Dequarius D. Fitzpatrick v. Delmar Fairchild

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 24, 2025*
Decided February 25, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1731
DEQUARIUS D. FITZPATRICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DELMAR FAIRCHILD,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 21-C-978
Lynn Adelman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Dequarius Fitzpatrick, a Wisconsin prisoner, sued Sergeant Delmar Fairchild, an
officer at Green Bay Correctional Institution in Green Bay, Wisconsin, alleging that
Fairchild was deliberately indifferent to his threats of suicide in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted Fairchild’s motion for
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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summary judgment, and Fitzpatrick appeals. Because Fairchild did not have subjective
knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to Fitzpatrick, we affirm.
The case was resolved on cross-motions for summary judgment, so we recount
the facts in the light most favorable to the losing party—here, Fitzpatrick. See Holcomb v.
Freedman Anselmo Lindberg, LLC, 900 F.3d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 2018).
Fitzpatrick, who was housed in the restrictive housing unit, was injured on
March 10, 2021, when he stabbed himself with a rubber pencil. He and Fairchild had
three interactions that day: two before the incident, during which Fitzpatrick threatened
to stab himself with the pencil, and one after, when Fairchild discovered Fitzpatrick
bloodied in his cell.
At approximately 3:45 p.m., Fairchild was supervising the cleaning of a cell near
Fitzpatrick’s when Fitzpatrick called for his attention. After confirming Fairchild was
listening, Fitzpatrick told Fairchild he was suicidal and planned to stab himself.
Fitzpatrick detailed his plan to stab himself with his pencil after he turned in his food
tray that night. He then said that Fairchild would have to remove him from his cell to
get the pencil to prevent him from carrying out his plan. Fitzpatrick emphasized that
the pencil was “very sharp,” and that he had sharpened it on the floor. Fairchild asked
to see the pencil, and when Fitzpatrick showed it to him, Fairchild laughed because it
was a rubber pencil. Fairchild said he had never seen anyone hurt themselves with a
rubber pencil, to which Fitzpatrick responded that he would be the first. Fairchild
repeatedly asked to borrow the pencil, and Fitzpatrick refused each time.
According to Fairchild’s sworn declaration, he reported Fitzpatrick’s threats of
self-harm to two supervisors. One supervisor told Fairchild that Fitzpatrick had been
threatening to harm himself since that morning to manipulate staff but had not taken
any action to do so. The other told Fairchild that he was aware of the situation and
would address it as soon as he could.
Fairchild returned to Fitzpatrick’s cell about an hour later while collecting dinner
containers, and he again asked Fitzpatrick for the pencil. Fitzpatrick refused to hand
over the pencil, saying he was writing a letter, and he repeated his threats to harm
himself. As Fairchild walked away, another prisoner stopped Fairchild and told him
that he was not following the prison’s policy for dealing with prisoners who threaten
suicide. Fairchild responded that Fitzpatrick was currently writing a letter and does not
show any signs of harming himself. Fairchild said: “I already talked to him. We’re
good.”

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No. 24-1731 Page 3
In his declaration, Fairchild attested that, in his experience and from what others
had told him, Fitzpatrick commonly made threats of self-harm to manipulate staff.
Fairchild also said that he had handled rubber pencils, believed that they were designed
to prevent self-harm and could not be used to break skin, and was unaware of any
incident in which a prisoner used a rubber pencil to stab himself. Based on these factors,
in combination with Fitzpatrick’s demeanor, Fairchild attested that he did not believe
that Fitzpatrick was at risk of harming himself.
At approximately 5:30 p.m., Fairchild stopped at Fitzpatrick’s cell while passing
out supplies. He asked about the pencil and then, upon seeing Fitzpatrick with blood on
his clothes and the floor of his cell, exclaimed, “What the fuck, dude?” Fairchild asked
Fitzpatrick to show him the wound and then called for medical staff and restraints.
Fitzpatrick was taken to an examination room where medical staff treated a
1.5-centimeter laceration on his left forearm with steri-strips and gauze.
Fitzpatrick filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Fairchild was
deliberately indifferent to his risk of serious harm from suicide in violation of his rights
under the Eighth Amendment. After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment; the district court denied Fitzpatrick’s motion and granted
Fairchild’s. Relying primarily on Fairchild’s declaration, the court concluded that
Fairchild was not subjectively aware that Fitzpatrick faced a substantial risk of harm to
his health or safety, and therefore did not disregard any such risk.
On appeal, Fitzpatrick contests the entry of summary judgment, asserting that
Fairchild did believe Fitzpatrick would seriously harm himself and acted with
deliberate indifference to that risk. We review the district court’s decision de novo.
Quinn v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 8 F.4th 557, 565 (7th Cir. 2021).
To create a triable claim under the Eighth Amendment, Fitzpatrick must supply
evidence that he faced an objectively serious risk to his health and safety, and that
Fairchild was deliberately indifferent to that risk. Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 760
(7th Cir. 2006). Fairchild does not dispute that Fitzpatrick faced an objectively serious
risk. See Quinn, 8 F.4th at 565 (“[T]he imminent risk of death by suicide is not something
that might be objectively reasonable.”). If the harm is an attempted suicide, “the second,
subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim requires a dual showing that the
defendant: (1) subjectively knew the prisoner was at substantial risk of committing
suicide and (2) intentionally disregarded the risk.” Collins, 462 F.3d at 761.

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We agree with the district court that the evidence in the record would not enable
a reasonable jury to conclude that Fairchild subjectively believed that Fitzpatrick was at
substantial risk of harm. To meet the subjective prong, Fairchild would have to “both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Chatham v. Davis, 839 F.3d 679, 684
(7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
The undisputed evidence does not support a conclusion that Fairchild drew the
inference that Fitzpatrick presented an imminent risk of self-harm. To be sure,
Fitzpatrick told Fairchild that he planned to stab himself with a rubber pencil. But a
prison guard is “neither required nor expected to believe everything inmates tell them.”
Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 713 (7th Cir. 2014). Fairchild attested in his declaration
that he did not believe Fitzpatrick’s behavior reflected that of a prisoner intending to
commit suicide. Indeed, Fairchild was aware that Fitzpatrick had a history of
threatening self-harm to manipulate staff. And Fairchild consulted with two
supervisors who explained that Fitzpatrick had been threatening self-harm for several
hours and confirmed Fairchild’s belief that there was no immediate need to act.
Fitzpatrick responds that the district court was wrong to consider his history of
manipulation and Fairchild’s account of his conversations with his supervisors. But
Fairchild’s knowledge of Fitzpatrick’s past behavior is relevant to Fairchild’s state of
mind. See LaBrec v. Walker, 948 F.3d 836, 842–43 (7th Cir. 2020) (all factors, including
prisoner’s past conduct, must be considered in determining whether official was aware
of substantial risk). Further, Fitzpatrick offers no admissible evidence disputing
Fairchild’s sworn declaration. Fitzpatrick admits he has no way of knowing whether
Fairchild’s conversations with supervisors occurred.
Moreover, Fairchild knew that rubber pencils were provided to inmates in the
restrictive housing unit to avoid the very kind of harm Fitzpatrick was threatening. He
was unaware of any instance involving a prisoner using a rubber pencil to break or cut
skin and knew that rubber pencils were designed to bend when pressed with force.
See, e.g., Est. of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that
guards’ failure to perceive non-obvious risk to prisoner safety is insufficient to establish
liability for deliberate indifference). Further, Fairchild’s reactions to Fitzpatrick,
captured on video, reflect his disbelief that Fitzpatrick could harm himself with the
pencil: Fairchild laughed when he realized Fitzpatrick’s pencil was rubber, and he
expressed shock when he saw Fitzpatrick bloodied in his cell.

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Fitzpatrick argues that Fairchild’s repeated requests for the pencil demonstrate
that he was concerned Fitzpatrick might follow through with his plan. But considering
the other evidence in the record, Fairchild’s non-urgent requests for Fitzpatrick to
voluntarily relinquish the pencil do not support an inference that Fairchild knew
Fitzpatrick faced a substantial risk of self-harm. A prison guard who takes steps to help
a prisoner has not necessarily developed a belief that the prisoner is at a substantial risk
of harm. See Quinn, 8 F.4th at 566. The evidence here shows Fairchild tried to remove
the rubber pencil despite his belief that Fitzpatrick was neither willing nor able to stab
himself with it. Therefore, on this record, a reasonable jury could not find that Fairchild
subjectively knew of a substantial risk of harm to Fitzpatrick.
AFFIRMED

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