Jeffery Johnson v. Accenture Llp

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1473
JEFFERY JOHNSON ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
A CCENTURE LLP,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
No. 1:21-cv-03285 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 9, 2024 — DECIDED J ULY 2, 2025
____________________
Before R OVNER , HAMILTON , and J ACKSON -A KIWUMI , Cir-
cuit Judges.
JACKSON -A KIWUMI , Circuit Judge. Jeffery Johnson, who is
Black, reported racial discrimination while working on a cli-
ent project at Accenture LLP. Accenture’s internal investiga-
tion found that Johnson’s complaint was made in good faith
but lacked merit. Johnson had trouble getting staffed on sub-
sequent projects and was eventually fired. He sued Accenture
claiming, as relevant here, the company illegally retaliated

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2 No. 23-1473
against him for reporting discrimination. The district court
awarded Accenture summary judgment and dismissed the
case.
Johnson was indeed terminated because he had difficulty
finding projects, and that did happen after he complained of
racial discrimination. But the record before us is insufficient
to support Johnson’s argument that his complaint caused his
difficulty getting staffed on projects and his termination.
Thus, we must affirm. But not without noting that our conclu-
sion is governed by the record and binding case law, not
blindness to the reality Johnson presses—that bias affected as-
pects of his work experience. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias
in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1124, 1159 (2012) (explain-
ing that the “conventional legal model” can miss employment
discrimination where “employment decisions might be moti-
vated by implicit bias but rationalized post hoc based on non-
biased criteria”).
I
We present the following facts in the light most favorable
to Johnson as the party opposing summary judgment. Ander-
son v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, we
do not consider the additional pages of Johnson’s deposition
that he submitted to us but failed to submit to the district
court. See Prairie Rivers Network v. Dynegy Midwest Generation,
LLC, 2 F.4th 1002, 1013 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[A]s a general rule we
will not consider evidence on appeal that was not before the
district court.”).
Accenture provides clients with project-based profes-
sional services. Accenture employees apply internally to be
staffed on a project. An employee not currently on a project is

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No. 23-1473 3
said to be on the company’s “bench.” Employees on the bench
receive their full salary but are expected to find new projects.
Accenture monitors the time employees spend on the bench
and company guidelines provide for termination after eight
weeks without client work.
Johnson started at Accenture in January 2018 as an Appli-
cation Development Associate Manager. During his first year,
he worked on three projects without incident. After complet-
ing the third project, he spent nearly three months on the
bench. Lisa Quiroz was a Talent Fulfillment Specialist as-
signed to support Johnson during this period. Quiroz advised
Johnson on how to find new projects, said that she was pro-
posing him as a candidate for open roles, and warned him
that if he was unable to get staffed on a project, he risked be-
ing fired.
In February 2019, Johnson joined a project for client Dana
Holding Corporation (Dana Project). His first day on the pro-
ject, he perceived what he believed was racial discrimination.
Specifically, an Accenture employee refused to serve as his
administrative assistant on the project; Johnson believed this
was because he was Black. (Johnson later learned that the em-
ployee was never assigned to be his assistant.) Then, the pro-
ject’s client manager told Johnson that the Black employee
Johnson replaced was “inadequate” and “not smart enough.”
The client manager also warned Johnson to “tread lightly”
around a German employee at Dana, whom Johnson identi-
fies only as Anya. Johnson reported these concerns to human
resources that first day.
Johnson remained on the Dana Project. He tells us that he
continued to observe racist, hostile, and combative acts, par-
ticularly from Anya. After working on the project for about a

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4 No. 23-1473
month, Johnson reported his concerns about Anya to Rick No-
ble, an Accenture senior manager assigned to the Dana Pro-
ject. Noble told Johnson that the client was intimidated by
Johnson’s deep voice and recommended he try raising his
voice a few octaves. Johnson interpreted Noble’s comments
as racist and as condoning Anya’s racist behavior. Four days
later, Johnson called Accenture’s human resources hotline to
report racial discrimination and a hostile work environment.
Accenture policy advised employees who made com-
plaints of discrimination to remove themselves from their
projects while human resources investigated their com-
plaints. So, Johnson informed Noble he would not be contin-
uing with the project and added that he was not comfortable
working in an unhealthy environment. Accenture’s human
resources department investigated Johnson’s claims, includ-
ing by interviewing Johnson and Noble, but ultimately con-
cluded the claims were without merit.
During his interview, Johnson informed the human re-
sources investigator, Shelly Amick, that he was willing to re-
turn to the Dana Project. No one in human resources informed
the Dana Project leaders that Johnson wanted to rejoin the
project. Johnson reaffirmed his willingness to return while
meeting with human resources at the close of the investiga-
tion. But Amick and Quiroz continued to advise Johnson to
seek another project.
After taking that advice and departing the Dana Project,
Johnson had another lengthy spell on the bench. In late April,
another Accenture manager, Nishant Jain, considered adding
Johnson to the Cargill Project. Jain asked Michael Hancock, an
Accenture team leader, for feedback on Johnson’s Dana Pro-
ject performance. When Hancock received this request for

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No. 23-1473 5
feedback, he emailed Noble, “Was this the guy that walked
out?” Noble responded, “YES!” Hancock then notified Jain
that Johnson “walked off the project” and “left us in a bad
spot with the client.” A member of human resources saw this
email exchange and encouraged Jain to instead seek feedback
from one of Johnson’s earlier projects, noting that there were
“extenuating circumstances” on the Dana Project. Jain did so
and received positive feedback about Johnson, but ultimately
decided to bring on another employee who already had a re-
lationship with the client.
In May, Johnson finally joined a new project: Johnson &
Johnson. However, he was removed for performance reasons
after only eight days. Johnson’s manager explained in an
email at the time that Johnson had flown home without noti-
fying the project, was “reluctant to cooperate with the team,”
created work product “[f]ar below [an] acceptable level of
quality,” and did not read his email carefully.
After more time on the bench, Johnson joined one final
project which he completed without incident at the end of Au-
gust. Afterwards, Johnson returned to the bench. Quiroz
again coached Johnson on how to secure assignments and
personally recommended him for staffing on projects. Despite
this, Johnson remained on the bench for nearly three months,
at the end of which he was fired. According to Accenture, he
was terminated for spending too many consecutive weeks on
the bench.
Following the termination, Johnson sued Accenture for ra-
cial discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Accenture moved for
summary judgment. The district court determined that John-
son’s summary judgment filings violated Northern District of

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6 No. 23-1473
Illinois Local Rule 56.1(d) by presenting several assertions
without appropriate citation and by offering facts that were
either legal conclusions or irrelevant to Accenture’s claims.
Consequently, the court struck from the record many of John-
son’s facts and admitted several of Accenture’s facts as uncon-
troverted. What remained, the court decided, did not show
that Johnson had been discriminated against based on his
race. The court also ruled that Johnson provided insufficient
evidence for his retaliation claims. For these reasons, the court
awarded Accenture summary judgment on all of Johnson’s
claims.
Johnson now appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment but only as to his retaliation claims under § 1981
and Title VII. Johnson does not appeal the loss of his race dis-
crimination claims.
II
There is one matter to address before we discuss Johnson’s
retaliation claims. Johnson challenges the district court’s de-
cision to admit many of Accenture’s proposed undisputed
facts as uncontroverted. But Johnson’s responses to the rele-
vant facts were non-responsive, unsupported, or both. The
district court was therefore well within its discretion to en-
force Local Rule 56.1 and admit Accenture’s facts. See
McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 787 n.2
(7th Cir. 2019) (“We give substantial deference to a judge’s de-
cision to strictly enforce local summary-judgment rules, re-
versing only for abuse of discretion.”).
Turning to the merits, we review a summary judgment de-
cision de novo and construe the record in the light most fa-
vorable to the nonmoving party. Adebiyi v. S. Suburban Coll.,

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No. 23-1473 7
98 F.4th 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2024). To survive summary judg-
ment, a plaintiff must point to specific evidence creating a
genuine dispute for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
A. § 1981 Claim
Section 1981 states that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States shall have the same right in every
State ... to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens.” The rights protected under the statute apply
to “nongovernmental discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c).
To avoid summary judgment on a § 1981 retaliation claim,
the plaintiff must show a genuine dispute about whether “(1)
the plaintiff engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) the
employer took a materially adverse action; and (3) there is a
causal connection between the two.” Humphries v. CBOCS W.,
Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 404 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 442 (2008)
(recognizing retaliation claims under § 1981). Johnson does
not present his argument using the burden-shifting frame-
work of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
so we evaluate the evidence as a whole, see Ortiz v. Werner
Enterprises, 834 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2016). See also Baines v.
Walgreen Co., 863 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that
courts use the same frameworks to evaluate Title VII and
§ 1981 retaliation claims).
Johnson undisputedly engaged in protected activity when
he reported discrimination on the Dana Project. And he iden-
tifies five adverse employment actions: (1) Accenture’s failure
to reinstate him to the Dana Project; (2) Accenture’s failure to
staff him to the Cargill Project; (3) Accenture’s failure to rein-
state him to the Johnson & Johnson Project (J&J Project); (4)

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8 No. 23-1473
Accenture’s failure to select him for other consulting projects;
and (5) Accenture’s decision to terminate him. See Muldrow v.
City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354–55 (2024) (explaining a
plaintiff must show disadvantageous change in employment
term or condition but need not show “significant” harm).
That leaves the question of causation: has Johnson shown,
or can a jury infer, a causal link between his report of discrim-
ination and the adverse actions he experienced? To show cau-
sation in the retaliation context, the protected activity need
not be the “only cause of the adverse action,” but the plaintiff
must be able to show the protected activity was a “but for”
cause, meaning that “the adverse action would not have hap-
pened without the activity.” Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758
F.3d 819, 828 n.1 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346–47 (2013)). The plaintiff may
rely on direct or circumstantial evidence of retaliation, includ-
ing “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements of animus, ev-
idence other employees were treated differently, or evidence
the employer’s proffered reason for the adverse action was
pretextual.” Rozumalski v. W.F. Baird & Assocs., Ltd., 937 F.3d
919, 924 (7th Cir. 2019).
The district court concluded that Johnson could not meet
his burden of showing causation, so a trial was not warranted.
Limited as we are to the record before us, we must agree. We
take each adverse action in turn.
1. Dana Project
Johnson argues that Accenture’s failure to reinstate him to
the Dana Project after his complaint of discrimination was re-
taliatory. Accenture argues that there is no causal connection

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No. 23-1473 9
between Johnson’s complaint and its decision not to reinstate
him to the project.
In the district court, Johnson focused his arguments on the
suspicious timing of the failure to reinstate coming soon after
his complaint of discrimination. But timing alone is “rarely
sufficient” to show causation. O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc.,
657 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 2011).
On appeal, Johnson adds that a jury could infer retaliation
because he wanted to rejoin the Dana Project but was refused
that opportunity. Only he does not provide any direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence that the decision was retaliatory. John-
son states that Noble or Hancock (or another unnamed Ac-
centure representative) actively refused to reinstate him to the
Dana Project. But Johnson does not suggest how a jury could
infer bias given he does not show that any Accenture policy
favored reinstatement and there is no evidence anyone with
the ability to reinstate him was aware that he wanted to return
to the project. The only people Johnson says knew of his de-
sire to return were Amick and Quiroz. And Johnson provides
no basis for a jury to infer that Amick or Quiroz had retalia-
tory animus that caused them to recommend that he find a
new project instead of recommending he be reinstated. There-
fore, Johnson’s evidence of a causal link between his com-
plaint of discrimination and this adverse action is insufficient.
2. Cargill Project
While on the bench after the Dana Project, Johnson ap-
plied for a position on the Cargill Project. Johnson states that
he was offered the position contingent on feedback from for-
mer supervisors. Accenture says that it never extended John-
son an offer. Either way, it is undisputed that as part of the

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10 No. 23-1473
hiring process, Jain, the hiring manager, reached out to Han-
cock for feedback on Johnson’s performance on the Dana Pro-
ject. Hancock stated that Johnson had “walked off the project”
and “left [them] in a bad spot with the client.” Jain, at human
resources’ urging, received positive feedback about Johnson
from another project, but ultimately selected another candi-
date.
On appeal, Johnson argues that Noble’s bias against him
ultimately caused his rejection from the Cargill Project. This
theory of causation is known as cat’s paw, which applies
when (1) a subordinate actually harbored retaliatory or other
unlawful animus against the employee, and (2) the subordi-
nate’s scheme proximately caused the adverse action. Robin-
son v. Perales, 894 F.3d 818, 832 (7th Cir. 2018). Even assuming
Johnson can meet his burden to show Noble harbored actual
animus against him, Johnson cannot meet his burden to show
Noble proximately caused the adverse action.
Johnson argues that Noble’s email to Hancock—which an-
swered “YES!” to Hancock’s question about whether Johnson
“walked out” on the Dana Project—“falsely advised” that
Johnson left that project without cause and resulted in Jain not
selecting Johnson for the Cargill Project. But any causal chain
between Noble’s email and Jain’s decision was broken by
three subsequent developments: human resources informed
Jain that Johnson had “extenuating circumstances” during the
Dana Project, Jain received other (positive) feedback about
Johnson, and Jain ultimately hired an employee who had pre-
viously worked with the client (something Johnson does not
contest). See Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9
(2010) (explaining that there is no proximate cause where the
casual links are “too remote, purely contingent, or indirect”).

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No. 23-1473 11
Johnson points to no other evidence to suggest Noble’s bias
infected Jain’s decision.
In sum, Johnson has not offered sufficient evidence from
which a jury could find that Noble proximately caused John-
son’s rejection from the Cargill Project.
3. Johnson & Johnson Project
After not getting staffed on the Cargill Project, Johnson
landed an assignment with the J&J Project. But he was re-
moved for performance reasons just eight days after he began.
Johnson argues that his removal was improper and the failure
to reinstate him was retaliatory. However, the record Johnson
developed does not tell us if he ever requested to be rein-
stated, who denied him reinstatement, what reasons that de-
cision-maker gave for the denial, or anything else specifically
related to the J&J Project. Instead, Johnson speculates that No-
ble must have worked behind the scenes to dissuade other
project managers from staffing Johnson. Speculation is not
enough to survive summary judgment. Gupta v. Melloh, 19
F.4th 990, 997 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[A] court need not give cre-
dence to facts based on speculation or conjecture.”). There is
no evidence in the record from which a jury could infer that
Noble or anyone else compromised Johnson’s ability to suc-
cessfully complete the J&J Project. And without such evi-
dence, Johnson cannot demonstrate a causal link between his
complaint of discrimination and his separation from the J&J
Project.
4. Other Accenture Projects
Johnson asserts that Noble’s retaliatory animus thwarted
his selection for three additional Accenture projects. Again,
Johnson offers only speculation that Noble spoke with and

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12 No. 23-1473
provided false statements to the hiring managers for these
projects. Without support in the record, Johnson’s beliefs are
not enough to survive summary judgment. See Gupta, 19 F.4th
at 997.
5. Termination
After Johnson spent ten weeks on the bench, Accenture
Senior Managing Director Pallavi Verma terminated him.
Johnson argues that Verma’s decision was based on the rec-
ommendations of Maren Krause and Bryan Basset, and their
recommendations were products of the retaliatory animus
that Noble, McQuin, and Quiroz each harbored against him.
Specifically, Johnson posits that Noble made false statements
about his performance on the Dana Project, and those false
statements prevented him from working on several projects
including Cargill and J&J. As for McQuin and Quiroz, John-
son says neither of them investigated his retaliation com-
plaints, and neither interceded on his behalf when Krause and
Basset recommended his termination. But again, Johnson re-
lies on a cat’s paw theory, so Johnson must show a causal link
between the actual bias of non-decisionmakers and the termi-
nation decision. See Robinson, 894 F.3d at 832. Johnson makes
no argument that Krause or Basset harbored actual bias
against him or even knew about his complaint of discrimina-
tion. That leaves McQuin, Quiroz, and Noble.
Even assuming Noble, McQuin, and Quiroz each har-
bored retaliatory animus against him, Johnson does not de-
velop a causal link to the termination decision. Johnson
would have to show that the animus of Noble, McQuin, and
Quiroz so infected the termination decision as to make Verna
“a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory

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No. 23-1473 13
employment action.” Woods v. City of Berwyn, 803 F.3d 865, 867
(7th Cir. 2015).
But Johnson does not point us to any record evidence to
build the casual chain between Noble’s animus and Verna’s
decision to terminate Johnson for being on the bench too long.
See Robinson, 894 F.3d at 832. As for McQuin and Quiroz,
Johnson presents no evidence that their animus caused the
termination. Johnson argues that they failed to intervene on
his behalf when Krause and Basset recommended his termi-
nation. But Johnson does not explain what would compel
them to intercede. He points to no policy, practice, or testi-
mony to support his theory.
Finally, Johnson maintains that his termination was pre-
textual. Accenture insists Johnson was terminated for spend-
ing too many consecutive weeks on the bench. To show pre-
text, Johnson needs to show the employer’s “proffered reason
was ... a lie,” which can be demonstrated by implausibility,
inconsistency, or contradiction in the reason for termination.
Parker v. Brooks Life Sci., Inc., 39 F.4th 931, 937–38 (7th Cir.
2022). Johnson presents no legally cognizable evidence to sug-
gest that Accenture’s stated reason—that Johnson spent too
much time on the bench—was pretextual. As such, his claim
that his termination was retaliatory fails.
We understand Johnson’s argument that his career went
downhill after he complained of racism at work. It is possible
that Johnson was subjected to different standards as a Black
man or pushed out because he was perceived as too threaten-
ing, as he suggests a jury should infer from Noble’s comments
about his voice being too deep. We know that implicit bias
can infect the workplace. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564
U.S. 338, 372–73 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and

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14 No. 23-1473
dissenting in part) (“Managers, like all humankind, may be
prey to biases of which they are unaware.”). And we recog-
nize that procuring evidence can be tricky in retaliation and
discrimination cases. But our case law makes it Johnson’s re-
sponsibility to provide the court with sufficient evidence to
survive summary judgment, and that was not done here. See
N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b); Wade v. Ramos, 26 F.4th 440, 446 (7th Cir.
2022) (“As we have said many times, summary judgment is
the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in a lawsuit, when a party
must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier
of fact to accept its version of events.” (cleaned)).
B. Title VII Claim
Since Johnson’s § 1981 claim fails on the merits, his Title
VII claim must also fail. See Baines, 863 F.3d at 661 (explaining
the same standards govern § 1981 and Title VII claims). Ac-
cordingly, we do not address if Johnson’s Title VII claim
would be timely and if tolling applies, two questions the par-
ties debated on appeal.
III
Johnson tried to persevere in a workplace that he had rea-
son to believe was biased against him. As he tells it, his com-
plaint of discrimination caused his difficulty being staffed on
projects and eventual termination. But Johnson failed to cre-
ate a record to link his complaint to any of the five adverse
employment actions he identified. We are limited to the sum-
mary judgment record before us, and it does not permit us to
conclude that a reasonable jury could find for Johnson on his
retaliation claims.
AFFIRMED.

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