Kara Mitchell v. Exxon Mobil Corporation

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2823
K ARA M ITCHELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
EXXON M OBIL C ORPORATION ,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-cv-06876 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED M AY 13, 2025 — DECIDED J ULY 14, 2025
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, B RENNAN , and PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN , Circuit Judge. Kara Mitchell worked as a labora-
tory technician for Exxon Mobil Corporation for a little over a
year before she was terminated in 2020. ExxonMobil says it
fired her because she compared unfavorably to peers in the
company’s annual employee assessment process. Mitchell
says ExxonMobil fired her because she is a woman.

-- 1 of 23 --

2 No. 24-2823
She sued the company for sex discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted
summary judgment to ExxonMobil because Mitchell failed to
provide sufficient evidence for her claim. We agree and af-
firm.
I. Background
A. ExxonMobil’s Employee Assessment Process
ExxonMobil employs tens of thousands of employees
worldwide, including about 20,000 in the United States. Every
year, the company conducts a complex, multi-step perfor-
mance assessment to evaluate the achievements and progress
of its large workforce. This process, described in an internal
company manual available to employees, is at the center of
Mitchell’s challenge.
At the beginning of every performance assessment period,
employees complete a one-page summary of their accom-
plishments, strengths, and development opportunities during
the previous 12 months. They also select co-workers to evalu-
ate their performance. Supervisors rely on the self-assess-
ment, feedback from co-workers, and their own judgment to
assign preliminary assessment categories to employees. These
categories may be adjusted up or down at a conclusive assess-
ment group meeting.
Assessment groups comprise employees in similar roles
with similar experiences. Nevertheless, employees in the
group may have different job titles, report to different super-
visors, and work in different locations across the country.
During the group meeting, each employee is represented by a
member of management, usually the employee’s direct super-
visor. ExxonMobil relies on this relative assessment process

-- 2 of 23 --

No. 24-2823 3
because comparing employees with their peers “meets [] prin-
ciples of meritocracy, performance differentiation, and con-
tinuous improvement.”
The assessment process differs based on an employee’s re-
sponsibilities. Mitchell, an “operational, clerical, and admin-
istrative” employee, was assessed by a process that assigns
performance categories A, B, C, or D to employees in the as-
sessment group.1 Guidelines set quotas for the number of em-
ployees who can be assigned each category. Per the manual,
this ensures that all assessment groups “will meet a standard
distribution, and each group will stand on its own.”
Once supervisors reach consensus about employees’ rela-
tive performance and assign final performance categories that
accord with the quotas, they communicate the final category,
and the reasons for that result, to employees. In turn, employ-
ees are expected to incorporate that feedback into their indi-
vidual development plans.
Employees who are assigned category D are placed on
ExxonMobil’s Management of Lower Relative Performance
program. That program gives employees the option either to
continue working under a performance improvement plan or
to resign and receive a base salary and outplacement services
until a specified date. Those who choose the latter, also called
1 Another assessment process applies to “managerial, professional,
and technical” employees.
Operational, clerical, and administrative employees are ranked as
outstanding (including a subcategory of outstanding with distinction); ex-
cellent; very good; good; and in need of improvement (including a subcat-
egory for in need of significant improvement).

-- 3 of 23 --

4 No. 24-2823
the “Pay in Lieu” option, agree to sign a separation agreement
and release claims.
During the 2019–2020 performance assessment cycle at is-
sue here, the performance improvement plan option was not
available to employees who fell into the Management As-
signed Category (“MAC”), meaning they were a new hire
with three or more years of relevant experience before joining
ExxonMobil. MAC-designated employees assigned category
D could choose either to receive Pay in Lieu or be terminated
without the benefits of Pay in Lieu.
B. Mitchell’s Assessment
ExxonMobil operates a fuel and lubricants plant in Cicero,
Illinois. Mitchell began work at the testing laboratory there in
March 2016 as a contractor while employed by a staffing com-
pany. As a lab technician, she tested samples of the products
entering and leaving the facility.
In 2019, after approximately three years as a contractor,
colleagues Jeffrey Hayes and Karen Hasberger encouraged
Mitchell to apply for a full-time position with ExxonMobil at
the Cicero plant. She was hired on April 22, 2019. Her title and
work responsibilities did not change when her employer be-
came ExxonMobil, and they remained the same until her ter-
mination on August 28, 2020.
Mitchell worked with two other lab technicians, Victor
Aguirre and Daniel Pitts. The parties dispute who supervised
these employees. The company maintains that although
Hayes was based in the Paulsboro, New Jersey facility, he su-
pervised all the lab technicians at Cicero. Mitchell counters
that Hasberger, a chemist at the lab, was her direct supervisor.
After Hasberger left the company, Mitchell says the

-- 4 of 23 --

No. 24-2823 5
supervisory role passed to a male employee. Still, she claims,
her performance was ultimately reviewed by three other su-
pervisors: Cicero plant manager Raul Sanchez, Hayes, and
their direct supervisor Louis Henry “Hank” Muller.
Mitchell had her first and only performance assessment by
ExxonMobil approximately one year into her full-time em-
ployment. As the manual required, she drafted a one-page
summary of her accomplishments, strengths, and areas for
development. She also selected five co-workers to evaluate
her, including her two colleagues from the Cicero lab, Aguirre
and Pitts.
Mitchell met with Hayes to discuss her performance.
Mitchell offered conflicting statements as to whether Hayes
told her which preliminary assessment category she was as-
signed. She said first that she learned she was assigned cate-
gory B during that conversation. But later in her deposition,
when asked what Hayes “conveyed” to her about her perfor-
mance during that conversation, she responded, “I don’t re-
call.” A June 9, 2020, email Hayes sent to Shannon McGuire in
human resources assigned category B to all three lab techni-
cians.
On June 15, Muller emailed the cluster of supervisors he
managed to discuss the preliminary assessment categories for
eleven employees in their departments. Muller explained that
the categories assigned to the operational, clerical, and ad-
ministrative employees had to meet a new “required distribu-
tion.”2 That meant, he instructed, that category A must be
2 Muller’s email contained a table displaying the expected distribution
of performance categories within an assessment group. Employees as-
signed the letter A for outstanding contributor were expected to make up

-- 5 of 23 --

6 No. 24-2823
assigned to two employees and category C to two other em-
ployees.
To satisfy that distribution, Muller lowered Pitts to cate-
gory C but kept Aguirre and Mitchell at category B. Muller
indicated the proposed categories were not final and asked
the supervisors he managed to “reply back with agreement or
a different proposed category and rationale.”
The same day Muller emailed only Sanchez, explaining he
did not “see [Mitchell], [Pitts], or [Aguirre] enough to judge
their initial placement” and asking for “[a]ny thoughts” about
their letter assignments. The next day, Hayes wrote to
Sanchez with new preliminary letter assignments for the three
lab technicians. The email explained that Hayes and Muller
discussed having to assign a category D. It was suggested to
keep Aguirre at B, leaving how to apportion the C and D as-
signments between Pitts and Mitchell.
Attaching self-assessments from each of the lab techni-
cians, Hayes concluded: “I would place [Pitts] as the C and
unfortunately, [Mitchell] MAC’d at the D, if need be.” Hayes
asked Sanchez to “review and confirm or realign my think-
ing.”
There is no evidence that Sanchez responded to the emails
he received on June 15 and 16. He testified he did not believe
he responded to either email. Mitchell claims Sanchez was in-
volved in her performance assessment process “as early as
June 15” when his name first appeared in an email recipient
list from Muller.
20–30% of the assessment group; B for strong contributor, 40–50%; C for
contributor, 20–30%; and D for needs improvement, 8–10%.

-- 6 of 23 --

No. 24-2823 7
At the final stage of the performance assessment process,
Mitchell was assigned to a group based on her position and
level of experience. As a lab technician, she was considered an
operational, clerical, and administrative employee. She was
also considered a MAC employee because she had three or
more years of relevant experience as a contractor before start-
ing full-time at ExxonMobil. Her assessment group consisted
of three other first-year employees in the MAC category, two
men and one woman: Gilmore Kwon, Louis Palombo, and
Terry Davis. Even though the others were not based in the
Cicero lab, like Mitchell they worked on fuels and lubricants
operations.
On June 17, two different groups were discussed at the as-
sessment group meeting. Hayes represented Mitchell, while
three other supervisors represented Kwon, Palombo, and Da-
vis. Muller testified he was there to represent employees in
the second group. But Mitchell disputes that Muller was pre-
sent and challenges his testimony about what was discussed
there.
According to Muller, the supervisors at the meeting deter-
mined that the other employees in Mitchell’s assessment
group “tended to go ‘above and beyond’ in performing their
job responsibilities, while [Mitchell] did not.” Mitchell was
“simply not a ‘stand out’ in comparison to her peers.” At the
conclusion of the meeting, Mitchell was assigned a final per-
formance assessment category of D, while the other three em-
ployees were assigned final categories of B.
Ordinarily Mitchell would have received feedback about
her assigned category from her direct supervisor—Hayes. But
Hayes also fared poorly during the performance assessment
for the 2019–2020 cycle and opted to retire. So, Muller

-- 7 of 23 --

8 No. 24-2823
approached Sanchez, requesting he deliver feedback to
Mitchell, Pitts, and Aguirre in Hayes’s stead. As Sanchez was
not present at the assessment group meeting, Muller in-
formed him about the discussions that took place and the rea-
sons for Mitchell’s final relative assessment category. To
Mitchell, Sanchez’s explanation for her assessment was
founded on Muller’s “self-serving” declaration and was thus
pretextual.
On August 21, Sanchez met with Mitchell to deliver the re-
sults of her performance assessment. Sanchez explained to
Mitchell that her assessment group was “competitive” and
that her assigned category resulted from a “lack of ‘stand
outs’” when compared with her peers. He also provided
Mitchell with a Separation Agreement explaining her options
as a MAC employee assessed in the D category.
Consistent with company policy and practice, assigning
category D to Mitchell meant she was placed in the Manage-
ment of Lower Relative Performance program. But as she was
also a MAC employee, the policy during the 2019–2020 per-
formance assessment cycle dictated she could choose either
the Pay in Lieu option or resign immediately without the ben-
efits of Pay in Lieu and without relinquishing her right to sue.
After meeting with Sanchez, Mitchell emailed human re-
sources several times between August 24 and 27 to inquire
about the terms of her termination and the reasons for her as-
sessment category. A human resources manager addressed
Mitchell’s questions about the terms of her termination but
directed her to consult Sanchez about her assessment process.
Sanchez spoke again to Mitchell on August 24 about the as-
sessment process.

-- 8 of 23 --

No. 24-2823 9
Mitchell ultimately decided not to sign the separation
agreement and her employment with the company ended.
She later learned a male contract employee assumed some of
her responsibilities at the lab. As of early 2024, ExxonMobil
asserts that no employee was hired to fill Mitchell’s position.
Mitchell brought this suit against ExxonMobil alleging
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1). Following discovery, which the parties requested be
extended numerous times, ExxonMobil moved for summary
judgment on Mitchell’s sex discrimination claim. The district
court granted the motion, and Mitchell appeals.
II. Evidentiary Rulings
Before reaching the merits of Mitchell’s sex discrimination
claim, we consider her appeal of two evidentiary issues,
which we review for abuse of discretion. Igasaki v. Ill. Dep’t of
Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 955 (7th Cir. 2021).
First, Mitchell disputes whether Muller was present at her
assessment group meeting and thus his declaration about the
reasons she was assigned category D. She characterizes his
testimony as “self-serving” and submits it should not be re-
lied on at summary judgment. “[S]elf-serving statements in
affidavits without factual support in the record carry no weight
on summary judgment.” Butts v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 387
F.3d 921, 925 (7th Cir. 2004).
Rather than self-serving, Muller’s declaration about
Mitchell’s category D assignment fell within his new respon-
sibility. The ExxonMobil manual requires supervisors to dis-
cuss the results of the performance group meeting with em-
ployees to explain the reasons for their final assessments.

-- 9 of 23 --

10 No. 24-2823
Hayes’s retirement transferred that responsibility to Muller as
Hayes’s immediate supervisor.
Even assuming Muller’s declaration was self-serving, suf-
ficient facts show that he attended the meeting. He stated he
was there as a representative of an employee in the other
group discussed that day. Muller was also included in an
email McGuire sent to “Assessment Meeting Participants.” No
proof contradicts this evidence, so the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it considered Muller’s declaration.
Second, Mitchell asked the district court to consider evi-
dence from a different case, Ontiveros v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No.
21 C 2335, 2024 WL 3823172 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2024).3 She
sought to use that evidence to support her claim of a pattern
or practice of discrimination against female employees at the
Cicero plant. The district court ruled inadmissible the evi-
dence from the other case because the “defendant ha[d] had
no opportunity to test [it] in the context of this case.”
Mitchell asks us to reconsider the district court’s eviden-
tiary decision because the other case involved the same
defendant, the same attorney, and many of the same supervi-
sors, but only a different female plaintiff. The evidence in that
case, she argues, is “probative, relevant, and a matter of public
record.”
To introduce evidence from another case, as Mitchell re-
quests, would violate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)
and 37(c)(1). Rule 26(a) requires a party to disclose the name
of “each individual likely to have discoverable information—
3 A panel of this court heard argument in that case on May 14, 2025
(Appeal No. 24-2645). The same attorney represented the plaintiff in that
case.

-- 10 of 23 --

No. 24-2823 11
along with the subjects of that information—that the disclos-
ing party may use to support its claims or defenses.” A party
who fails to do so is not allowed to use undisclosed infor-
mation or witnesses “to supply evidence on a motion … un-
less the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” F ED.
R. C IV. P. 37(c)(1).
Mitchell did not disclose her intent to rely on any docu-
ments or depositions from the Ontiveros case before including
them in her district court submission. Permitting their use at
such a late stage would have prejudiced ExxonMobil, which
had no opportunity to test that evidence. The district court
thus did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence
from Ontiveros, and that evidence is not included in our re-
view of the district court’s summary judgment ruling.
III. Title VII Discrimination
We turn now to the merits of Mitchell’s discrimination
claim. We review a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, construing the record in the light most fa-
vorable to Mitchell, the nonmoving party, and drawing all
reasonable inferences in her favor. Napier v. Orchard Sch.
Found., 137 F.4th 884, 891 (7th Cir. 2025). “[G]eneralized and
unsupported allegations cannot create a genuine dispute”
precluding summary judgment. Anderson v. Street, 104 F.4th
646, 651 (7th Cir. 2024). So, ExxonMobil “may prevail by
showing an absence of evidence to support” Mitchell’s claim.
Wince v. CBRE, Inc., 66 F.4th 1033, 1040 (7th Cir. 2023).
Mitchell contends that ExxonMobil discriminated against
her based on her sex when it terminated her. Title VII makes
it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual …
because of such individual’s … sex … .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

-- 11 of 23 --

12 No. 24-2823
2(a)(1). In discrimination cases, “[w]hen a defendant moves
for summary judgment, the ‘singular question’ for the district
court is whether the plaintiff has introduced evidence that
would ‘permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the
plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed fac-
tor caused the discharge or other adverse employment ac-
tion.’” Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 957 (quoting Purtue v. Wis. Dep’t of
Corr., 963 F.3d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 2020)).
Like many plaintiffs alleging discrimination, Mitchell
chose to carry her evidentiary burden by invoking the frame-
work of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–
03 (1973). To make a prima facie case under McDonnell Doug-
las, Mitchell must show that she (1) belongs to a protected
class, (2) was qualified for the job, (3) suffered an adverse
employment action, and (4) was treated less favorably than
similarly situated employees outside of her protected class.
Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 957. Most plaintiffs find meeting “the
prima facie burden is ‘not onerous.’” Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of
Youth Servs., 145 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2025) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of
Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly explained that the “precise re-
quirements of a prima facie case can vary depending on the
context and were ‘never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic.’” Id. at 1546 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,
534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)).
If Mitchell successfully makes her prima facie showing,
the “burden shifts to [ExxonMobil] to articulate a legitimate
reason for the adverse action.” Partin v. Baptist Healthcare Sys.,
Inc., 135 F.4th 549, 559 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Elkharwily v.
Mayo Holding Co., 823 F.3d 462, 470 (8th Cir. 2016)). This too is

-- 12 of 23 --

No. 24-2823 13
a light burden. See Stockwell v. City of Harvey, 597 F.3d 895, 901
(7th Cir. 2010).
If ExxonMobil articulates a “legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for its decision, the presumption of discrimination
falls away.” Id. At that point, the burden “shifts back to
[Mitchell] to show that the employer’s stated reason was a
pretext.” Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 957 (citation omitted).
Mitchell also urges us to consider her claim through the
holistic lens articulated in Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834
F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016). There, this court said that a plaintiff
does not have to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework to
succeed on a discrimination claim under Title VII. “Although
there are many tests and rubrics for viewing discrimination
claims, it is important to recall that, at the end of the day they
are all merely convenient ways to organize our thoughts.”
Brooks v. Avancez, 39 F.4th 424, 433 (7th Cir. 2022).
This court said in Brooks that district courts should evalu-
ate direct and indirect evidence together as a whole to assess
“the only question that matters:” whether a reasonable fact-
finder could conclude that a plaintiff suffered the adverse em-
ployment action because of her membership in a protected
class. Id.; see also Vega v. Chi. Park Dist., 954 F.3d 996, 1004 (7th
Cir. 2020) (“What matters is whether she presented enough
evidence to allow the jury to find in her favor.”).
Consistent with Mitchell’s arguments, we evaluate the ev-
idence using both approaches. See Napier, 137 F.4th at 891
(“McDonnell Douglas is entirely consistent with our holding in
Ortiz, and it ‘remains an efficient way to organize, present and
assess evidence in discrimination cases.’” (quoting Reives v. Ill.
State Police, 29 F.4th 887, 892 (7th Cir. 2022))).

-- 13 of 23 --

14 No. 24-2823
A. McDonnell Douglas Framework
Neither party disputes that Mitchell satisfies the first and
third elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework. As a
woman she belongs to a protected class, and she suffered ad-
verse action when she was terminated from her employment.
In dispute are elements two and four. If on this record no rea-
sonable jury could find that Mitchell was similarly situated to
her chosen comparators, she cannot satisfy the fourth element
of the framework.
“To prevail by showing a similarly situated employee was
treated differently, a plaintiff must show the purported
comparator was ‘directly comparable to her in all material re-
spects’ so as to ‘eliminate other possible explanatory varia-
bles.’” Gamble v. County of Cook, 106 F.4th 622, 626 (7th Cir.
2024) (quoting Downing v. Abbott Lab’ys, 48 F.4th 793, 805 (7th
Cir. 2022)). The purpose of the “similarly situated inquiry is
to eliminate other possible explanatory variables, … [to] iso-
late the critical independent variable—discriminatory ani-
mus.” Smith v. City of Janesville, 40 F.4th 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2022)
(citation modified).
Mitchell identifies the two male lab technicians she
worked with at the Cicero lab—Pitts and Aguirre—as com-
parators. She contends they were similarly situated to her be-
cause they held the same title, worked in the same location,
responded to the same local manager (first to Hasberger and
then to Sanchez), and were assigned preliminary assessment
categories by the same three managers (Sanchez, Hayes, and
Muller). Despite these similarities, Mitchell maintains that
she was assigned to a lower final assessment category, which
would allow a jury to infer sex discrimination.

-- 14 of 23 --

No. 24-2823 15
But finding the appropriate employees who are similarly
situated to Mitchell is not so straightforward. ExxonMobil’s
annual performance assessment process uses a particular
method for comparing employees. It assigns employees to as-
sessment groups based on similar roles and with similar ex-
perience, even if employees have different job titles, report to
different supervisors, and work in different locations across
the country. One element of the company’s process is to des-
ignate newly hired employees with three or more years of rel-
evant experience before being hired full-time at ExxonMobil
as MAC employees.
Recall that Mitchell, a MAC employee, was assigned to a
group of other MAC employees with operational, clerical, and
administrative responsibilities. The employees included in
her assessment group were one woman, Davis, and two men,
Kwon and Palombo. Pitts and Aguirre, neither of whom were
MAC employees, were placed in different assessment groups.
Thus, under ExxonMobil’s assessment process, Mitchell, Pitts,
and Aguirre were not similarly situated employees.
Mitchell does not complain that ExxonMobil’s assessment
process is facially discriminatory. Nor does she take issue
with being categorized as a MAC employee, with the assess-
ment group assignment process, or with the three individuals
to whom she was compared. To Mitchell, the relative ranking
that takes place at the assessment group meeting is beside the
point. Rather, she contends discrimination occurred in the
steps her supervisors took leading up to that meeting.
1. Mitchell alleges process errors in her evaluation.
Mitchell first maintains that “key evidence” shows that as-
sessment rankings are not “finalized” during the assessment

-- 15 of 23 --

16 No. 24-2823
group meeting. She claims instead that preliminary assess-
ments by local supervisors, as much as their input during the
assessment group meeting, play a critical role in determining
final categories. As proof, Mitchell explains that her prelimi-
nary assessment category changed from a B to a D after
Hayes, Muller, and Sanchez discussed the need to assign that
category to one of the Cicero lab technicians. She relies on the
fact that her assessment category did not change at the final
assessment group meeting as proof that the preliminary pro-
cess was as important as the final group meeting, if not more
so.
This is unconvincing for two reasons. First, Mitchell can-
not point to any evidence showing that the final assessment
group meeting was a pretense. The fact that her preliminary
assessment category did not change does not discredit the as-
sessment process.
In any event, the evidence undermines Mitchell’s position.
The record shows that Hayes initially assigned category B to
each of Mitchell, Pitts, and Aguirre. Then, Muller changed the
category for Pitts to C. And, after further discussion among
and contemplation by supervisors, Hayes changed Mitchell’s
category to D. From this timeline, the performance assess-
ment process appears dynamic, involving supervisors at dif-
ferent levels in the hierarchy discussing the readily changing
rankings. This means that the preliminary assessment cate-
gory could have just as easily changed at the final assessment
meeting as it did in the preliminary assessment stage.
Second, Mitchell claims that preliminary ranks are deter-
minative of the final outcome because the categories did not
change for her preferred comparators—Pitts and Aguirre—or
her actual comparators—Davis, Kwon, and Palombo. The

-- 16 of 23 --

No. 24-2823 17
record does not support her argument, though. Pitts and
Aguirre were initially assigned categories C and B, respec-
tively, but evidence did not reveal their final assessment cate-
gories. Davis, Kwon, and Palombo each received a final as-
sessment category of B, yet their initial assessment categories
are not part of the record. Without more, there is no support
for Mitchell’s claim that preliminary categories did not
change for any of the comparable employees.
Mitchell also complains that in the preliminary assessment
stage, she was ranked relative to Pitts and Aguirre in violation
of the assessment process described in ExxonMobil’s manual.
That portion of the manual is vague as to what goes into the
preliminary assessment categorization. Supervisors are ex-
pected to discuss their perspectives on an employee’s perfor-
mance with the aid of the employee’s self-assessment and the
feedback of the employee’s colleagues. Inherent in a supervi-
sor’s analysis of an employee’s performance is a comparison
of the employee to his other direct reports. Hayes cannot be
expected to blind himself to the performance of other lab tech-
nicians in his assessment of Mitchell.
In any case, as already explained, Mitchell has not proved
that the final assessment meeting merely rubber-stamped her
preliminary category. So, even if some deviation from the
manual occurred in the preliminary assessment stage, Mitch-
ell has not established that she was prejudiced by it.
2. Mitchell’s alleged comparators are not similarly situated.
The district court was correct that Pitts and Aguirre are not
similarly situated to Mitchell—but not only because they
were assigned to different assessment groups. The court ex-
plained that, even assuming Pitts and Aguirre are proper

-- 17 of 23 --

18 No. 24-2823
comparators, Mitchell did not offer evidence from which to
draw a comparison relevant to the performance assessment
context.
To establish Pitts and Aguirre as proper comparators,
Mitchell would have to show that they were assessed unfa-
vorably in comparison to others in their assessment groups
but were not assigned lower categories than their assessment
group peers and were not placed in the Management of
Lower Relative Performance program (like Mitchell was).
Mitchell resists the probative value of this evidence. She coun-
ters that this requirement is “overly stringent,” especially as
she presented evidence that her supervisors “tainted the pro-
cess for her” with a low preliminary assessment.
The requirements for a prima facie case do vary by context
and are not subject to a “rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic” in-
ventory of facts. Ames, 145 S. Ct. at 1546. But the type of evi-
dence the district court said would be proper to make this
comparison is not overly stringent. The record does not con-
tain any evidence about the final assessment categories as-
signed to Pitts and Aguirre. Without any evidence about how
they compared in the annual assessment process, the district
court did not err when it concluded that Mitchell’s contention
that she was treated less favorably based on sex is “mere spec-
ulation.”
3. Mitchell cannot establish that ExxonMobil’s decision was
pretextual.
Even if we assume that Mitchell established a prima facie
case, her sex discrimination claim fails because ExxonMobil’s
proffered reason for termination—that her performance com-
pared poorly relative to others in her comparator group—is

-- 18 of 23 --

No. 24-2823 19
nondiscriminatory. The burden thus shifts back to Mitchell to
show that ExxonMobil’s proffered reason is pretextual. Stock-
well, 597 F.3d at 901. A pretext is “a lie, specifically a phony
reason for some action, not just faulty reasoning or mistaken
judgment.” Napier, 137 F.4th at 892 (citation modified). Mitch-
ell has also failed to meet that burden.
She argues that no evidence supports the rationale that
one of the Cicero lab technicians had to be placed in the D
category before being ranked in their peer assessment group.
In an email to his cluster of supervisors, though, Muller ex-
plained that ExxonMobil has a required distribution for rank-
ings and instructed the supervisors to keep that distribution
in mind when recommending preliminary assessment catego-
ries. This means that one or more employees in the cluster
would have to be ranked in the D category.
Why a Cicero lab technician had to receive that rank, and
how many other employees in the cluster received it, is not
part of the record. Yet answers to these questions would not
help Mitchell. Whether for business reasons or arbitrarily, a
business may decide to downsize a department without sub-
sequent judicial review. See Galvan v. Indiana, 117 F.4th 935,
939 (7th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he court ‘is not a super personnel de-
partment that second-guesses employers’ business judg-
ments.’” (quoting Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 570
(7th Cir. 2017))).
Mitchell also argues that the reasons articulated for her
termination were pretextual because there is no evidence that
her performance fell so short of her peers as to justify her cat-
egory D assignment. But Mitchell did not fare well in compar-
ison to the other three MAC employees in her assessment
group. Muller testified based on his observations of the

-- 19 of 23 --

20 No. 24-2823
assessment group meeting that the process was “competi-
tive.” The managers discussed how Davis, Kwon, and Pal-
ombo “tended to go ‘above and beyond’ in performing their
job responsibilities, while [Mitchell] did not.” Mitchell was
“simply not a ‘stand out’ in comparison to her peers.”
Apart from Muller’s testimony, Mitchell does not cite any
evidence to show that her performance was comparable to
that of the employees in her assessment group. The record
does not contain self-assessment summaries from the three
comparators to weigh against Mitchell’s accomplishments.
When interviewed, Mitchell admitted to not having met her
comparators, not having observed their job performance, not
knowing how their job performance compared to hers, and
not knowing what final assessment they received during the
previous annual review. True, there is also no evidence that
Mitchell performed poorly or had any negative reviews prior
to the assessment group meeting. Yet that meeting differenti-
ated the employees and ranked them according to their rela-
tive performances under ExxonMobil’s protocols. Mitchell
was ranked last in that unchallenged process.
Mitchell also argues that Sanchez has a history of discrim-
inating against women at the Cicero plant and that he dis-
played the same animus when ranking her performance at the
preliminary ranking stage. This argument too is unpersua-
sive. As already discussed, any purported evidence of
Sanchez’s discriminatory behavior against women at Cicero
comes from deposition testimony from a different case and is
thus inadmissible here. What is more, Mitchell’s deposition
testimony about Sanchez tells a different story:
Q: Did you ever have any negative interactions
with Mr. Sanchez?

-- 20 of 23 --

No. 24-2823 21
A: No.
Q: Did Mr. Sanchez ever do anything during
your ExxonMobil employment that caused you
to believe that he was biased against women in
some fashion?
A: No.
Q: Have you ever heard him make any deroga-
tory comments about women in any fashion?
A: No.
As for Sanchez’s involvement in the preliminary assess-
ment process, Hayes and Muller did ask for his input. Yet
there is no evidence that Sanchez responded to those emails
or provided his input in any way. Per the record, Sanchez be-
came involved in Mitchell’s assessment process in August
when Muller tasked him with filling in for Hayes and deliv-
ering the assessment results.
In sum, Mitchell fails to carry her burden of proving that
ExxonMobil’s proffered reason for her termination is pre-
textual. Other than the fact that she is a member of a protected
class, there is no evidence in the record from which a reason-
able juror could infer that she was terminated because of her
sex.
B. Ortiz’s Holistic Approach
Mitchell also invokes Ortiz’s holistic approach, pointing to
other ways in which she was treated less favorably than her
male counterparts. The totality of the evidence approach ar-
ticulated in Ortiz instructs us to ask whether Mitchell experi-
enced sex discrimination, “eschewing any framework or for-
mula.” Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 958 (citing Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765).

-- 21 of 23 --

22 No. 24-2823
She argues she presented sufficient evidence to establish a
pattern or practice of sex discrimination at the Cicero plant.
Pattern or practice claims require “showing that an employer
regularly and purposefully discriminates against a protected
group.” Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir.
2012) (quoting Council 31, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun.
Emps. v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 1992)). Mitchell must
prove that “discrimination ‘was the company’s standard op-
erating procedure—the regular rather than the unusual prac-
tice.’” Id. (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 336 (1977)).
Mitchell claims that four other female employees at the
Cicero plant—Amee Patel, Hasberger, Kathleen Collier, and
Margaret Jeziorski—were terminated around the time she
was. To Mitchell, this constitutes a pattern of Sanchez using
the Management of Lower Relative Performance program to
systematically remove female employees from Cicero.
Her contention fails in two ways. First, this evidence is in-
admissible. As described above, deposition testimony taken
in a different case from witnesses who were not disclosed in
this case prejudices the defendant and cannot be considered
here. Second, even if admissibility was not at issue, this evi-
dence does not advance Mitchell’s pattern or practice claim.
None of the female employees Mitchell discusses were di-
rectly supervised by Sanchez. And, even if he played a role in
their termination, there is no evidence that he had a meaning-
ful role in Mitchell’s assessment process.
The circumstances of these female employees also differed
from Mitchell’s. Patel and Hasberger were managerial, pro-
fessional, and technical employees, so they were subject to a
different performance assessment process. Patel chose to

-- 22 of 23 --

No. 24-2823 23
retire before participating in the assessment process. And Col-
lier was a contract employee, so she would not have been a
part of the company’s performance assessment process.
Mitchell has not offered evidence of a pattern or practice
of sex discrimination by ExxonMobil. The district court cor-
rectly concluded that Mitchell’s pattern or practice claim
“boils down to her assertion that ‘several’ women in various
positions at the Cicero plant were ‘let go by Sanchez through
the [Management of Lower Relative Performance] process.’”
But this assertion, without context and “at this high level of
generality,” is not actionable.
IV. Conclusion
Mitchell fails to present sufficient facts to support an infer-
ence of sex discrimination. We agree with the district court
that no reasonable jury could find that ExxonMobil subjected
Mitchell to sex discrimination. Mitchell’s Title VII discrimina-
tion claim thus fails under both the McDonnell Douglas bur-
den-shifting framework and Ortiz’s holistic approach. We
therefore A FFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment to ExxonMobil.

-- 23 of 23 --