Cellco Partnership , d/b/a VERIZON WIRELESS v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE and JERREL KRUSCHKE

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-1212
C ELLCO PARTNERSHIP , d/b/a VERIZON WIRELESS ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
C ITY OF M ILWAUKEE and JERREL K RUSCHKE,
Defendants,
A PPEAL O F : DEER DISTRICT LLC,
Intervening Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 2:23-cv-01581-BHL — Brett H. Ludwig, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 14, 2024 — DECIDED J UNE 13, 2025
____________________
Before JACKSON -A KIWUMI , PRYOR , and M ALDONADO, Cir-
cuit Judges.
M ALDONADO, Circuit Judge. Two years ago, in an effort to
improve network coverage, Verizon Wireless sought permits

-- 1 of 13 --

2 No. 24-1212
from the City of Milwaukee to install small cells and matching
utility poles in a downtown plaza next to a major arena. The
City denied most of the permits, initially citing aesthetic con-
cerns and proximity to existing poles. Later, it asserted that it
lacked authority to grant the permits because the plaza was
leased to a private entity, Deer District LLC.
Verizon sued the City in federal court, arguing that the de-
nials violated the Telecommunications Act (TCA), 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), and Wis. Stat. § 66.0414. After a bench trial,
the district court ruled for Verizon. It concluded that the
City’s shifting justifications did not hold up and that the City
wanted to steer Verizon toward using Deer District’s own
wireless system. Exercising its equitable authority under the
TCA, the district court ordered the City to issue the permits.
Verizon has since installed the poles.
The City accepted the ruling. Deer District—an interven-
ing-defendant—did not. It now appeals, challenging the dis-
trict court’s interpretation of the lease and Wis. Stat. § 66.0414,
but not its holding under the TCA. In essence, Deer District
argues that the district court’s decision, particularly its char-
acterization of the plaza as a public right-of-way, violates its
rights under the lease. As discussed below, we cannot reach
Deer District’s arguments because it lacks Article III standing
to bring this appeal. We therefore dismiss for want of juris-
diction.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts
In July 2021, the Milwaukee Bucks won the NBA Finals.
The championship series spanned two weeks and drew thou-
sands of fans to the Bucks’ arena, the Fiserv Forum, and its

-- 2 of 13 --

No. 24-1212 3
adjacent pedestrian mall, the Deer District Public Plaza (the
Plaza). The large crowds strained cellular coverage in the
area. Verizon’s network, in particular, struggled to support
the volume of devices, resulting in unreliable service for
many customers.
Then, in December 2022, news broke that the Fiserv Forum
would host the Republican National Convention (RNC) in
July 2024, an event projected to attract 50,000 attendees over
four days. Wary of repeating the network issues experienced
during the NBA Finals, Verizon began exploring options to
improve cellular coverage in the Plaza.
Initially, Verizon sought to install “small cells,” short-
range mobile cell sites designed to augment network capacity
in dense urban areas, on existing utility poles in the Plaza. But
the City of Milwaukee rejected this request because it did not
own the poles. The City explained that these poles were
owned by Deer District LLC, an affiliate of the Milwaukee
Bucks, and that Deer District refused permission for the small
cells to be installed.
Unable to utilize the existing infrastructure, Verizon con-
sidered alternatives. One option was to design, construct, and
install its own utility poles in the Plaza, which would require
Verizon to secure the necessary city permits. Alternatively,
Verizon considered a proposal from Deer District to deploy a
distributed antenna system (DAS) instead of small cells. Un-
der Deer District’s proposal, Verizon would pay Deer District
an initiation fee of $10 million to use the DAS and then a
monthly rent of $10,000, subject to a 3.5% increase per year. In
the end, Verizon decided to install its own small-cell poles,
concluding that the DAS would introduce compatibility

-- 3 of 13 --

4 No. 24-1212
issues with its existing network and that Deer District’s pro-
posal was cost-prohibitive.
Accordingly, on August 3, 2023, Verizon submitted permit
applications with the City to install four small-cell poles: three
within the Plaza and one north of the Fiserv Forum. Verizon
specified in its permit applications that the poles would be
custom-made to match the existing ones in the Plaza.
On October 24, the City approved Verizon’s permits for
the pole to be constructed outside the Plaza. Two days later,
however, the City denied the permits for the three proposed
poles within the Plaza. In an email to Verizon, the City justi-
fied the denials because the proposed poles were “too close to
existing poles” and constituted “unsightly or out-of-character
deployments” in violation of the City’s aesthetic require-
ments.
The next day, Deer District’s lawyer told the City that its
lease of the Plaza precluded it from permitting Verizon to in-
stall poles in the Plaza. Specifically, the City had leased the
Plaza to Wisconsin Center District, a quasi-governmental en-
tity, which subleased the property to Deer District. According
to Deer District, its sublease (the Lease) granted it exclusive
rights over commercial activities in the Plaza, including the
installation of public utilities. The email also referenced Deer
District’s ongoing proposal to implement a DAS as an alter-
native for Verizon to improve network connectivity.
On November 10, two weeks after receiving Deer Dis-
trict’s email and ninety-nine days after Verizon submitted its
permit applications, the City sent Verizon a letter offering an
additional rationale for the permit denials. Adopting Deer
District’s position, the City claimed that it lacked authority to

-- 4 of 13 --

No. 24-1212 5
grant permits for pole installations within the Plaza because
it had effectively transferred all control over the Plaza to Deer
District, reserving only limited rights for public transporta-
tion and public access. Two weeks later, Verizon sued the City
of Milwaukee and its Commissioner of Public Works in fed-
eral court.
II. Procedural History
Verizon’s complaint proceeded under two causes of ac-
tion. First, it alleged that the City’s permit denials were
preempted by the TCA, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), because
the denials were not supported by “substantial evidence.” It
also alleged that the denials violated Wis. Stat. § 66.0414,
which requires approval of small wireless facility permits in-
side a “right-of-way” unless they conflict with specified reg-
ulations. Because the RNC was only months away, Verizon
sought “expedited review” of its claims in the district court
and moved for a preliminary injunction. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
The City argued that it did not violate either statute, main-
taining that it lacked the authority to issue permits for the
Plaza since the property was leased to Deer District. The City
conceded that the Plaza was “technically” a public right-of-
way that would ordinarily be subject to the TCA and Wis.
Stat. § 66.0414, but it contended that the Lease extinguished
some of the City’s rights (and obligations) under those stat-
utes.
On January 19, 2024, the district court held an initial hear-
ing on Verizon’s motion for a preliminary injunction. After
this hearing, and on the City’s recommendation, the district

-- 5 of 13 --

6 No. 24-1212
court invited Deer District to join the suit. Three days later,
Deer District moved to intervene, and the court granted its
motion. Two days after that, with all parties’ consent, the
court held a bench trial on the merits under F ED. R. C IV. P.
65(a)(2), hearing arguments from Verizon, the City, and Deer
District, along with witness testimony and numerous decla-
rations and exhibits.
After the trial, the district court ruled in favor of Verizon.
First, it found that the City’s initial two grounds for denial,
aesthetic concerns and proximity of the proposed poles to ex-
isting poles, were not supported by substantial evidence and
thus violated the TCA. The district court emphasized that the
City’s justifications were “hard to square with the record,”
noting that Verizon designed the poles to match those in the
Plaza and placed them just one foot closer to existing poles
than a previously approved permit. As for the City’s third ra-
tionale for denial, that Deer District held exclusive property
rights to the Plaza, the district court found it untimely, as it
was raised after the TCA’s 90-day deadline.1 Regardless, the
district court opined that this argument would also fail on the
merits because the Plaza was unquestionably a public right-
of-way in which the City retained rights. The district court
went on to hold that the City also violated Wis. Stat. § 66.0414,
1 Both the TCA and Wis. Stat. § 66.0414 require municipalities to re-
spond to applications for the construction of small cell facilities within
ninety days. See Declaratory Ruling and Third Report and Order, Acceler-
ating Wireless Broadband Deployment by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure
Investment, 33 FCC Rcd 9088, ¶ 105 (2018); Wis. Stat. § 66.0414(3)(c)1.d. The
deadline for the City to respond to Verizon’s August 3 applications was
November 1, 2023, but its third rationale for denial did not come until No-
vember 10, 2023.

-- 6 of 13 --

No. 24-1212 7
finding no evidence showing that the permit applications
failed to meet any of the applicable codes or ordinance stand-
ards.
Next, the district court concluded that equitable relief was
warranted under the TCA. It found that Verizon would suffer
irreparable reputational harm without suitable connectivity
during the RNC and that proper service would benefit the
community. The court also noted evidence of the City’s
“gamesmanship and backroom dealing,” suggesting its true
motive for denying the permits was to push Verizon toward
Deer District’s DAS project. Accordingly, the district court is-
sued an injunction requiring the City to grant Verizon the de-
nied permits within seven days.
The City did not appeal the district court’s ruling and, on
February 1, 2024, issued Verizon permits for the remaining
small-cell poles. Verizon installed the poles shortly thereafter,
and they are now operational. On February 9, after the per-
mits were issued, Deer District appealed.
Two features of Deer District’s appeal are notable. To start,
the City did not join the appeal. Second, Deer District does not
challenge the district court’s holding that the City violated the
TCA. Instead, it argues that the district court erred in identi-
fying the Plaza as a “right-of-way,” as used in Wis. Stat.
§ 66.0414, and likewise misinterpreted its rights under the
Lease. On these bases alone, Deer District asks us to vacate the
district court’s judgment against the City.
As described below, these two features preclude us from
redressing any harm Deer District may have suffered from the
injunction. For that reason, Deer District lacks standing and
we must dismiss the case without reaching the merits.

-- 7 of 13 --

8 No. 24-1212
DISCUSSION
To invoke federal court jurisdiction, a party must first
clear the threshold set by Article III of the Constitution: pre-
senting an actual case or controversy. Murthy v. Missouri, 603
U.S. 43, 56 (2024). A key aspect of the case-or-controversy re-
quirement is that plaintiffs must demonstrate standing to sue.
Id. at 57. Those seeking appellate review must prove Article
III standing, just like those appearing in trial courts. Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013). The standing in-
quiry presents a question of law that we review de novo and,
if necessary, sua sponte.2 See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331
(1977).
A litigant must satisfy three criteria to establish standing:
injury, causation, and redressability. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). In this case, we focus on redress-
ability, which examines the “relationship between ‘the judi-
cial relief requested’ and the ‘injury’ suffered.” California v.
Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 671 (2021) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984)). It requires the litigant to prove that
it is “‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the in-
jury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Lujan, 504
U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S.
26, 38, 43 (1976)). The requirement stems from the “bedrock
principle that a federal court cannot redress ‘injury that re-
sults from the independent action of some third party not
2 Neither party raised the issue of standing in their appellate briefing.
After oral argument, the Court requested and received supplemental ju-
risdictional memoranda from both parties addressing whether Deer Dis-
trict has Article III standing to pursue this appeal.

-- 8 of 13 --

No. 24-1212 9
before the court.’” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 57 (quoting Simon, 426
U.S. at 41–42).
The most glaring issue with Deer District’s appeal is the
City’s absence. Deer District asks us to vacate the district
court’s injunction, but the injunction runs exclusively against
the City. Cellco P'ship d/b/a Verizon Wireless v. City of Milwau-
kee, No. 23-CV-1581-BHL, 2024 WL 329001, at *11 (E.D. Wis.
Jan. 29, 2024) (“It is hereby ordered that the City of Milwaukee
must issue Verizon the six permit applications it previously
denied within seven days of the date of this order.” (emphasis
omitted)).
Even if we accept that Deer District suffered a concrete in-
jury “derivative” of the injunction, that injury cannot be re-
dressed unless we can vacate an injunction against a party not
before us. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Branson, 212 F.3d 995,
998 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, the “critical question” here is “when
a district judge enters an order creating obligations only for
Defendant A, may the court of appeals alter the judgment on
appeal by Defendant B when obligations imposed on A indi-
rectly affect B?” Id. The answer in this case is no.
A court will not change a judgment in favor of a party that
chose not to appeal, “even if the interests of the party not ap-
pealing are aligned with those of the appellant.” Cabral v. City
of Evansville, 759 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation omit-
ted and cleaned up); see also Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S.
237, 244 (2008) (“[A]n appellate court may not alter a judg-
ment to benefit a nonappealing party.”); 15A Wright & Mil-
ler’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 3904 (3d ed.).
Several concerns animate this core appellate principle.
First, fairness. When a party declines to appeal, reviewing the

-- 9 of 13 --

10 No. 24-1212
judgment raises “obvious” process concerns by denying the
Court the opportunity to consider its arguments. Cabral, 759
F.3d at 643. Moreover, allowing review could encourage liti-
gants to strategically opt out of an appeal in the hope of reap-
ing the benefits of another party’s success. In other words, we
would create “an intractable free-rider problem.” Id. (quoting
K.C. v. Shipman, 716 F.3d 107, 117 (4th Cir. 2013)). Second, ef-
ficiency. Adjudicating the rights of non-appealing parties in-
vites “endless follow-on litigation” to determine whether
their interests are closely enough aligned with those of the ap-
pealing party. Id. Such piecemeal litigation serves to compli-
cate, rather than settle, the parties’ expectations after a judg-
ment. Taken together, these concerns show how the principle
prevents cascading litigation and honors the strategic choices
of non-appealing parties.
We have no reason to stray from this “unwritten but
longstanding rule.” Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 244. By not appeal-
ing, the City remains bound by the district court’s injunction
regardless of what we rule in this appeal. 1000 Friends of Wis.
Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 860 F.3d 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2017)
(“A court of appeals cannot modify a judgment to make it
more favorable to a party that did not file a notice of appeal.”).
Therefore, Deer District’s alleged injury from the judgment—
the City permitting Verizon to install poles in the Plaza—can-
not be redressed by this Court. See id. at 482 (“[D]ecision after
decision, by the Supreme Court and this circuit, holds that,
when the public agency with duties under a judgment elects
not to appeal, a different litigant cannot step into the agency’s
shoes and carry on.”).
Our decision in Cabral v. City of Evansville supports this
conclusion. There, the City of Evansville granted a local

-- 10 of 13 --

No. 24-1212 11
church a permit to temporarily erect numerous crosses along
a public riverfront property. Cabral, 759 F.3d at 641. Several
residents then sued Evansville under the First Amendment
and sought to enjoin the crosses’ installation. The church in-
tervened in the suit. The district court sided with the residents
and permanently enjoined Evansville from issuing the per-
mits. Evansville did not appeal the decision, but the interve-
nor church did. Id.
On appeal, our Court dismissed the church’s case on
standing grounds, finding that it failed to satisfy the redress-
ability prong. Id. at 641–43. We addressed the redressability
problem from two angles. First, we highlighted that even if
we vacated the injunction against Evansville, “we could only
speculate as to whether [the church’s] injury would be re-
dressed” because Evansville would still be free to either per-
mit the church’s display or not. Id. at 642. We explained that
“[s]uch speculation is not enough to turn this into a case and
controversy with a redressable injury.” Id. at 642–43 (cit-
ing ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989)). Second,
we underscored that vacating the injunction against Evans-
ville would violate the appellate rule that prevents granting
relief to a party who has chosen not to appeal. Id. at 643. Like
Evansville in Cabral, the City of Milwaukee’s decision not to
appeal has zapped Deer District of standing.
In fact, the redressability problems here run even deeper.
Deer District appealed only the district court’s rulings on Wis.
Stat. § 66.0414 and the Lease—it did not challenge the TCA
holding. That’s a problem. The injunction rests on the TCA
holding. We know this because the district court’s analysis of
equitable relief focused exclusively on the TCA. And so Deer
District failed to challenge the operative holding.

-- 11 of 13 --

12 No. 24-1212
To illustrate the problem, imagine granting Deer District
all the relief it seeks on appeal: finding that the Plaza is not a
right-of-way and that the City gave Deer District exclusive
control over public utilities through the Lease. The City
would then face two conflicting orders. First, an injunctive or-
der from the district court directing it to issue the permits un-
der the TCA. Second, an order from this Court finding that
the City generally lacks authority to issue those permits, but
leaving the unchallenged TCA holding intact. What’s the City
expected to do then?
The predicament worsens when we consider that the
small-cell poles have already been installed. Deer District did
not ask this Court to order Verizon to remove the poles, and
even if it had, it is unclear on what basis our Court could grant
such relief. This all begs the question: What does Deer District
actually want from this Court?
Statements during oral argument reveal Deer District’s
true objective. There, the Court asked why Deer District had
not sought a stay of Verizon’s pole installations pending ap-
peal. In response, counsel downplayed the significance of the
pole installations and instead stressed that its “main concern”
was preserving its rights under the Lease and preventing the
Plaza from being deemed a public right-of-way, warning that
the decision would invite other wireless providers to adopt
Verizon’s tactics. Oral Argument at 4:20-5:04. As such, it ex-
pressed hope for an opinion from our Court that detailed its
property rights in the Plaza, even though such a decision
would have no practical effect on the current dispute. Put an-
other way, Deer District is asking for an advisory opinion. But
“federal courts do not issue advisory opinions.” TransUnion
LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 424 (2021). If Deer District

-- 12 of 13 --

No. 24-1212 13
believes that the City is not respecting the terms of the Lease,
a more appropriate way to address that problem would be in
an action against the City, not in a spin-off suit against Veri-
zon.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained, Deer District lacks standing to
pursue this appeal. Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal for
want of jurisdiction.

-- 13 of 13 --