Antwon Manning v. Ryan A. Kilduff

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 24, 2025*
Decided February 24, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2686
ANTWON MANNING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RYAN A. KILDUFF,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 24-cv-01223-SMY
Staci M. Yandle,
Judge.
O R D E R
Antwon Manning, an Illinois prisoner, sued a member of the Administrative
Review Board (the authority that reviews grievances for the Illinois Department of
Corrections) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Manning alleged that the member interfered with
his attempt to exhaust administrative remedies in violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The district court dismissed Manning’s suit. It ruled that, even if the
Board member had prevented exhaustion, he did not interfere with Manning’s ability to
* The appellee was not served with process and is not participating in this appeal.
We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2686 Page 2
sue in court and thus did not violate his constitutional rights. Further, the court ruled
that no amendment could cure that fatal defect. Because the Board member did not
interfere with Manning’s access to the courts or deprive Manning of any other interest
protected by the Constitution, and because Manning has not proposed any amendment
that could cure the defects of his complaint, we affirm.
We accept the facts alleged in Manning’s complaint as true and view them in the
light most favorable to him. Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 522 (7th Cir.
2023). Manning, who is housed at Shawnee Correctional Center in Vienna, Illinois, filed
a grievance contesting a disciplinary ticket and the subsequent punishment he received
after verbally clashing with a guard. Two weeks later, Manning had not received a
response from the prison’s grievance officer, and he concluded that his grievance had
been thrown away by guards. Manning rewrote the grievance and sent it to the
Administrative Review Board, asserting that his initial grievance was discarded and
requesting that the Board either review the grievance or direct the prison’s grievance
officer to do so. A member of the Board returned Manning’s grievance. The Board
member indicated that Manning needed to obtain and attach responses from the
administrators at his prison before he could appeal to the Board.
Manning sued the Board member, alleging that the Board member’s refusal to act
on the grievance violated Manning’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court
screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. It construed Manning’s suit as raising
an access-to-the-courts claim because Manning alleged that the Board member
prevented him from exhausting his administrative remedies (a step required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act before prisoners may sue). So construed, the court
dismissed Manning’s suit for failure to state a claim. It reasoned that Manning was not
deprived of his access to the courts because when a prison makes administrative
remedies unavailable, the exhaustion requirement is waived, permitting Manning to
sue. Further, the court added, a prison’s mishandling of grievances does not violate a
prisoner’s right to due process. Finally, because amending would be futile, the court
dismissed the case with prejudice.
On appeal, Manning challenges the suit’s dismissal, a ruling that we review
de novo. See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020). He raises two
arguments. First, he contends that the district court misconstrued his claim to allege
interference with court access. He insists that, instead, he alleged a claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due process because the Board member prevented
him from accessing the grievance procedure. But a prison’s grievance procedure is not

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No. 24-2686 Page 3
in itself a liberty interest; therefore the loss of the opportunity to file a grievance does
not violate a prisoner’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422,
1430 (7th Cir. 1996). For completeness, we observe that Manning does not allege (or
propose to allege) that the Board member’s response to his grievance forced Manning
“to face risks that could be averted by faithful implementation of the grievance
machinery.” See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). Thus he has no claim
under an Eighth Amendment theory either. See id.
Manning next argues that the district court abused its discretion by not allowing
him the opportunity to amend his complaint. District courts have broad discretion to
deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile. Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th
673, 683 (7th Cir. 2024). Because our case law refutes Manning’s argument that his
allegations state a claim, and he does not propose any curative allegations, the district
court did not abuse its discretion.
AFFIRMED

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