Clarence Jackson v. STATE OF ILLINOIS and ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 5, 2025*
Decided March 6, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1824
CLARENCE JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ILLINOIS and ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 2:20-cv-02081-CSB-EIL
Colin S. Bruce,
Judge.
O R D E R
Clarence Jackson appeals the denial of his second post-judgment motion, which
we construe under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), to reinstate his case against
the State of Illinois and the Illinois Department of Human Services. In his complaint, he
contends that, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, the Department should reimburse
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1824 Page 2
him for certain transportation services. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to
state a claim under § 1983 and lack of jurisdiction over the state-law claim. Because
Jackson did not provide an adequate reason to reinstate the dismissed case, the district
court properly denied the post-judgment motion, and we affirm.
This suit arose after Jackson, who has limited walking ability, sought vocational
rehabilitation services from the Department in 2018. Specifically, he asked the
Department for help with his job search by paying for travel to Washington, D.C., and
repairs to his car. The Department gave him only a local bus pass. In response, Jackson
sued, alleging that the Department denied his request because he had previously sued
the State and because he is a black man. Such retaliation, he contended, violated his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law. The district
court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the suit. First, it correctly ruled that
the State and the Department are not suable under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Second, it dismissed his state-law claim without prejudice
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Jackson did not allege diversity of
citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Jackson twice moved to reinstate the suit, to no avail. In his first motion, filed
two weeks after dismissal, he asserted that his suit prompted the City of Decatur,
Illinois, to offer free bus rides during the COVID-19 pandemic, entitling him to pay
from the Department for helping the public. The district court denied his motion a week
later, explaining that it did not identify any legal errors in its ruling. Six weeks after the
dismissal, Jackson filed his second motion. He repeated that he should be compensated
for prompting Decatur to provide free bus rides and argued that “whatever jurisdiction
was in effect” while his suit was pending provided subject matter jurisdiction over his
request for pay. The district court declined to reinstate the case.
Jackson timely appealed the denial of his second motion. Because he filed this
appeal more than 28 days after the denial of his first post-judgment motion, we limited
this appeal to a review of the denial of that second motion. See F ED. R. A PP . P. 4(a)(1)(A),
(a)(4). We construe that motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) because
when a post-judgment motion, like Jackson’s second motion, is filed more than 30 days
after judgment, only Rule 60(b) can provide relief. See Banks v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 750 F.3d
663, 666 (7th Cir. 2014). We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of
discretion. See Word Seed Church v. Vill. of Homewood, 43 F.4th 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2022).
The district court reasonably denied Jackson’s second motion. A judgment may
be set aside under Rule 60(b) for several reasons, such as “mistake,” “newly discovered

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No. 24-1824 Page 3
evidence,” “fraud,” or “any other reason that justifies relief.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 60(b)(1)–(3),
(6). Jackson points to no particular factor listed in Rule 60(b). Instead, he appears to
argue only that the district court had jurisdiction over the state-law claim. But he could
have asserted a basis for jurisdiction over that claim (and Rule 8(a)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure obligated him to do so) before dismissal. Because he did not,
Rule 60(b) relief was not warranted. See Word Seed Church, 43 F.4th at 691 (“[A] motion
to reconsider is not the proper vehicle to raise new arguments that could and should
have been raised prior to judgment.”). In any case, Jackson does not now offer a valid
basis for an assertion of federal jurisdiction over his state-law claim.
We have considered whether Jackson sought in his motion leave to amend his
complaint to replace his original claim with a new claim about entitlement to a reward
from the Department for prompting Decatur to provide free bus service. Even if so
construed, the district court properly denied a request to amend. After judgment has
been entered, a plaintiff may amend a complaint only if the plaintiff first persuades the
district court to reinstate the case. Ewing v. 1645 W. Farragut LLC, 90 F.4th 876, 893
(7th Cir. 2024). But the judgment of dismissal here was still intact when Jackson filed his
motion, and, as just discussed, Jackson gave the court no valid reason to reinstate the
case. So amending a complaint in a dismissed case would have been inappropriate.
AFFIRMED

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