United States of America v. Christopher Harris

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 29, 2025
Decided September 30, 2025
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2656
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 18-CR-30023-001
Colleen R. Lawless,
Judge.
O R D E R
Christopher Harris pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine
and was sentenced to 180 months in prison. He appeals, but his appointed counsel
asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief details the nature of the case and discusses
issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because counsel’s
analysis appears thorough, and Harris did not respond to the motion, see C IR . R. 51(b),
we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey,
748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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In January 2017, Harris conspired with others to transport drugs from Arizona to
Illinois. As part of the planning, he twice met in central Illinois with the intended
driver, Angelica Perez. He then flew to Arizona, where he met Perez and provided her
with methamphetamine and cocaine. On her return to Illinois, Perez was stopped by
police, who located the drugs in her car.
Perez later identified Harris as a member of the conspiracy. Perez, who had since
been indicted on drug trafficking charges, made the identification in September 2017
from a single photo. In May 2018, Harris was indicted in the Central District of Illinois
for conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount of methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), 846.
He was arrested six months later.
After the district court denied a series of pretrial motions, Harris entered a
conditional guilty plea that reserved his right to appeal those rulings. See FED. R. C RIM.
P. 11(a)(2). The district court adopted the presentence investigation report’s
recommended guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. The court then
weighed the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and sentenced Harris to a
below-guidelines sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised
release.
1. Pretrial Motions
a. Santiago Proffer
In his Anders brief, counsel first considers challenging the rulings on certain
pretrial motions Harris had filed. Counsel begins with Harris’s motion to compel
disclosure of co-conspirator statements that the government intended to introduce (a
“Santiago proffer,” see United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1130–31 (7th Cir. 1978),
overruled on other grounds by Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)). The court
granted the motion in part, directing the parties to propose a deadline for the Santiago
proffer, but resolution of the matter was delayed by continuances that Harris requested.
Counsel correctly concludes that any challenge to the court’s ruling would be frivolous.
A decision to admit co-conspirator statements is conditional and may be revisited as
late as the trial, see United States v. Davis, 845 F.3d 282, 286–87 (7th Cir. 2016), so we
would not find any error in the court delaying its decision before trial.

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No. 24-2656 Page 3
b. Dual Role Witnesses
Counsel is likewise correct that there is no basis to challenge the denial of
Harris’s motion to compel disclosure of any “dual-role” witnesses—for instance, a law
enforcement officer who offered both lay and expert testimony. See, e.g., United States v.
Jett, 908 F.3d 252, 267 (7th Cir. 2018). Because the government said that it did not intend
to call such witnesses, the district court denied the motion as moot, a conclusion we
would uphold.
c. Venue Motions
Counsel next concludes, correctly, that Harris could not challenge the court’s
denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment based on improper venue. Harris had
argued that he should be tried in the District of Arizona because most of the acts
involved in the alleged conspiracy occurred there. The court denied the motion on
grounds that significant acts allegedly occurred in the Central District of Illinois. We
would agree that venue was proper in that district because the government alleged that
Harris was in Quincy, Illinois—in the Central District of Illinois—when he agreed with
Perez to traffic drugs. See United States v. Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th 915, 928 (7th Cir.
2022).
Counsel is likewise correct that it would be frivolous for Harris to appeal the
denial of his motion to transfer venue for reasons of convenience, FED. R. C RIM. P. 21(b).
Even though Harris lived in Arizona, the district court denied this motion because most
of the witnesses lived in or near the Central District of Illinois. This was a determination
well within the court’s discretion, see United States v. Jordan, 223 F.3d 676, 685–86
(7th Cir. 2000), since the court took into account the relevant factors set forth in Platt v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 243–44 (1964).
d. Motion to Suppress
Counsel also considers whether Harris could plausibly challenge the court’s
denial of his motion to suppress Perez’s statement of identification. Harris had argued
that the identification was unduly suggestive because police obtained it by showing
Perez a single photograph rather than a photo lineup. But as the district court noted,
regardless of whether the procedure was unduly suggestive, an identification is
admissible if it was otherwise reliable—a determination a court makes after considering
factors that include “the witness’s opportunity to view the defendant during the crime.”
United States v. Edwards, 34 F.4th 570, 581–82 (7th Cir. 2022). Because Perez had met

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Harris on several occasions for significant periods of time, we would uphold the court’s
conclusion that the identification was sufficiently reliable.
e. Speedy Trial Motion
Counsel next considers challenging the court’s denial of Harris’s motion to
dismiss based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Harris
argued that the government did not indict him until a year after it had indicted his
co-conspirators—at which point it did not arrest him for another six months. The court
denied the motion because Harris had no right to a speedy trial before being charged,
and the delay after the indictment was not prejudicial. But counsel is correct that a
challenge based on the pre-indictment delay would be frivolous because the Sixth
Amendment does not require the government to wrap up its investigation quickly and
bring charges. United States v. Richardson, 780 F.3d 812, 813 (7th Cir. 2015).
As for the six-month delay between Harris’s indictment and arrest, no case
establishes that a six-month delay is presumptively prejudicial, see, e.g., Blake v. United
States, 723 F.3d 870, 887 n.16 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting intra-circuit split on whether
eight-month delay is presumptively prejudicial). And because the law is unsettled, any
error could not be plain. See United States v. Pemberton, 85 F.4th 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2023).
2. Guilty Plea
Counsel next informs us that he advised Harris about the risks and benefits of
challenging the guilty plea and determined that Harris does not seek to withdraw the
plea. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). Counsel therefore
properly omits discussion of whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. See United
States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024).
3. Sentencing
Counsel then concludes, correctly, that any procedural challenges to the sentence
would be frivolous. By agreeing that the guidelines calculations were accurate, Harris
waived his right to challenge them. See United States v. Fuentes, 858 F.3d 1119, 1121 (7th
Cir. 2017). Further, the sentence does not exceed the maximum under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A). And when imposing the sentence, the court adequately considered the
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007).
Finally, we agree with counsel that it would be frivolous for Harris to challenge
the substantive reasonableness of his below-guidelines, 180 months’ sentence. A

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below-guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable, see United States v. Oregon,
58 F.4th 298, 302 (7th Cir. 2023), and Harris could not plausibly rebut that presumption.
The district court reasonably weighed the sentencing factors under § 3553(a), balancing
the need to deter a repeat offender against Harris’s non-violent criminal record,
traumatic childhood, and desire for rehabilitation.
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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