Testo completo
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 9, 2025*
Decided May 12, 2025
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3088
BOBBY R. BLAIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MILWAUKEE COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 22-cv-1142
Brett H. Ludwig,
Judge.
O R D E R
Bobby Blain is an African American man who was employed as a highway
maintenance worker for Milwaukee County. He was fired after he delayed reporting his
involvement in a hit-and-run accident while operating County equipment. Blain filed
suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17,
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12212, asserting that he
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appeal is
frivolous. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(A).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1
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No. 24-3088 Page 2
was unlawfully fired based on his race and disability. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Milwaukee County because Blain’s claims were barred
by a settlement agreement with the County and, alternatively, because Blain did not
obtain a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
In his brief on appeal, Blain rehashes his arguments that the County treated him
unfairly, but he does not engage with the district court’s rationale, let alone cite any case
law that would cast doubt on the ruling. Although we construe pro se briefs liberally,
an appellate brief must contain a discernible argument challenging the district court’s
reasoning and support for that argument. See F ED. R. A PP . P. 28; Anderson v. Hardman,
241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). Because an appeal is meant to evaluate the district
court’s decision, see Wonsey v. City of Chicago, 940 F.3d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 2019), it must be
dismissed if the appellant’s brief lacks any basis to disturb the judgment, see Anderson,
241 F.3d at 545.
DISMISSED
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