United States of America v. Patrick D. Rogers

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued February 25, 2025
Decided April 29, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2125
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PATRICK D. ROGERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 21-CR-152-JPS
J. P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
O R D E R
Patrick Rogers pleaded guilty to possessing a controlled substance with intent to
distribute it and illegally possessing a firearm. At sentencing, the district court
calculated Rogers’s Sentencing Guidelines range to be 168 to 210 months, then
sentenced him to serve 120 months on the drug offense followed by 18 months on the
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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firearm offense. Rogers brings procedural challenges to his sentence and alternatively
asks us to remand for resentencing under 28 U.S.C. § 2106. Because the district court
provided an adequate explanation for a below-Guidelines sentence, and any potential
procedural error was harmless, we affirm.
I
This case began when the Milwaukee County Sherriff’s Office learned from two
confidential informants that Patrick Rogers was trafficking large amounts of
methamphetamine from Chicago for distribution in the Milwaukee area. Soon after,
Rogers arranged a large drug transaction with the informants. But when Rogers arrived
at the meeting spot, law enforcement promptly arrested him. Officers recovered over
1.5 pounds of heroin/fentanyl mixtures and 12.4 grams of methamphetamine from the
scene, as well as a firearm from Rogers’s waistband. A subsequent search of his home
revealed additional controlled substances, another firearm, scales, and thousands of
dollars in cash. At the time of his arrest, Rogers had been on state supervision for less
than two years after serving a lengthy prison sentence for a reckless homicide he
committed at age 17.
Rogers’s parole was revoked and he was taken back into state custody. A year
later, a federal grand jury returned a five-count indictment charging Rogers with drug-
trafficking and firearms offenses. Rogers eventually pleaded guilty to one count of
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A), (a)(2), and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924(a)(2). Rogers spent approximately two years in state custody
before he was moved to federal custody prior to sentencing.
At sentencing, the district court determined his Sentencing Guidelines range to
be 168 to 210 months. Rogers’s drug count carried a minimum sentence of 120 months,
whereas 120 months was the maximum sentence he could receive on his firearms
offense. Rogers requested a total sentence of 120 months. The government requested a
total sentence of 168 months. After hearing arguments from the parties, the court
imposed a sentence of 120 months on the drug offense, to be followed by a consecutive
sentence of 18 months on the firearm offense, “for a total sentence of 138 months.”
In explaining its sentence, the district court relied on the following: (1) the
seriousness of Rogers’s offense and the violence often associated with drug crimes; (2)

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the need for proportionality and uniformity in sentencing; (3) the need to protect the
public from the fentanyl epidemic; (4) the public’s interest given the increasing costs of
incarceration, staffing shortages, and overcrowding in federal prisons; (5) Rogers’s
troubling criminal record and violation of supervised release; and (6) the competing
statutory maximum and minimum sentences.
II
On appeal, Rogers argues that the district court procedurally erred in imposing
his sentence, a challenge we review de novo. United States v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 527
(7th Cir. 2016). Rogers claims the district court procedurally erred by (1) not adequately
explaining its sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), see United States v. Jerry, 55 F.4th 1124,
1130 (7th Cir. 2022); (2) improperly imposing consecutive sentences without considering
the framework the Guidelines prescribe, see United States v. Nania, 724 F.3d 824, 830,
838–39 (7th Cir. 2013); and (3) failing to address Rogers’s principal, nonfrivolous
arguments, see United States v. Martin, 718 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2013). Rogers
alternatively asks us to remand for resentencing for consideration of Amendments 821
and 825 to the Guidelines, see 28 U.S.C. § 2106.
A
As to his first procedural challenge, Rogers contends that the district court failed
to properly weigh the § 3553(a) factors and adequately explain its sentence in light of
them. In particular, Rogers says the district court’s explanation was not sufficiently
individualized and failed to address his personal history and characteristics. But the
analysis of the sentencing factors “need not be exhaustive.” United States v. Vasquez-
Abarca, 946 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). “[T]he district court need
not recite and apply every single § 3553(a) factor.” United States v. Hendrix, 74 F.4th 859,
867 (7th Cir. 2023).
Here, the district court focused its sentencing explanation on the nature and
circumstances of the offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) & (2)(A), the need to protect the
public and deter future crimes, id. § 3553(a)(2)(B) & (C), and the need for
proportionality and uniformity in sentencing, id. § 3553(a)(6). It did not merely recite
these factors without more. Rather, it provided a thorough analysis that applied these
factors to Rogers specifically. The court explained the severity of Rogers’s instant
offense and the danger of violence it carries, specifically tying it to Rogers’s reckless

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homicide conviction. It also emphasized the harm Rogers’s criminal conduct imposed
on the community. While the district court did not explicitly invoke the phrase “history
and characteristics,” there are no “magic words” the court must recite at sentencing.
United States v. Woods, 556 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2009). Indeed, we have repeatedly said
that procedural compliance does not require district courts to approach the factors “in
checklist fashion.” United States v. Grigsby, 692 F.3d 778, 791 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation
omitted). Still, the court considered this factor when it recognized that Rogers had
experienced challenges in his life but declined to find that those challenges excused his
criminal conduct. United States v. Bonk, 967 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2020) (court’s reasons
for sentence need only be logical and consistent with § 3553(a)). The district court
sufficiently “considered the sentencing factors in toto” and provided an adequate
record for our review on appeal. Hendrix, 74 F.4th at 867.
Contrary to Rogers’s assertion, the district court’s remarks on the fentanyl
epidemic and issues with the federal prison system do not compel remand. The
discussion of the community harms of drug trafficking was relevant to the court’s
evaluation of the need to protect the public. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). And courts may
rely on considerations common to the community, such as widespread drug
distribution, so long as there is a “reasonable nexus” between that problem and the
crime committed and the court does not “blame” the defendant for issues outside of his
control. Hendrix, 74 F.4th at 869–70 (quotation omitted). The district court commented
on the overwhelming harm that fentanyl has caused in the community, particularly in
tandem with firearms. This is “plainly relevant” to Rogers’s drug distribution offense
and illegal firearm possession. Id. at 870. We also reject Rogers’s objection to the
statements about rising incarceration costs. The court has discretion to consider what is
in the public’s interest, see United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 299 (7th Cir. 2014),
and this factor counsels a shorter sentence in any event.
B
For his second procedural challenge, Rogers contends that the district court did
not follow proper procedure when it imposed consecutive, rather than concurrent,
sentences. He demands remand, claiming procedural error because the district court
did not apply U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 to determine whether the Guidelines recommend
concurrent sentences and failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors when making its
decision. See Nania, 724 F.3d at 830, 838; 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b). Section 5G1.2 instructs

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district courts to determine the total punishment and then, considering the relevant
statutory maximum and minimum sentences for each count, impose concurrent or
consecutive punishments as needed to reach that total punishment. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2
cmt. n.1 & n.3. Concurrent sentences are preferred. Id. § 5G1.2(b) & (c); see also 18
U.S.C. § 3584(a). Despite this framework, § 5G1.2 is not binding, and district courts have
no obligation to choose concurrent sentences. Nania, 724 F.3d at 830. In the typical case,
though, district courts will impose the total punishment as an operative sentence on
each count with an adequately high statutory maximum and then set sentences on the
remaining counts at their respective statutory maximums, with all sentences running
concurrently. E.g., United States v. Holder, 94 F.4th 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2024); United States
v. Miles, 86 F.4th 734, 738–39 (7th Cir. 2023). Here, the court imposed consecutive
sentences of 120 and 18 months to reach a total sentence of 138 months. To the extent
the court’s explanation of this sentencing structure may have constituted error, it was
harmless. A procedural error is harmless “where the district court made it clear that it
would have imposed the same sentence even if the error had not been made.” United
States v. Glosser, 623 F.3d 413, 419 (7th Cir. 2010). It is clear the district court determined
Rogers’s total punishment to be 138 months and imposed consecutive terms to reach
that sentence. The court’s comments during sentencing reflect that it sought to avoid
repeating an error it had recently made in another case with competing maximum and
minimum sentences, United States v. Fields, No. 22-1676 (7th Cir. Oct. 22, 2022). Based on
the court’s discussion of the sentencing factors, we are confident it would impose an
identical sentence on remand, making any errors regarding the consecutive sentences
harmless. United States v. Alvarez-Carvajal, 2 F.4th 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2021).
C
In his final procedural challenge, Rogers says the district court failed to address
several principal, nonfrivolous arguments in mitigation. A court “commits procedural
error if it fails to address all of a defendant’s principal arguments.” United States v. Patel,
921 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). But this applies only to
“developed, meritorious argument[s].” United States v. Lee, 897 F.3d 870, 873 (7th Cir.
2018). Courts may reject insubstantial, stock, or minor arguments without discussion.
United States v. Ramirez, 983 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Cheek, 740 F.3d
440, 455 (7th Cir. 2014).

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Rogers points to three arguments the district court should have addressed: (1) his
age significantly decreases his risk of recidivism; (2) his firearm possession charge and
firearm sentencing enhancement constitutes double counting; and (3) his criminal
history category overrepresents the seriousness of his criminal history, and he should
receive a sentencing reduction for the time served on his state revocation sentence. A
defendant’s advanced age when he will be released from prison is a stock argument not
entitled to discussion, particularly when the defendant provides no data supporting the
claim of reduced risk of recidivism. Cheek, 740 F.3d at 455; Ramirez, 983 F.3d at 961–62.
The same goes for Rogers’s argument that his criminal history points overstate his
criminal history. United States v. Moreno-Padilla, 602 F.3d 802, 811–12 (7th Cir. 2010). The
court acknowledged Rogers’s double-counting argument without explanation, but it
was not required to give one because our precedent squarely controls. “As long as the
district court applies the guidelines as written, there is no double-counting error.”
United States v. Vizcarra, 668 F.3d 516, 526–27 (7th Cir. 2012). Rogers does not suggest
that the court wrongly calculated his Guidelines range. There was, therefore, no double-
counting error, and the court could reject that argument without discussion. Finally, the
district court addressed at length Rogers’s argument that he should receive a reduced
sentence to credit his time in state custody. Though Rogers may be displeased with the
court’s conclusion, that is not grounds for a procedural objection. The district court
considered the argument and provided a “reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal
decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). That is all we
require.
D
Alternatively, Rogers asks us to remand to the district court for reconsideration
of his sentence in light of Amendments 821 and 825 to the Guidelines. Amendment 821,
made retroactive by Amendment 825, alters how so-called status points are used to
calculate a defendant’s criminal history category. U.S.S.G. Amend. 821, 825 (2023). For
Rogers, this would lower his Guidelines range from 168 to 210 months to 151 to 188
months. Accordingly, Rogers asks us to vacate his sentence and remand for
consideration of the Amendments, invoking our independent authority under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2106. But Rogers has already attempted to avail himself of Amendment 821. Before the
district court, Rogers moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The
district court correctly found him ineligible for a reduction because his sentence was
already below the amended Guidelines range. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2) is the relevant

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policy statement for sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(2) and is binding on federal
courts. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826, 830 (2010). It provides that “the court
shall not reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment … to a term that is less than the
minimum of the amended guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A). Rogers’s below-
Guidelines sentence disqualifies him from relief under § 3582(c)(2), and “there is no
functional difference between § 3582(c)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 2106” in this way. United
States v. Rivers, 108 F.4th 973, 984 (7th Cir. 2024). The district court was therefore
justified in denying Rogers relief under § 2106. Cf. United States v. Claybron, 88 F.4th
1226, 1231 (7th Cir. 2023) (granting relief under § 2106 when § 3582(c)(2) was available
but not asserted). The district court properly denied Rogers’s § 3582(c)(2) motion, and
we decline to use § 2106 to sidestep that decision.
AFFIRMED

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