BELINDA J. ROSSETTI and EZRA J. ROSSETTI v. Haim Saban

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 21, 2025*
Decided March 21, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3221
BELINDA J. ROSSETTI and EZRA J.
ROSSETTI,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
HAIM SABAN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 21 C 4324
Jorge L. Alonso,
Judge.
O R D E R
Belinda and Ezra Rossetti appeal the dismissal of their suit against out-of-state
defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. Because none of the
conduct attributable to the defendants that gave rise to Ezra’s claims occurred in
Illinois, dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction was proper. We therefore affirm the
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-3221 Page 2
judgment as to Ezra; we modify the judgment as to Belinda, who lacked standing to
sue, to reflect that her claim fell outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
We summarize the allegations in the complaint. Ezra, who planned to live at
college in Pennsylvania in 2020, started searching from Illinois for an apartment at the
college. He contacted Katie Liberman, an employee at The Bryn, a student-housing
property, to ask about an apartment. The Bryn is managed by Cardinal Group and
owned by Haim Saban and his affiliated businesses; they and Liberman are all
non-residents of Illinois. Ezra and his mother, Belinda, asked Liberman about the
cleanliness of the units, and Liberman replied that the units were professionally
cleaned. Liberman also stated that Ezra needed to sign a lease immediately. Ezra did,
agreeing with Cardinal Group to rent an apartment from August 2020 through July
2021. Before Ezra moved to Pennsylvania, he received an email from The Bryn
providing more details about the cleaning of the apartment. After he moved in, Ezra
and Belinda inspected Ezra’s apartment and thought it unlivable; they also learned that
he need not have signed his lease immediately. Ezra and Belinda complained, and a few
repairs occurred. Still dissatisfied, in May 2021, Ezra vacated his apartment before the
lease term ended. Unable to find other affordable housing, Ezra returned to Illinois.
The Rossettis sued The Bryn, Saban, Cardinal Group, Liberman, and other
non-residents of Illinois in the Northern District of Illinois. Invoking federal-question
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction, id. § 1367, the Rossettis
raised federal claims of race discrimination, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 3610, and state-law
claims. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, as relevant on appeal,
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. They reasoned that the complaint
did not allege that they were domiciled in Illinois (and the plaintiffs do not dispute this
point on appeal) or that the case arises out of conduct they initiated in Illinois. And,
they added, the Northern District of Illinois was an improper venue.
The district court granted the motion. Among other defects in the suit, the court
explained that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. It ruled that, because
none of the defendants were domiciled in Illinois, no general personal jurisdiction
applied. And, it continued, no specific personal jurisdiction applied either because the
case had only a “fortuitous connection” to Illinois by virtue of the Rossettis’ electronic
communication. Finally, the court ruled, venue was also improper in the Northern
District of Illinois because all the defendants were residents of California, Colorado,
Delaware, or Pennsylvania, and most of the events took place in Pennsylvania.

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No. 23-3221 Page 3
We begin our analysis with subject-matter jurisdiction. Because both Ezra and
Belinda have sued, we must assess whether both have standing to sue, an element of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Standing requires that “they both have alleged an injury that
a favorable ruling on appeal can redress.” See Bachner v. C.I.R., 124 F.4th 1066, 1070–71
(7th Cir. 2025) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). Ezra meets
these requirements, but Belinda does not. For Ezra, the alleged misconduct led him to
sign a lease, move from Illinois, occupy an apartment assertedly in disrepair, and move
out of it. This is not the case for Belinda. She did not sign the lease, move to the unit,
live in it, or otherwise allege a personal injury. Because Belinda lacks standing, the
judgment as to her is modified to reflect a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
On appeal Ezra first argues that the district court had personal jurisdiction over
the defendants. We review the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo.
See Curry v. Revolution Laby’s, LLC, 949 F.3d 385, 392 (7th Cir. 2020). In a case involving
federal and state-law claims, the district court looks at the federal laws invoked in the
suit and the long-arm statute of the state in which the court sits. Omni Cap. Int’l, Ltd. v.
Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1987). The federal laws that Ezra cites, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982, 3610, do not provide for national service of process; thus, the district
court may exercise personal jurisdiction only if it is authorized by Illinois law and the
United States Constitution. F ED. R. C IV. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,
283 (2014). And Illinois authorizes personal jurisdiction as far as federal due process
permits. See 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c); Curry, 949 F.3d at 393.
Due process allows for two types of personal jurisdiction, but neither one applies
here. Ezra does not press on appeal “general” personal jurisdiction (which is based on a
defendant’s domicile, see Walden, 571 U.S. at 283 n. 6); the other is “specific” personal
jurisdiction, which is tied to a defendant’s specific actions giving rise to the suit.
Id. at 283–84. Walden holds that a state may assert specific jurisdiction only if the
“defendant himself” created contacts with “the forum State itself,” not just with the
plaintiff. Id. at 284–85. “[T]he plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant
and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant's conduct that must form the necessary
connection with the forum State that is the basis for its jurisdiction over him.”
Id. at 285.
Under these principles, dismissal was proper. Based on Ezra’s allegations, he
initiated from Illinois the communications with the out-of-state defendants about the
property in Pennsylvania that led to the transaction at the crux of this suit: signing the
lease and moving from Illinois to Pennsylvania to live in the property. Ezra does not

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No. 23-3221 Page 4
identify any conduct giving rise to this suit that the defendants initiated in Illinois. And
the defendants’ use of email to respond to Ezra is, by itself, insufficient. Advanced
Tactical Ordnance Sys. v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 803 (7th Cir. 2014). Ezra
replies by citing some of the defendants’ other marketing activity in Illinois and some
commercial property that they own there. But the marketing he cites is neither
temporally nor transactionally related to the claims in this suit, and the properties in
Illinois are unrelated to the claims in this suit. They are therefore irrelevant to a proper
claim of specific personal jurisdiction in this case. See id.
We close with two observations. First, because the court’s decision on personal
jurisdiction was proper, we need not reach the alternative ground for dismissal,
improper venue. Second, Ezra argues that the district judge failed to make certain
financial disclosures. But he never raised this issue in the district court, and arguments
raised for the first time on appeal are waived. See Allen v. City of Chicago, 865 F.3d 936,
943 (7th Cir. 2017).
The judgment as to Ezra is AFFIRMED and as to Belinda it is MODIFIED to
reflect that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

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