Lyrah Hernandez , as Special Administrator for the Estate of Luis Cruz v. CITY OF PEORIA, ILLINOIS , and RYAN ISONHART

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2851
LYRAH HERNANDEZ , as Special
Administrator for the Estate of
Luis Cruz,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C ITY OF PEORIA, I LLINOIS , and
R YAN I SONHART,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 1:19-cv-01153-JES-JEH — James E. Shadid, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED O CTOBER 21, 2024 — DECIDED A PRIL 21, 2025
____________________
Before R OVNER , S CUDDER , and LEE, Circuit Judges.
R OVNER , Circuit Judge. In the early hours of July 19, 2018,
Peoria Police Department Officer Ryan Isonhart fatally shot
Luis Cruz. At the time of his death, Cruz was fleeing from
officers and—according to Isonhart and his partner Nicholas
Mason—pointing his gun at Mason. Following Cruz’s death,

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2 No. 23-2851
Lyrah Hernandez, Cruz’s sister, brought suit on behalf of
Cruz’s estate alleging federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and state law claims against Officer Isonhart, Officer Mason,
and the City of Peoria. The district court granted defendants’
request for summary judgment as to the claim against Officer
Mason, and the matter went to trial against the remaining de-
fendants. Ultimately, the jury found in favor of the defend-
ants. Hernandez now appeals, alleging that the district court
abused its discretion by admitting four specific pieces of evi-
dence and barring testimony from two individuals. We affirm
the decisions of the district court.
I.
At the time of his death, Cruz was the father of twin girls.
Cruz was incarcerated when the twins were born, although
the girls did visit Cruz while he was in prison. Within one
month of Cruz’s release, the Illinois Department of Child and
Family Services removed the girls from the home. To obtain
visitation rights, the Department of Child and Family Services
required that Cruz complete a parenting class. Cruz chose not
to complete the class, and the girls were returned to their
mother after Cruz’s death with no finding of wrongdoing,
abuse, or neglect. At the time of his death, Cruz also had a
pending charge for unlawful possession of a controlled sub-
stance.
Immediately prior to his death, Cruz was in a car driven
by Shaquille Alexander. Cruz was the subject of two “49 mes-
sages”—intra-department alerts that notify officers that prob-
able cause exists to arrest an individual and the basis for that
probable cause. According to the 49 messages, Cruz was
wanted in connection with a shooting and a domestic battery
incident.

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No. 23-2851 3
After receiving information that Cruz and Alexander were
together in a red Pacifica, Isonhart and Mason located the
Pacifica parked outside of an apartment complex. While they
were waiting outside of the apartment building, Mason and
Isonhart viewed a live Facebook video showing Alexander
and Cruz together in an apartment. Later, Cruz and Alexan-
der exited the apartment together and began driving in the
Pacifica again. Isonhart and Mason followed the Pacifica in
their semi-marked squad car. After following the Pacifica for
a short time, Mason activated the vehicle’s lights and, when
the Pacifica did not pull over, the siren.
Isonhart and Mason’s squad car had a dashcam, and the
jury viewed the dashcam footage during trial. The following
is a description of the dashcam video. As the Pacifica slowed
to stop, Cruz jumped out of the passenger seat clutching at his
pants. Cruz ran in front of the Pacifica, and Isonhart gave
chase. Although not seen on the dashcam, Mason also exited
the vehicle, and the sound of the vehicle door closing can be
heard on the video. Isonhart called out to Cruz,1 which can be
heard on the video, and Cruz began to turn toward Isonhart
while continuing to run toward the edge of the dashcam’s vis-
ual frame. Isonhart can still be seen in the center of the frame.
Cruz then runs out of frame, and Isonhart begins shooting his
weapon, still in frame. According to the defendants, while
Cruz was out of frame, he pointed his gun at Mason and
1 The parties dispute what Isonhart said to Cruz, and the statement is
not well captured on the video. Because the content of Isonhart’s state-
ment to Cruz is not material to the resolution of the questions before us,
we decline to resolve this factual dispute.

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4 No. 23-2851
racked2 it, thus causing Isonhart to fear for the life of his part-
ner and fire his weapon at Cruz.
After the shooting, Cruz’s gun was found near his body,
as was a bullet that was the same caliber as the bullets in
Cruz’s gun. The investigator on scene—Timothy LeMasters—
did not swab the slide of the gun for fingerprints despite be-
ing told that Cruz racked the gun. A few hours after the shoot-
ing, Alexander gave a video and audio recorded statement to
Illinois State Police officers investigating the shooting where
he explained that he did not see Cruz pull out a weapon be-
fore Isonhart shot him.
On July 24, 2018, the Illinois State Police held a Major Case
Review meeting about the shooting. One purpose of the meet-
ing was to review the testing already done, and to determine
what additional testing needed to be conducted. One attendee
was Jennifer MacRitchie, an Illinois State Police forensic sci-
entist, who, after the meeting, authored a “conversation re-
port”—notes recording the information she learned during
the Major Case Review meeting, see R. 99 at 14:13–14—in
which she did not mention that Cruz racked the gun. After
the meeting MacRitchie did not order additional testing of the
gun’s slide. Even though other attendees’ identities are un-
known, the parties agree that Isonhart did not attend the
meeting.
Before trial, the plaintiff made multiple motions in limine.
As relevant here, the plaintiff sought to bar admission of the
49 messages, the Department of Child and Family Services in-
vestigation, the fact that Cruz was incarcerated at the time his
2 Racking a gun involves pulling the gun’s slide so that a round is
chambered, and the previously chambered round is ejected.

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No. 23-2851 5
daughters were born, and Cruz’s pending drug charge at the
time of his death.
The district court found the 49 messages relevant to Ison-
hart’s state of mind at the time of the shooting. The district
court also found that the messages would be relevant if the
plaintiff argued at trial that Isonhart did not need to give
chase. In the same ruling, the district court barred defendants
from telling the jury that Cruz was a person of interest in a
murder investigation at the time of his death. In outlining its
reasoning, the district court explained that telling the jury that
Cruz was a person of interest in a murder “leads to too many
questions, too many thoughts, and that could be—the preju-
dice could outweigh the probative value. So, domestic vio-
lence or domestic battery and a shooting for now.” R. 96 at
12:2–9. The plaintiff orally sought reconsideration, arguing
that the defendants could explain to the jury that Cruz was
wanted for two separate crimes without specifying the
crimes. The district court denied the motion for reconsidera-
tion, reiterating that the crimes for which Cruz was wanted
went to Isonhart’s state of mind.
The district court also found the Department of Child and
Family Services investigation relevant to Cruz’s damages,
and it denied both the plaintiff’s motion in limine and the
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The district court ex-
plained that the daughters’ removal from the home and
Cruz’s failure to follow the steps necessary to obtain visitation
rights were relevant to the plaintiff’s damages. Similarly, the
district court found Cruz’s incarceration at the time of his
daughters’ birth relevant to the plaintiff’s damages stemming
from the claimed loss of society.

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6 No. 23-2851
Initially, the district court opined that Cruz’s pending
drug charge would be relevant to respond to the plaintiff’s
claims that Cruz fled from police because he distrusted them,
but the district court reserved ruling on the issue until closer
to trial. On the fourth day of trial, the plaintiff sought clarifi-
cation about the court’s ruling and the court stated that “[t]he
defense could introduce evidence that Mr. Cruz was facing
pending possession of controlled substance charges at the
time of the incident as it pertains to damages and loss of soci-
ety.” R. 133 at 797.
Notably, in discussing the plaintiff’s arguments that these
pieces of evidence were too prejudicial, the district court of-
fered twice to bifurcate the trial, which the plaintiff refused.
R. 96 at 14:4–15:12, 25:9–21. At the final pretrial conference,
after the plaintiff presented her motions for reconsideration,
the district court again offered to bifurcate the trial stating
“based on some of the rulings I made, there would be so much
about Mr. Cruz that would not be admissible if it was just li-
ability first and then damages second.” R. 99 at 33:13–34:1.
The plaintiff did not consent to bifurcation.
Before trial, the defendants made their own pretrial mo-
tions. Specifically, the defendants sought to bar MacRitchie
from testifying because the plaintiff had not timely disclosed
her as an expert witness. Even though the plaintiff claimed
that MacRitchie was a fact witness, see R. 98-3 at 6, defendants
argued that MacRitchie’s testimony regarding DNA testing
would be expert in nature. R. 98. The plaintiff explained to the
district court that the focus of MacRitchie’s testimony would
be about “the information that she received from the Peoria
Police Department and how that dictated the actual testing
that she performed and why she made the decisions that she

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No. 23-2851 7
made.” R. 99 at 15:11–15. This information was relevant, the
plaintiff explained, because MacRitchie’s incident report was
“opposite” to the officers’ testimony, and the plaintiff sus-
pected that the rack “likely would have been tested for touch
DNA” if MacRitchie “had been told that [Cruz] racked the
gun.” Id. at 15:22–16:19. However, plaintiff noted that she
“had no idea who was at this Major Case Incident Review.”
Id. at 17:12–13. The district court opted to reserve its ruling
until trial. Id. at 18:7–17.
Approximately one week prior to trial, the district court
entered a ruling barring MacRitchie from testifying. Specifi-
cally, the district court found MacRitchie’s proffered testi-
mony to be expert in nature. The district court explained as
follows:
Plaintiff proffered that MacRitchie would be
called to identify her role in the investigation
and to be questioned about documentation that
she drafted. [Plaintiff seeks] to question
MacRitchie about what she and others in the Il-
linois State Police investigation were told about
how the events at issue in this case occurred,
and how they structured their investigation as a
result. In particular, Plaintiff contends that the
version of events that MacRitchie was given,
which were documented in a Major Case Re-
view, do not include the alleged fact that the de-
cedent "racked the slide" on his gun as he
pointed it at PPD Officer Mason. Additionally,
MacRitchie allegedly did not swab this portion
of the firearm that was recovered for the dece-
dent's DNA, which Plaintiff will presumably

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8 No. 23-2851
argue she would have done had she been told
that Cruz racked the slide. These aspects, partic-
ularly the second, fall within the realm of expert
testimony: what level of information a forensic
scientist is typically given, what steps they take
in an investigation and how they shape their
testing based on the information they are given
cannot be properly understood without an ex-
planation of the scientific and technical back-
ground underpinning each point. Without ex-
pert testimony, the jury would not be able to ad-
equately decide which of the possible explana-
tions of this testimony is more credible—Plain-
tiff's allegation that MacRitchie didn't test the
slide because she wasn't told about that detail as
it was fabricated at some later point, or any of
the innocent explanations that Defendants
could offer. As Plaintiffs failed to disclose
MacRitchie as an expert, the Rules mandate that
they cannot call her as such.
R. 100. The plaintiff sought reconsideration, which the district
court denied. In doing so, the district court explained that the
conversation record was a “vague summary” and that it was
unclear whether “it would have even included the racking the
slide allegation” thus diminishing MacRitchie’s ability to im-
peach Isonhart’s testimony. See R. 129 at 21:3–6. Further, the
district court explained, even if MacRitchie was aware that
Cruz allegedly racked the gun’s slide, “talking about doing
further testing and then having to explain what that means is
expert testimony […] or close to it.” Id. at 21:4–10.

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No. 23-2851 9
Before trial, the plaintiff also sought to admit Alexander’s
statement under the residual hearsay exception, Rule 807 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. At the same time that the dis-
trict court judge ruled on the defendants’ summary judgment
motion, the district court also barred admission of Alexan-
der’s video and audio interview with police. In doing so, the
district court evaluated the statement’s trustworthiness and
found it lacking. Notably, the district court explained that Al-
exander admitted that “he did not see the critical seconds be-
fore Cruz was shot” and that Alexander’s statement “makes
assumptions, rather than observations from personal
knowledge, regarding the incident.” R. 60 at 7.
The trial spanned six days. After slightly more than three
hours of deliberation, the jury ultimately returned a verdict in
favor of the defendants. Because the jury found in the defend-
ants’ favor on liability, it did not consider damages. The plain-
tiff now appeals, challenging the district court’s evidentiary
rulings. Specifically, the plaintiff challenges the district
court’s decisions to admit the 49 messages, the Department of
Child and Family Services investigation, the fact that Cruz
was incarcerated at the time his daughters were born, and
Cruz’s pending drug charge at the time of his death, as well
as the district court’s decisions barring MacRitchie from testi-
fying and Alexander’s recorded statement.
II.
We begin with the plaintiff’s challenges to the evidence
the district court admitted before turning to the challenges to
the evidence that the district court barred. This former cate-
gory includes the crimes underlying the 49 messages, the De-
partment of Child and Family Services investigation, the fact

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10 No. 23-2851
of Cruz’s incarceration at the time of his daughters’ birth, and
Cruz’s pending drug charge at the time of his death.
We review each of the district court’s evidentiary rulings
for abuse of discretion. “A determination made by a trial
judge regarding the admissibility of evidence is treated with
great deference because of the trial judge's first-hand expo-
sure to the witnesses and the evidence as a whole, and be-
cause of his familiarity with the case and ability to gauge the
likely impact of the evidence in the context of the entire pro-
ceeding.” Doornbos v. City of Chicago, 868 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir.
2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. Wash, 231 F.3d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 2000)). “We will re-
verse only if no reasonable person would agree with the trial
court's ruling and the error likely affected the outcome of the
trial.” Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 2013).
Even though this bar is quite high, the plaintiff does not need
to show that, on remand, a jury will come out the other way.
United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2013).
First, the plaintiff challenges the district court’s decision to
admit the crimes underlying the 49 messages. Specifically,
that officers had probable cause to arrest Cruz for a shooting
and domestic battery. The plaintiff argues that the district
court impermissibly allowed the 49 messages to be admitted
for propensity purposes.
The crimes for which Isonhart and Mason pulled Cruz
over are directly relevant to the objective reasonableness of
Isonhart’s force. Indeed, the reasonableness inquiry turns on
the “facts and circumstances of each particular case” includ-
ing “the severity of the crime at issue.” Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Isonhart knew that Cruz was wanted for
a domestic battery and in connection with a shooting. Indeed,

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No. 23-2851 11
that is part of the reason why officers sought Cruz that even-
ing. Tr. 162:2–5; 225:12–21. “[T]he knowledge of the officer is
a critical inquiry in any assessment of reasonable force.” Bur-
ton v. City of Zion, 901 F.3d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 2018). To omit the
crimes for which Cruz was wanted would have kept valuable
information from the jury that was directly relevant to their
determination, and the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in allowing the limited amount of information that it did
about the 49 messages.
Against this well-established legal backdrop, the Plaintiff
argues that the 49 messages constitute improper other-act ev-
idence. But the district court did not admit the 49 messages as
other-act evidence. It admitted the evidence to explain “why
Isonhart wanted to make the stop,” “to establish what Ison-
hart’s state of mind was,” and to counter an argument that the
officers did not need to chase Cruz. R. 96 at 8–10. “Other-act
evidence need not be excluded whenever a propensity infer-
ence can be drawn, provided its relevance to another purpose
can be established through a chain of reasoning that does not
rely on the forbidden inference.” Burton, 901 F.3d at 784.
The plaintiff argues that the district court did not properly
consider the prejudicial nature of the evidence, and she claims
that the prejudice outweighs the highly probative value of the
evidence. “[A]ll evidence is prejudicial.” Common v. City of
Chicago, 661 F.3d 940, 947 (7th Cir. 2011). “Evidence is unduly
prejudicial if it creates a genuine risk that the emotions of the
jury will be excited to irrational behavior, and the risk is dis-
proportionate to the probative value of the offered evidence.”
United States v. Loughry, 660 F.3d 965, 974 (7th Cir. 2011). As
discussed above, the evidence was highly probative, and it is
unclear how the brief mention of the underlying crimes for

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12 No. 23-2851
which Cruz was wanted without details about the crimes
themselves would create prejudice sufficient to outweigh this
probative value. See Common, 661 F.3d at 947. And notably,
the district court overruled the plaintiff’s motion in limine in
the same breath that it barred other evidence for being more
prejudicial than probative. R. 96 at 12:2–9. Under these cir-
cumstances, including the highly probative nature of the evi-
dence, we cannot conclude that “no reasonable person would
agree with the trial court's ruling.” Perry, 733 F.3d at 252.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence that Cruz was incarcerated at the time of his daugh-
ters’ births, nor did it abuse its discretion when it admitted
evidence of the Department of Child and Family Services in-
vestigation. Both pieces of evidence were directly relevant to
the plaintiff’s damages. The jury was instructed that, if it
found in Hernandez’s favor, it “must then fix the amount of
money which will reasonably and fairly compensate Luis
Cruz’s daughters […] for the pecuniary loss proved by the ev-
idence to have resulted to Luis Cruz’s children from his
death.” R. 115 at 24. The instructions included the “loss of
money, benefits, goods, services, and society” in pecuniary
loss, and defined loss of society as “the mutual benefits that
each family member receives from the other’s continued ex-
istence, including love, affection, care, attention, companion-
ship, comfort, guidance, and protection.” Id.; see also id. at 27.
The instructions directed the jury that it “may consider what
the evidence shows concerning […] [t]he relationship be-
tween Luis Cruz and his children[.]” Id.
As we explained in Cobige, when a plaintiff introduces ev-
idence that paints the decedent’s character in a positive light,
the defendants are permitted to introduce evidence that

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No. 23-2851 13
paints a contradictory picture. Cobige v. City of Chicago, 651
F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2011), as amended on denial of reh'g (Sept.
8, 2011). This is not to say that prior criminal acts are always
relevant in wrongful death or Section 1983 cases. Instead, we
must consider the scope of the harm the plaintiff is claiming
that he or she suffered, and the relevance of the proffered ev-
idence in directly rebutting that harm. See Barber v. City of Chi-
cago, 725 F.3d 702, 713–14 (7th Cir. 2013); Smith v. Hunt, 707
F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2013). For example, the plaintiff in Co-
bige testified that Cobige, the decedent, “had been a friend as
well as a parent, a bulwark of support and a role model
throughout his life.” Cobige, 651 F.3d at 784. In response, the
defendant “was entitled to introduce evidence suggesting
that Patricia Cobige was not likely to assist others” and to al-
low “defense counsel to ask just what kind of ‘role model’ she
could have been.” Id. at 784–85.
Here, the plaintiff presented evidence to the jury that Cruz
was a present and involved father. For example, the twins’
mother testified that Cruz was “very close to the girls” and
was a patient, caring, overprotective father who “always
wanted [the twins] to be in a good environment.” R. 133 at
882:17–883:1. She testified that Cruz “did a lot of things with
the girls” and testified about the activities he can no longer do
with them, and guidance he cannot give them now. Id. at
885:13–20, 897:20–898:23. Hernandez testified that Cruz was
an attentive and caring father who was learning about
parenthood, and that he was committed to bettering his life at
the time of his death. Id. at 915:23–916:2, 918:21–25, 927:10–16.
Cruz’s prolonged absence from his daughters’ lives and sub-
sequent refusal to take parenting classes so that he could visit
them is directly relevant to the jury’s understanding of Cruz’s
involvement with his daughters and the closeness of their

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14 No. 23-2851
relationship. The plaintiff presented evidence that Cruz was
an attentive and caring father who wished to spend time with
his children. Defendant was, in turn, permitted to present ev-
idence that Cruz was absent for much of the twins’ lives and
did not take the steps necessary to see his children. Even if
reasonable jurists could disagree about admitting the reasons
for Cruz’s absence—that is, his incarceration and the Depart-
ment of Child and Family Services investigation—that disa-
greement is insufficient to demonstrate that the district court
abused its discretion. Aldridge v. Forest River, Inc., 635 F.3d 870,
875 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he district court's decision is to be
overturned only if no reasonable person would agree with the
trial court's ruling.”).
Finally, we consider the district court’s decision that
Cruz’s pending drug charge was relevant to the plaintiff’s
damages. The difficulty with a pending drug charge, of
course, is that it is an unproven allegation. As an unproven
allegation, it is unclear what, if anything, could be inferred
from the charge that would affect Cruz’s “love, affection, care,
attention, companionship, comfort, guidance, and protec-
tion.” R. 115 at 27. Indeed, it is possible that Cruz would be
found not guilty of the possession charge, and that he would
return to being the father that the plaintiff and the twins’
mother testified that he was. Defendants cite Cobige in sup-
port, but the decedent in Cobige “was in prison for extended
periods, and in thrall to heroin when not imprisoned.” Cobige,
651 F.3d at 784. Within this context, the district court errone-
ously barred admission that, at the time of her death, the de-
cedent was “in the lockup following arrest on yet another
drug charge.” Cobige, 651 F.3d at 784. Thus, the unproven al-
legation in Cobige was directly related to the circumstances of
the decedent’s death and an ongoing heroin addiction that

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No. 23-2851 15
could reasonably be expected to affect the relationship be-
tween the decedent and the plaintiff. Here, it is not clear that
Cruz’s pending drug charge provided the same insight into
his relationship with his daughters.
But even if we assume that the district court erred, the er-
ror was harmless. Reversal is only required where the eviden-
tiary error had “a substantial and injurious effect or influence
on the jury’s verdict” such that “a significant chance exists”
that the error “affected the outcome of the trial.” Narkiewicz-
Laine v. Doyle, 930 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
No such chance exists here.
The evidence supporting the jury’s liability verdict was
overwhelming. Cruz’s gun was found near his body and a
bullet from that gun—which would have been ejected if Cruz
racked the gun—was also nearby. The plaintiff challenges nei-
ther that evidence, nor more generally the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, and the unchallenged
evidence provides a strong basis for the jury’s verdict. Lange
v. City of Oconto, 28 F.4th 825, 845 (7th Cir. 2022).
Aside from the strength of defendants’ case, the jury al-
ready knew that officers wished to arrest Cruz for two violent
crimes at the time of his death, so the information did not
newly suggest that Cruz had brushes with the law, nor did it
newly suggest that, at the time of his death, Cruz was em-
broiled in illegal activity. “As a general rule, errors in admit-
ting evidence that is merely cumulative of properly admitted
evidence are harmless.” Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1138
(7th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases). In light of the other evidence
admitted at trial, it is improbable that the inclusion of Cruz’s
pending drug charge had “a substantial and injurious effect
or influence on the jury’s verdict” such that “a significant

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16 No. 23-2851
chance exists” that the error “affected the outcome of the
trial.” Narkiewicz-Laine, 930 F.3d at 901.
III.
We now turn to the evidence that the plaintiff wished to
admit but that the district court barred. This category of evi-
dence includes Alexander’s recorded statement and
MacRitchie’s testimony. As with the evidence the plaintiff al-
leges the district court improperly included, we review the
district court’s decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Lange, 28 F.4th at 842. “We will reverse only if no
reasonable person would agree with the trial court's ruling
and the error likely affected the outcome of the trial.” Perry,
733 F.3d at 252.
The district court did not err in barring Alexander’s rec-
orded statement. The plaintiff moved to admit Alexander’s
statement under the residual exception to the rule against
hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 807. “We construe the Rule 807 re-
quirements narrowly.” Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18
F.4th 214, 233 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Burton v. Kohn L. Firm,
S.C., 934 F.3d 572, 583 (7th Cir. 2019)). The plaintiff argues that
the district court’s evaluation of Alexander’s statement was
too “mechanical” in that it did not adequately consider that
Alexander was the only non-police eyewitness to the shooting
and that the COVID-19 pandemic interfered with Alexander’s
deposition. To the extent that COVID made Alexander una-
vailable, that was not adequately explained to the district
court. See R. 60 at 8–9 (district court noting that the plaintiff
provided “no reason for Alexander’s unavailability” and no
“evidence of her efforts to attempt to contact Alexander” after
she “served Alexander for a deposition prior to the COVID
lockdowns of 2020”). And while the plaintiff argues that

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No. 23-2851 17
Alexander was the only non-police witness to the shooting,
the district court found that Alexander “did not see the critical
seconds before Cruz was shot” and that Alexander made “as-
sumptions, rather than observations from personal
knowledge, regarding the incident.” R. 60 at 7.
Perhaps more fundamentally, as the district court’s
thoughtful and thorough written opinion explained, it barred
Alexander’s statement because the statement lacked the “cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those
contemplated under Rule 807.” R. 60 at 9. The plaintiff does
not argue that the district court’s analysis itself was wrong, or
that Alexander’s statement was “supported by sufficient
guarantees of trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Evid. 807. Instead, she
argues that the district court did not give enough weight to
factors that she deems important. This is not an abuse of dis-
cretion particularly where, as here, the district court consid-
ered the factors that the plaintiff claims it did not. And to the
extent that the plaintiff argues that the district court should
have abdicated its responsibility to determine the admissibil-
ity of the evidence, and that it should have instead allowed
the jury to determine the statement’s credibility, that argu-
ment misapprehends the law and the district court’s duty.
Finding the statement trustworthy is a prerequisite to admis-
sion. See Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(1).
The plaintiff further argues that Alexander’s statement
should have been admitted as an excited utterance. But as the
plaintiff seems to realize in her reply brief, she did not raise
this argument to the district court, and thus she asks us to re-
view for plain error. “Our ability to review for plain error in
civil cases is severely constricted,” because “a civil litigant
‘should be bound by his counsel's actions.’” SEC v. Yang, 795

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18 No. 23-2851
F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d
1356, 1360 (7th Cir. 1988)). This case does not present an ex-
ceptional circumstance that would warrant review for the first
time on appeal. See id. As the district court noted, Alexander
stated that he did not see the critical moment of the shooting,
thus limiting the value of the evidence in answering the criti-
cal questions that faced the jury.
Similarly, the plaintiff argues that MacRitchie’s testimony
should have been admitted, and that her testimony was not
expert in nature. Recall that plaintiff wanted to admit
MacRitchie’s testimony to impeach Isonhart’s testimony that
Cruz racked his gun. Even setting aside the nature of
MacRitchie’s testimony, it is unclear how the testimony itself
was relevant for impeachment purposes. Before both the dis-
trict court and this court, the plaintiff was unable to articulate
a link between MacRitchie’s conversation record and the de-
fendants, severely hindering any impeachment value of the
evidence. Tr. 16:9–18:15, 21:11-16. The plaintiff invites us to
speculate that the information must have come directly from
someone with sufficient knowledge of the events to impeach
Isonhart’s testimony, despite recognizing that she has no
knowledge or record of who attended the meeting aside from
MacRitchie, nor any knowledge of how the meeting’s at-
tendees learned the relevant facts. Hernandez Reply Br. at 16;
R. 99 17:12–13. We decline the plaintiff’s invitation to specu-
late.
IV.
For the above reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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