Alex Kedas v. Illinois Department of Transportation

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-2775
A LEX K EDAS ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
I LLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois
No. 19-cv-02113 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2023 — DECIDED A UGUST 11, 2025
____________________
Before HAMILTON , K IRSCH , and PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
PRYOR , Circuit Judge. Alex Kedas sued his employer, the Il-
linois Department of Transportation (IDOT), under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging retaliation after he
complained about gender discrimination in the workplace.
IDOT filed a motion for summary judgment, which the dis-
trict court granted in part, with Kedas’s remaining claims pro-
ceeding to trial. The jury found Kedas had successfully
demonstrated that IDOT had engaged in retaliatory behavior

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2 No. 22-2775
but chose to award him no monetary award because he had
not suffered any mental or emotional pain. Kedas appeals,
challenging only the district court’s grant of partial summary
judgment, which limited the types of alleged adverse employ-
ment actions Kedas could present at trial. For the reasons dis-
cussed below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
“Because [Kedas] appeals from a grant of summary judg-
ment, we must view the evidence in the light reasonably most
favorable to him, as the non-moving party, and we must give
him the benefit of conflicts in the evidence.” Freelain v. Vill. of
Oak Park, 888 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 2018).
A. Kedas’s Employment History
Kedas worked with the Illinois Department of Transpor-
tation from 1990 to 2021—over thirty years. He held various
titles over that time, including Inspector, Assistant Resident
Engineer, and Senior Resident Engineer. For the majority of
that time, from April 1998 until his resignation in March 2021,
Kedas worked as a senior resident engineer.
IDOT required senior resident engineers to have extensive
engineering knowledge and practical construction experi-
ence. As a senior resident engineer, Kedas was responsible for
supervising field activities for complex highway projects
within IDOT District 5, which is comprised of seven counties
in Central Illinois and located in IDOT Region 3. Until May
2018, IDOT assigned senior resident engineers construction
projects valued between $2 million and $20 million.
Over his career, Kedas reported to various supervisors:
Michael Carnahan, from March 2008 until December 2014; Jim
Crawford, from December 2014 until March 2016; and Jason

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No. 22-2775 3
Smith, from March 2016 until March 2021, when Kedas re-
signed. At the time of Kedas’s resignation, District 5 was over-
seen by Project Implementation Engineer Kenneth Crawford,
who reported directly to Region 3 Engineer Kensil Garnett.
Prior to his resignation from IDOT, Kedas had developed
a unique working relationship with both his direct supervi-
sors and management. Kedas was known for “habitually”
questioning decisions made by supervisors including job as-
signments. Kedas’s behavior was so pervasive that in 2014,
Garnett ordered Kedas to undergo a “fitness to work” evalu-
ation. Though Kedas was found fit to continuing working for
IDOT, this behavior continued when Smith became Kedas’s
supervisor.
In February 2016, Kedas took issue with a job assignment
that Carnahan, his previous supervisor, had given to Andrea
Childers, a resident technician, also in District 5. Unlike senior
resident engineers, IDOT did not require resident technicians
to have an engineering background. Also, IDOT limited their
technicians to highway improvement projects ranging in
value from $200,000 to $30 million. Kedas believed that he
was more qualified than Childers but that she was receiving
better assignments. Kedas expressed his concerns to Project
Implementation Engineer Crawford. He also expressed his
belief that Carnahan was favoring Childers because of her
gender. In April 2016, having not received a proper response
to his complaints of discrimination, Kedas reported these
same concerns to Tim Morris, an attorney with IDOT’s Chief
Counsel and Chief Ethics Office.
This time, Kedas’s concerns were addressed by IDOT Re-
gion 3 Engineer Garnett. On June 1, 2016, Garnett sent Kedas
a memorandum explaining that Kedas’s April 2016 complaint

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4 No. 22-2775
regarding the alleged Carnahan–Childers relationship was in-
appropriate, and that further counseling would be forthcom-
ing. Garnett also notified Kedas that the memorandum, alt-
hough not a disciplinary action, would be attached to Kedas’s
upcoming performance evaluation.
A man of his word, Garnett attached the memorandum to
Kedas’s June 2016 performance review. Kedas scored high in
various categories, but his supervisors marked him at 1 out of
5 for his ability to accept supervision and his ability to support
personnel and resolve conflicts. Overall, Kedas’s performance
rating was 76%, placing him below the threshold marker for
receiving a yearly merit-based bonus.1 Kedas did not receive
any merit-based bonuses between 2016 and 2019.
B. Kedas’s Job Assignments in 2017 and 2018
Despite his poor evaluation, in 2017, IDOT assigned Kedas
a construction project valued at $14.3 million––the largest and
most complex job in the Department at the time. While work-
ing on this project, Kedas approved $100,000 for patching
work, an amount exceeding Kedas’s $20,000 spending limit.
Kedas chose to disregard his supervisors’ spending re-
striction because he believed they had erred in their allocation
of funds.
In response, the following year, Kedas’s supervisors de-
cided to severely limit his construction assignments without
any explanation. Upon receiving his assignments for the 2018
construction year in February 2018, Kedas realized that his
1 The counseling memorandum also explained that the agreement be-
tween Kedas’s union and IDOT indicated that any discipline would follow
a progression beginning with an oral reprimand and extending to a writ-
ten reprimand, suspension, and potential discharge.

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No. 22-2775 5
assigned projects fell below the $2 million floor authorized for
senior resident engineers. Childers, on the other hand, had
been assigned a $15 million construction project. Kedas
viewed this as retaliation for his complaints of discrimination.
Upon raising this concern, Kedas received another memo-
randum from Region 3 Engineer Garnett on March 21, 2018.
The notice required Kedas to attend a pre-disciplinary meet-
ing to discuss his alleged insubordination, disruptive con-
duct, and failure to follow process. After receiving no re-
sponse from IDOT’s Chief Legal Counsel’s Office and Chief
Ethics Office, Kedas, on April 11, 2018, filed a complaint with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging
gender discrimination. After receiving his right-to-sue letter,
Kedas filed this action in federal court alleging retaliation.
Shortly after, in May 2018, IDOT “clarifi[ed]” the project value
of job assignments for senior resident engineers would vary.
Later that same year, Smith, Kedas’s supervisor, requested
that Kedas be reassigned to a different district because Kedas
had become “unsuperviseable [sic] in his current state.” Smith
stated “the cancer” was spreading to other employees in the
district.
Finding the work environment detrimental to his health
and welfare, Kedas resigned from IDOT in March 2021.
C. Procedural History
On April 30, 2019, Kedas filed this suit against IDOT
bringing a claim of retaliation for reporting gender discrimi-
nation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In his later amended complaint,
Kedas alleged various adverse actions that IDOT engaged in
following his April 2016 email complaint. These actions

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6 No. 22-2775
included retaliatory disciplinary sanctions, poor performance
appraisals, false claims of insubordination, and constructive
discharge. According to Kedas, all of this led him to being
constructively discharged from IDOT.
IDOT filed a motion for summary judgment, which was
later granted in part by the district court. The judge found
Kedas’s June 2016 counseling memorandum; June 2016 nega-
tive performance evaluation and denial of merit-based bonus;
and February 2018 assignment of projects below the $2 mil-
lion threshold constituted materially adverse employment ac-
tions, but the remaining actions by IDOT did not. Next, the
court analyzed whether Kedas was able to demonstrate a
“causal link” between his protected activity in April 2016 and
the identified materially adverse employment actions. Find-
ing no link between Kedas’s protected activity in April 2016
and IDOT’s decision to assign him projects in February 2018
totaling less than $2 million, the district court granted IDOT
summary judgment in part. But because Kedas provided suf-
ficient evidence for a reasonable jury to infer a causal link be-
tween the April 2016 report and the June 2016 counseling
memorandum and poor performance review, the district
court permitted these adverse employment actions to proceed
to trial.
At trial, the jury concluded that Kedas had successfully
demonstrated that IDOT retaliated against him for filing his
April 2016 gender discrimination complaint by issuing the
June 2016 disciplinary counseling memorandum. On Kedas’s
claim that his June 2016 performance evaluation was down-
graded in retaliation for his complaint of gender discrimina-
tion, the jury found in favor of IDOT and against Kedas. Find-
ing Kedas had not suffered any mental or emotional pain as a

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No. 22-2775 7
result of retaliation, the jury did not award Kedas any mone-
tary compensation.
Kedas now appeals, challenging only two of the district
court’s summary judgment determinations. First, Kedas
maintains that the district court erred in determining that he
had not presented sufficient evidence of constructive dis-
charge. He also finds fault in the district judge’s conclusion
that a reasonable jury could not find a causal connection be-
tween the February 2018 job assignments and Kedas’s April
2016 email complaint.
II. A NALYSIS
On appeal, Kedas argues that the district court prevented
him from demonstrating to the jury IDOT’s allegedly contin-
ual pattern of retaliation. “We review de novo a district
court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Finite
Res., Ltd. v. DTE Methane Res., LLC, 44 F.4th 680, 683 (7th Cir.
2022). Summary judgment is proper when the moving party
shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Equal Emp.
Opportunity Comm'n v. Vill. At Hamilton Pointe LLC, 102 F.4th
387, 400 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing F ED R. C IV. P. 56(a)).
A. Retaliation in the Form of Constructive Discharge
Kedas maintains that the district court erred in finding he
had failed to demonstrate that IDOT constructively dis-
charged him in retaliation for his complaints of gender dis-
crimination. Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating
against employees for complaining about unlawful employ-
ment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Burlington Northern
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006). To survive
summary judgment under this theory of retaliation, Kedas

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8 No. 22-2775
needed to offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could
find that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2)
he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3)
there’s a causal connection between the two. Alley v. Penguin
Random House, 62 F.4th 358, 361 (7th Cir. 2023).
The first element is not disputed. The parties do not con-
test that Kedas engaged in protected activity under Title VII
by raising concerns of gender discrimination in April 2016 at
IDOT.2 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 473 (7th Cir.
2011). Also, there’s no disagreement, looking to the second el-
ement, that constructive discharge constitutes an adverse em-
ployment action. Fischer v. Avanade, Inc., 519 F.3d 393, 408-09
(7th Cir. 2008) (citing EEOC v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 276 F.3d
326, 331 (7th Cir. 2002)). IDOT disputes, however, Kedas’s as-
sertion that he was constructively discharged in March 2021.
An employee is constructively discharged when, from the
standpoint of a reasonable employee, the working conditions
become unbearable. Wright v. Ill. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs.,
798 F.3d 513, 527 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Chapin v. Fort-Rohr Mo-
tors, Inc., 621 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2010)). We have recog-
nized two types of constructive discharge. Fields v. Bd. of Educ.
of City of Chi., 928 F.3d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2019). Under the first
form, the employee resigns because of discriminatory “work-
ing conditions even more egregious than that required for a
hostile work environment claim.” Id. The second form of con-
structive discharge “occurs when an employer acts in a man-
ner that would make clear to a reasonable employee that [he]
will be immediately fired if [he] does not resign.” Id.
2 Here, Kedas does not assert that any of his other activities qualified as
protected activity.

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No. 22-2775 9
Under either approach, Kedas fails to establish construc-
tive discharge. Kedas argues that several subsequent ac-
tions—his being stripped of job duties, labeled a “cancer,” re-
peatedly disciplined “for no reason,” and having his job de-
scription altered—demonstrate that he was constructively
discharged by IDOT for reporting discrimination in April
2016. These actions do not collectively demonstrate an egre-
gious discriminatory work environment or that the “axe was
about to fall” for Kedas. Fischer, 519 F.3d at 409.
First, Kedas has not reported any threats of violence or any
form of harassment so severe that it created a work environ-
ment more egregious than a hostile work environment. We
recognize that Kedas’s supervisor referred to him as a work-
place “cancer,” but this comment was never communicated to
Kedas while he worked at IDOT and was shared privately
amongst the supervisors. Because Kedas’s argument fails to
capture this context, it cannot support his allegation that he
felt mistreated by his supervisors. Smith explained that
Kedas’s overall insubordination and questioning of assign-
ments had begun to affect the team, and he suggested that
Kedas be transferred to a different supervisor. See Chapin, 621
F.3d at 678 (explaining the test of whether an act is retaliatory
is objective and that context matters). Kedas is also unable to
show that IDOT acted in a way that made clear that Kedas
was going to be fired if he did not immediately resign. See
Fields, 928 F.3d at 625. We have found conduct fits in this cat-
egory when, for example, the employee returns to their office
to find their belongings packed up and the office being used
as storage. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 276 F.3d at 332. On these facts,
we cannot agree with Kedas that his termination was immi-
nent.

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10 No. 22-2775
We conclude that no reasonable employee in Kedas’s po-
sition would believe the workplace was objectively intolera-
ble. True, Kedas faced disciplinary actions, but they were not
unfounded: the record shows that Kedas continuously re-
fused supervision and faced consequences to which he did
not respond. That Kedas refused to heed management’s
warnings that he needed to improve and faced continuous
reprimand did not make his working conditions objectively
intolerable––IDOT could, and indeed did, “hope that criti-
cism w[ould] lead to better performance by [Kedas].” Fields,
928 F.3d at 626. Though Kedas argues that he resigned due to
stress and health problems on the advice of his doctor, he has
shown no evidence that “a reasonable person would have felt
compelled to retire or quit.” Id.
At oral argument, counsel for Kedas conceded that our cir-
cuit’s case law required more than the evidence Kedas pre-
sented. (Oral Argument at 10:25–31). Without evidence that a
reasonable person in Kedas’s position would believe he suf-
fered an objectively intolerable work environment, or that his
termination was imminent, no reasonable jury could have
concluded that IDOT constructively discharged Kedas. The
district court did not err in concluding Kedas’s retaliation
claim in the form of constructive discharge under Title VII
fails.
B. Retaliatory Job Assignments in 2018
Kedas also contests the district court's grant of partial
summary judgment on his retaliation claim regarding the
February job assignments in 2018. Specifically, Kedas argues
the district court erred in finding, at summary judgment, no
casual connection between his April 2016 email complaints
and IDOT’s assignment of jobs below $2 million in February

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No. 22-2775 11
2018. Recall to survive summary judgment on his Title VII re-
taliation claim, Kedas must be able to show that (1) he en-
gaged in an activity protected by the statute; (2) he suffered
an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link
between the protected activity and the adverse action. Ander-
son v. Street, 104 F.4th 646, 654 (7th Cir. 2024). For the reasons
we explain below, this theory of retaliation fails at causation.
To demonstrate causation in the retaliation context, Kedas
must be able to show that the protected activity was a “but
for” cause for the adverse action, meaning “the adverse action
would not have happened without the activity.” Johnson v. Ac-
centure LLP, 142 F.4th 536, 543 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Carlson
v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 828 n.1 (7th Cir. 2014)). This
may be established using direct or circumstantial evidence,
including “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements of ani-
mus, evidence other employees were treated differently, or
evidence the employer's proffered reason for the adverse ac-
tion was pretextual.” Adebiyi v. S. Suburban Coll., 98 F.4th 886,
892 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Rozumalski v. W.F. Baird & Assocs.,
Ltd., 937 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 2019). The key question is
whether Kedas presented sufficient evidence to support an in-
ference that his protected activity caused IDOT’s adverse ac-
tion. See Igasaki v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948,
959 (7th Cir. 2021).
Based on this record, Kedas maintains that a reasonable
jury could infer retaliation based on “suspicious timing and
other facts.” In his appellate brief, Kedas highlights the timing
between his April 2016 email complaints and IDOT’s April
2016 disciplinary action and June 2016 performance evalua-
tion. The problem with Kedas’s argument, however, is that he
fails to link these decisions to IDOT’s decision to assign Kedas

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12 No. 22-2775
low-value projects in February 2018. The lack of a temporal
proximity between the April 2016 events and the February
2018 decision also undercuts this argument. See Paluck v.
Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1009–10 (7th Cir. 2000) (tim-
ing of the adverse action is suspicious when it occurs “fairly
soon after the employee’s protected expression”); cf. Malin v.
Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 559 (7th Cir. 2014).
Next, Kedas asks us to consider IDOT’s decision in May
2018 to remove the requirement that senior resident engineers
receive the most consequential projects and his supervisor’s
comments that he was a “cancer” as sufficient evidence for a
jury to find retaliation, but the record demonstrates other-
wise. In 2017, Kedas was assigned some of the most high-
value projects within IDOT. During that year, however,
Kedas was disciplined for his complete disregard of his su-
pervisor’s instructions on how to manage those projects, rep-
rimanded for his continuous refusal to follow IDOT policy,
and counseled on his inability to work with various contrac-
tors. These intervening events remain uncontradicted by
Kedas, and he has not offered any evidence to undermine
IDOT’s assertions that these were the honest reasons for
Kedas’s job assignments in February 2018.
Lastly, Kedas relies on the comment made by his supervi-
sor that Kedas was a “cancer” and IDOT’s decision to modify
his job description in May 2018 as evidence of IDOT’s im-
proper motive in this case. Kedas fails to demonstrate how
these later actions show cause or evidence of pretext with re-
spect to IDOT’s decision in February 2018 to assign Kedas
low-value projects. Poullard v. McDonald, 829 F.3d 844, 857
(7th Cir. 2016). Viewing the evidence as a whole, we find
Kedas failed to present sufficient evidence of a casual chain

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No. 22-2775 13
between his protected activity and the adverse employment
action, thus his retaliation theory regarding his February 2018
job assignments also fails.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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