United States of America v. Arthur Runnels

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued September 30, 2025
Decided October 17, 2025
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
Nos. 24-2560 & 24-2561
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ARTHUR RUNNELS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United
States District Court for
the Southern District of Illinois.
Nos. 3:05-cr-30184-DWD-1
3:23-cr-30136-DWD-1
David W. Dugan,
Judge.
O R D E R
In 2023, federal authorities arrested Arthur Runnels for possessing and distributing
cocaine and possessing a firearm as a felon. The arrest occurred while Runnels was on
supervised release. In a consolidated hearing, the district court sentenced him to
90 months’ imprisonment for those new offenses and to a consecutive term of 57 months
for violating his supervised release conditions. On appeal, Runnels argues that the district
court failed to adequately justify the 90-month sentence, which was above the advisory
range of the Sentencing Guidelines, and, in his view, also substantively unreasonable.
Seeing no error, we affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Nos. 24-2560 & 24-2561 Page 2
I
In 2023, as part of a Drug Enforcement Agency investigation, federal authorities
arrested Runnels while he was out of prison on supervised release. Officers found
ammunition, a handgun, 746 grams of cocaine, and a digital scale with cocaine residue in
the home he shared with his fiancée and their young child. A federal grand jury indicted
Runnels with two counts of distributing cocaine, one count of possessing with intent to
distribute cocaine, and one count of possessing a firearm as a felon. Runnels pleaded
guilty to the charges.
A probation officer then prepared a Presentence Investigation Report. The PSR’s
analysis yielded a guidelines range of 57–71 months. Because the statutory minimum
sentence of 60 months for his cocaine conviction was greater than the minimum of the
applicable guidelines ranges, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), the PSR set Runnels’s
advisory guidelines range at 60–71 months.
At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSR, including its 60–71 month advisory
guidelines range. After hearing the arguments of both sides and Runnels’s own
allocution, the district court turned to the sentencing factors, weighing Runnels’s history
and characteristics, the seriousness of the offense, deterrence, and respect for the law.
The district court concluded that the advisory range did not adequately account for
Runnels’s criminal history. The district court explained that Runnels’s older convictions
fell outside the guidelines calculation because they “aged out” while he was in prison
and did not necessarily reflect rehabilitation. The district court sentenced Runnels to 57
months for violating the terms of his supervised release. The district court then sentenced
Runnels to 90 months on each of the four criminal counts to run concurrently with each
other and consecutively to the 57-month revocation sentence.
II
Runnels appeals both sentences, but his brief addresses only the 90-month sentence
for his new convictions. So we focus our analysis only on that sentence.
We first review a district court’s sentencing determination for procedural error,
including any failure to calculate the guidelines range or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence. Here, the district court correctly calculated the advisory guideline range,
see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007), and Runnels does not argue to the
contrary. He contends, instead, that the district court failed to explain its reasoning for
imposing an above-guidelines sentence.

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Nos. 24-2560 & 24-2561 Page 3
A district court may impose an above-guidelines sentence if the court considers the
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Snyder, 635 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir.
2011). Here, the district court explained its application of the § 3553(a) factors, connecting
four of them to Runnels’s criminal history, the seriousness of the offense, and other
aggravating factors. Additionally, the court explained why the advisory range of 60–71
months did not adequately account for Runnels’s lack of rehabilitation, ultimately
determining that a longer sentence was needed to deter future misconduct. The district
court offered an adequate explanation for the chosen sentence, thereby committing no
procedural error.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion,
considering whether the district judge imposed a sentence for logical reasons consistent
with the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Campbell, 37 F.4th 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 2022).
The district court did so here. The factors the court considered, including Runnels’s
repeated offenses, the seriousness of being a “career criminal,” and the circumstances
surrounding his conviction—especially the fact that there was a toddler within the home
where authorities found the cocaine and a gun—are logically connected to and consistent
with the § 3553(a) factors.
The district court also explained that the advisory range did not adequately account
for Runnels’s prior criminal convictions because, although some of them were old or were
misdemeanors, discounting a large number of convictions underrepresented his actual
criminal history. In its final analysis, the district court concluded that a within-guidelines
sentence would not reflect the seriousness of the crime, adequately deter Runnels, or
protect the public. See United States v. Bridgewater, 950 F.3d 928, 936–38 (7th Cir. 2020).
The district court’s justifications were proportionate to the degree of variance from the
guideline range, and therefore sufficient to support the reasonableness of the above-
guidelines sentence. See United States v. Wood, 31 F.4th 593, 600 (7th Cir. 2022).
Runnels maintains that the court undervalued his potential for rehabilitation. Here,
too, we disagree, as the district court has broad discretion to weigh both aggravating and
mitigating factors. See United States v. Cook, 108 F.4th 574, 586 (7th Cir. 2024). His
disagreement with how the district court balanced these factors does not make a sentence
substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Hatch, 909 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2018).
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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