Kenneth Slaughter v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Company

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued January 29, 2025
Decided February 19, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2163
KENNETH SLAUGHTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HARTFORD LIFE & ACCIDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:22-cv-05787
Jeremy C. Daniel,
Judge.
O R D E R
Following a hospital stay for heart failure, Kenneth Slaughter sought long-term
disability benefits pursuant to his former employer’s group policy with Hartford Life
and Accident Insurance Company. Hartford denied the claim, finding that Slaughter
was not “disabled” within the meaning of the policy. The district court upheld that
decision in a thorough opinion that canvassed the medical evidence and carefully
applied the policy’s requirements for showing a disability. While not the outcome
Slaughter had wanted, we agree in full with the district court and see no factual or legal
errors in its reasoning. This leaves us to affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 24-2163 Page 2
I
Kenneth Slaughter worked for 37 years at Boeing, most recently as a systems
engineer focusing on cybersecurity. On August 27, 2020, Slaughter went to the
emergency room at a Chesterfield, Missouri hospital complaining of chest pains and
shortness of breath. A diagnosis of heart failure followed, and he remained hospitalized
for a week. Slaughter never returned to work.
In January 2021 Slaughter submitted a claim for long-term disability benefits. As
a benefit of employment, Boeing provided long-term disability coverage pursuant to a
group insurance policy, the Group Long Term Disability Plan for Employees of the
Boeing Company. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company issued the
underlying policy and also reviews claims for benefits under the Plan. Everyone agrees
that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 governs the Boeing Plan.
Hartford denied Slaughter’s claim, finding that he did not meet the Plan’s
definition of “disabled.” The medical and other evidence, Hartford determined, did not
show that Slaughter suffered from any physical or cognitive impairment so significant
that he could not work as a systems engineer—either for Boeing or any other employer.
Slaughter appealed and Hartford upheld its prior decision to deny long-term disability
benefits.
Slaughter then turned to federal court, challenging the denial of benefits
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The parties stipulated to the district court’s
resolution of the case based on the evidence in the administrative record under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)—a point Slaughter confirmed he is not disputing on
appeal. See Fontaine v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining
that Rule 52(a) “is well-suited to ERISA cases in which the court reviews a closed
record”). Because the Plan did not grant discretionary authority to Hartford in
evaluating claims, the district court reviewed Hartford’s decision to deny benefits
without deference. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
To meet the Plan’s definition of “disabled,” Slaughter had to establish that he is
prevented from performing one or more essential duties of his occupation. Hartford
classifies Slaughter’s position, a systems engineer, as “sedentary,” meaning it requires
“sitting [a] majority of [the] workday with occasional standing/walking for brief periods
of time.” But, as the district court recognized, a systems engineer must also perform
certain cognitive tasks. See U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Code
033.167-010 (4th ed. 1991).

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No. 24-2163 Page 3
After carefully and thoroughly reviewing the administrative record, the district
court determined that Slaughter fell short of carrying his burden to show he was
disabled within the meaning of the Plan. The court found that Slaughter did not
establish he is unable to perform any essential duties of his job—a required component
of the Plan’s definition of “disabled.” The district court rooted its finding largely in the
opinion of Slaughter’s treating cardiologist, Dr. James Ellison. The court also took care
to explain why it chose not to credit the assessment provided by Slaughter’s retained
vocational expert, Delores Gonzalez.
In the alternative, the district court found that Slaughter failed to prove he was
“under the regular care of a physician” beyond the date he initially applied for long-
term disability benefits—as further required under the Plan.
In the end, then, the district court denied Slaughter’s claim for benefits and
granted Hartford’s motion for judgment under Rule 52(a). Slaughter now appeals.
II
The sole issue before us is Slaughter’s challenge to the district court’s conclusion
that he is not entitled to long-term disability benefits. We review the district court’s
legal conclusions without deference but defer to its findings of fact and application of
law to those findings—reversing only for clear error. See Hess v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins.
Co., 274 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous ….”). As the applicant seeking benefits, Slaughter bears the burden of
proving that he is entitled to benefits under the Plan. See Scanlon v. Life Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 81 F.4th 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2023).
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Slaughter failed to prove he
satisfied the Plan’s definition of “disabled,” and we adopt its reasoning in full. This
conclusion obviates any need for us to reach the question of whether Slaughter was
“under the regular care of a physician” within the meaning of the Plan.
The district court undertook its analysis faithful to the record evidence and
diligent in its application of the Plan’s requirements for establishing disability. Without
repeating the district court’s chain of reasoning, a couple of points warrant emphasis.
Slaughter’s cardiologist, Dr. Ellison, treated him in the hospital and for several
months after he was discharged. Dr. Ellison’s treatment notes reflect that Slaughter’s
condition improved during that time. For example, three months after the hospital
discharge, Dr. Ellison observed that Slaughter’s “functional capacity and feeling of well

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being have improved greatly.” Less than a month later, he determined Slaughter “may
be ready to go back to work” if his ventricular ejection fraction—which measures the
volume of blood pumped with each heartbeat—increased. It did. A subsequent
echocardiogram measured Slaughter’s left ventricular ejection fraction at levels similar
to his pre-heart failure results. And Dr. Ellison reported four days later that Slaughter
“does not complain of chest pain or unusual shortness of breath,” his “recent ejection
fraction had improved,” and his heart condition “is reasonably well compensated at this
time.”
It makes sense, then, that when Dr. Ellison completed his attending physician’s
statement as part of Slaughter’s application for benefits, his report did not describe an
inability to work. To the contrary, Dr. Ellison concluded that during a regular workday,
Slaughter could sit for eight hours with standard breaks, stand for one hour at a time
for a total of two hours, and intermittently walk for one hour at a time for a total of one
hour. He also prescribed no restrictions on Slaughter’s ability to sit—the most critical
requirement of a sedentary occupation. And, in connection with cognitive functioning,
Dr. Ellison opined that Slaughter suffered from no psychiatric or cognitive
impairments.
The district court considered and emphasized all of this, and we see no clear
error in any of its findings of fact or its overarching conclusion that Slaughter failed to
prove his cardiac condition left him unable to perform any essential duties as a systems
engineer. We agree, in short, with the district court’s determination that Slaughter was
not “disabled” within the meaning of the Plan.
III
Slaughter’s only response is to criticize the district court’s evaluation of the
report submitted by Delores Gonzalez, his retained vocational expert. Gonzalez
determined that Slaughter could not work not only because he could not meet the
physical demands of his job due to difficulty walking and balancing, but also because
he suffered daily from insomnia, depression, anxiety, and panic to degrees that left him
unable to focus and concentrate during the workday. But the district court adequately
explained why Gonzalez’s assessment of Slaughter’s limitations was inconsistent with
other evidence, including the medical records and opinion of his treating cardiologist.
The arguments Slaughter presses on appeal echo the ones he raised before the
district court. Having taken our own independent look at the record, we see no error,
legal or factual, and therefore AFFIRM based on the district court’s reasoning. We also
commend the district judge’s diligent and careful handling of the case.

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