Mohamed A. Dida v. Christel Crow

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 24, 2025*
Decided July 24, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1793
MOHAMED A. DIDA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHRISTEL CROW,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 3:24-cv-00131-GCS
Gilbert C. Sison,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
While incarcerated at Big Muddy River Correctional Center in Ina, Illinois,
Mohamed Dida sued the prison’s warden in her official capacity, seeking an injunction
requiring accommodation of his religious diet under the First Amendment and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. A magistrate
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1793 Page 2
judge, presiding with the parties’ consent, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), denied Dida’s motion
for a preliminary injunction, and Dida filed this interlocutory appeal. See id. § 1292(a)(1).
In April 2025, while the appeal was pending, Dida finished his prison term and began
his term of supervised release. Then in May, the district court dismissed the suit for
failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) and entered final
judgment. Because Dida is no longer in prison and the case has been finally resolved,
his interlocutory appeal is moot, and we dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction without
addressing his arguments. See Medlock v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 683 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir.
2012).
Dida’s appeal is moot for two independent reasons. First, his release from prison
renders his claim for injunctive relief moot. See Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 451
(7th Cir. 2012). When Dida was released, he stopped receiving meals from Big Muddy
staff. We will not presume that he will be reincarcerated, let alone at Big Muddy
specifically, so the warden no longer poses any threat that Dida could ask the courts to
enjoin. See Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2009).
Second, this appeal specifically concerns the denial of a preliminary injunction,
but the district court has since dismissed the underlying case for failure to prosecute.
This dismissal amounts to a final judgment. Barr v. Bd. of Trs. of W. Ill. Univ., 796 F.3d
837, 840 (7th Cir. 2015). Because a preliminary injunction lasts at the latest until a final
judgment, there is no relief that we could provide in this appeal even if the district court
erred in refusing the injunction, and so the appeal is moot. See Auto Driveaway Franchise
Sys., LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2019). To
whatever extent Dida might still be able to obtain some relief on his claims, any further
review must be sought through an appeal from the final judgment, though Dida has not
yet filed one.
Because Dida’s appeal is moot, we lack jurisdiction to review his arguments and
the appeal must be DISMISSED.

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