;
OR
b. Defendant RONALD WILLIAMS
(1) knowingly benefitted, financially or by
receiving a thing of value, from partici-
pation in a venture which has engaged
in an act of recruiting, enticing, harbor-
ing, transporting, providing, obtaining,
or maintaining by any means Hannah
Brown; and
(2) knew or recklessly disregarded that
Hannah Brown was under 18 years of
age; and
(3) knew or recklessly disregarded that
Hannah Brown would be caused to en-
gage in a commercial sex act.

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No. 23-2079 11
NO  YES 
So, although the jury found Williams guilty, the verdict
form does not reflect the jury’s exact reasoning. Williams ar-
gues there was insufficient evidence to convict him under any
of the scenarios the verdict form above outlines. The next
three sections explain why we must reject this argument. We
first evaluate the charges concerning Cyan, then Hannah, and
we end with the conspiracy charge.
III
We affirm Williams’s conviction for sex trafficking Cyan
because the record contained sufficient evidence for a reason-
able jury to find that Wiliams: (1) knew Cyan was performing
commercial sex acts, (2) transported her for those acts, (3)
made money from those acts, (4) should have known she was
a minor, and (5) even if he did not know Cyan was a minor,
had a reasonable opportunity to observe her. See 18 U.S.C. §
1591.
To begin, to find Williams guilty under any theory, the
jury had to find that Williams understood that Spencer caused
Cyan to engage in commercial sex acts. Statements from Wil-
liams himself provided ample evidence of this. During trial,
the jury saw and heard a video recording of the FBI’s inter-
view of Williams after his arrest. In that interview, Williams
admitted that he knew Spencer planned to use Cyan and Han-
nah for commercial sex. When the FBI agents asked what
Spencer was “doing with these girls,” Williams replied,
“[p]rostitution.” The FBI agent asked, “And so . . . I mean so
you knew what they were doing?” and Williams replied, “I
had a good idea.” Williams also explained what Spencer

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12 No. 23-2079
meant when he said “fresh meat” was coming: It meant
“women, girls.” And Williams told the agents that on Cyan’s
first day in Chicago, he heard Spencer ask Cyan if she per-
formed specific sexual activities. This evidence leaves little
doubt for a jury that Williams understood Spencer’s inten-
tions for Cyan were for her to engage in commercial sex acts.
Additionally, the jury found that Williams knew or should
have known fraud or coercion caused Cyan to comply with
those plans. Cyan’s testimony about her first day in Chicago
supplied sufficient evidence on this topic. As for coercion,
Cyan testified that Spencer and Williams made violent threats
against Hannah in front of Cyan. Spencer threatened to beat
Hannah up if he ever saw her and, as Cyan recalled, “[t]hey
were both chiming in on things about her.” Cyan understand-
ably was intimidated by these threats: they “made [her]
scared to leave” and feel like she had no option but to do what
Spencer wanted because “that could be [her] next.” A reason-
able jury could determine that Williams knew or should have
known that talking about beating up Hannah—the girl who
introduced Cyan to Spencer—would have coerced Cyan into
performing commercial sex acts.
The jury heard evidence of not just coercion, but fraud too.
Cyan testified that after her first commercial sex encounter,
she told Spencer in front of Williams that she was confused,
did not know what was going on, and only wanted to meet
clients like Stan who did not demand sex. Spencer told Cyan
“[T]hat was fine and he would see [Stan’s] availability.” And
yet, even after hearing that Cyan did not expect to engage in
commercial sex activity, Williams continued to drive her to
such appointments. Thus, a reasonable jury could easily

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No. 23-2079 13
conclude that Williams understood Spencer caused Cyan to
engage in commercial sex acts through fraud or coercion.
The next step is to determine whether Williams knowingly
facilitated or knowingly profited from a commercial sex act
involving Cyan. The jury heard evidence supporting both
findings. As previously explained, Section 1591 criminalizes
a variety of actions that facilitate the sex trafficking of minors
or coerced adults, including “transport[ing]” victims. 18
U.S.C. § 1591(a). The jury heard from Cyan that Williams
drove her to commercial sex appointments. And even if Wil-
liams had not transported Cyan, a reasonable jury could have
found that Williams financially benefited from Cyan’s sexual
exploitation. Cyan testified that when Williams drove her to
commercial sex appointments, he received one-third of the
money clients paid. That constitutes financial benefit under
the statute.
We next evaluate the relevance of Cyan’s age. Section 1591
criminalizes facilitating or profiting from sex trafficking if the
defendant knows or should know that the victim is under
eighteen. Williams protests, but there was sufficient evidence
for a jury to find that he knew or should have known Cyan’s
age.
The video recording of Williams’s FBI interview, shown at
trial, provides the requisite evidence. During the interview,
the agents asked Williams to estimate Cyan’s age from a pic-
ture they showed him. Williams guessed that Cyan was six-
teen or seventeen. Williams challenges this evidence as insuf-
ficient because, he says, the picture could have been taken a
long time ago, and the jury could not see the picture. He ar-
gues that Cyan could have looked different in the picture than

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14 No. 23-2079
she did in person, and the jury would have no way of know-
ing.
That is certainly possible. But it is also possible for a rea-
sonable jury to conclude, from Williams’s estimation of
Cyan’s age in the picture, that when Williams first saw her he
knew or should have known that she was under eighteen. As
we have repeatedly stated, “[i]t is the jury’s job, and not ours,
to gauge the credibility of the witnesses and decide what in-
ferences to draw from the evidence.” United States v. Leal, 72
F.4th 262, 268 (7th Cir. 2023). We will therefore not “reweigh
the evidence []or second-guess the jury’s credibility determi-
nations,” as Williams asks us to do here. United States v. Tava-
rez, 626 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir. 2010).
Furthermore, Williams told the FBI agents that Cyan’s be-
havior resembled that of a minor, not an adult. Williams first
claimed during his interview that he had no idea Cyan and
Hannah were under 18. He told the FBI agents that Cyan and
Hannah “had [him] under the impression that these were pro-
fessional women and that they were grown.” But when the
FBI agents asked, “Did they act grown?” Williams replied that
Cyan “said some strange” things, like “[t]his will be my first
time ever turning a date,” by which he meant engaging in
commercial sex acts. The fact that Williams could so quickly
identify red flags about Cyan’s age during the FBI interview
could lead a reasonable jury to determine that he recklessly
disregarded her age.
Even if no reasonable jury could have found that Williams
recklessly disregarded Cyan’s age, that would make no dif-
ference in this appeal. Williams would still be guilty under
Section 1591 if he transported Cyan for commercial sex and
“had a reasonable opportunity to observe” her. 18 U.S.C.

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No. 23-2079 15
§ 1591(c). A reasonable jury could have found that Williams
had that opportunity.
As previously explained, Section 1591 relieves the govern-
ment of its burden to prove that the defendant knew or
should have known the victim was a minor. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(c) (“[T]he Government need not prove that the defend-
ant knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that the person
had not attained the age of 18 years.”). In doing so, the statute
shifts the burden to individuals to ensure that, if they partici-
pate in the commercial sex trade, they do not exploit children.
The jury heard several pieces of evidence that demonstrate
Williams had a reasonable opportunity to view Cyan. He
picked her up from the train station when she first arrived in
Chicago and drove her to a commercial sex appointment. He
walked her into the house where the client was waiting and
was there to pick her up when she emerged. He transported
her to more commercial sex appointments throughout the
week, and they even went to Burger King together. These en-
counters amount to a reasonable opportunity to view Cyan.
Williams contends, with no case citation and no support-
ing evidence, that it is not enough that he had the opportunity
to view Cyan. Rather, as he sees it, the government must also
prove force, fraud, or coercion. That contradicts the plain lan-
guage of the statute. Section 1591(a) makes someone guilty of
sex trafficking if they use “force, threats of force, fraud, [or]
coercion . . . or [if] the person has not attained the age of 18
years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act.”
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (emphasis added). That disjunctive lan-
guage creates two separate avenues by which a defendant can
be found guilty. Cf. Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 357
(2014) (“To read the next clause, following the word ‘or,’ as

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16 No. 23-2079
somehow repeating that requirement, even while using dif-
ferent words, is to disregard what ‘or’ customarily means. As
we have recognized, that term’s ‘ordinary use is almost al-
ways disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to be given
separate meanings.’” (quoting United States v. Woods, 571 U.S.
31, 45–46 (2013)). And if the trafficker had the opportunity to
view the minor victim, knowledge of victim’s age is irrele-
vant. See 18 U.S.C. 1591(c). The plain meaning of the statute
cannot bear Williams’s contrary interpretation.
As a result, sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find
Williams guilty in a number of ways. There was no error.
IV
In our review of the trial, there was as much sufficient ev-
idence for a reasonable jury to find Williams guilty of sex traf-
ficking Hannah as there was Cyan. In sum: (1) Williams knew
that Spencer wanted to use Hannah for commercial sex acts,
(2) Williams knowingly facilitated and profited from her ex-
ploitation, (3) Hannah told Williams she was under eighteen,
and (4) Williams had a reasonable opportunity to observe her
anyway.
Everything we said about Williams’s knowledge about
Spencer’s intentions for Cyan also applies to Hannah. Wil-
liams made it clear in his FBI interview that he knew Spencer
would cause these girls to engage in commercial sex acts.
Spencer even sent Williams explicit photos of Hannah. And
Hannah herself testified that Williams offered to reduce the
price he charged for rides if she would have sex with him.
There is consequently sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury
to conclude that Williams knew Spencer caused Hannah to
engage in commercial sex acts.

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No. 23-2079 17
There is also sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
find that Williams profited from Hannah’s commercial sex
acts. Hannah testified that Spencer made her pay Williams
when he drove her to the commercial sex appointments. As
previously stated, it is a jury’s job, not ours, to evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, see Tavarez, 626 F.3d at 906, and a rea-
sonable jury could believe Hannah’s testimony.
We also easily conclude that a jury could find that Wil-
liams knew Hannah was a minor. Hannah, after all, testified
that she told Williams that she was under eighteen. According
to Hannah, the day after she arrived in Chicago, Spencer told
her that she could be honest with Williams, so she told him:
“The truth. [She] was 17.” That is all a jury needed to hear.
But, as with Cyan, even if the jurors did not believe Han-
nah’s testimony that she shared her true age with Williams,
that makes no difference. A jury could find that Williams had
a reasonable opportunity to view Hannah. He drove her to
multiple commercial sexual encounters, including one that
was an hour away. During that time, Hannah testified, Wil-
liams could see her in the rearview mirror. Williams therefore
had hours during which he could observe Hannah.
Sufficient evidence therefore exists for a jury to find Wil-
liams guilty of sex trafficking Hannah in violation of Section
1591.
V
Having reviewed the evidence for Counts 2 and 3 concern-
ing Cyan and Hannah, we turn to Williams’s contention that
the record lacked sufficient evidence for his Count 1 conspir-
acy conviction. We once again reject Williams’s argument.

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18 No. 23-2079
18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) provides that “[w]hoever conspires
with another to violate section … 1591 shall be punished in
the same manner as a completed violation of such section.”
Williams contends that he was not part of any conspiracy; he
was just a driver who does all kinds of jobs for people in his
neighborhood, from grocery store runs to transporting Spen-
cer’s commercial sex workers. That makes him no more liable,
he says, than any driver for a taxicab company or private car
service would be.
The trial evidence tells a different story. It demonstrates
that Williams was actively invested in Spencer’s plans for
Cyan and Hannah. Spencer kept Williams up to date on
Cyan’s and Hannah’s arrival times, and Williams was eager
for them to arrive in Chicago. When Cyan was in the hospital,
Williams even told Spencer he would have someone he knew
in South Bend corroborate Cyan’s story. And when Cyan and
Hannah were in Chicago, he drove them to commercial sex
appointments, knowing the nature of the appointments. This
is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Williams was an
active participant in a conspiracy to sex traffic Cyan and Han-
nah.
If there is any doubt that these activities meet the legal def-
inition of conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking, our case
United States v. Cephus, 684 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2012), removes
that doubt. There, we entertained a challenge to a defendant’s
conviction for conspiracy to entice minors to engage in pros-
titution. The defendant-appellant, Stanton Cephus, argued
that the jury had insufficient evidence to convict him, because
“he had just helped out his brother from time to time.” Id. at
706. We rejected that excuse, finding that “[a]lthough Stanton
didn’t commit all the substantive offenses charged in the

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No. 23-2079 19
indictment, he participated in the conspiracy by driving girls
and women to their ‘calls’ and collecting money from the
johns for his brother. He did not beat any of the prostitutes
but he watched them being beaten and so was aware of the
scope of the conspiracy he had joined.” Id. The same applies
to Williams. He, like Stanton, did not commit all the underly-
ing offenses, but he drove Cyan and Hannah to their appoint-
ments, received money from them, and was aware of how
Spencer exploited them. In short, there was enough evidence
for a jury to find Williams guilty of conspiring to sex traffic
Cyan and Hannah.
For the above reasons, we AFFIRM.

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